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SUMMARY
As wireless networks continue to flourish worldwide and play an increasingly promi-
nent role, it has become crucial to provide effective solutions to the inherent security issues
associated with a wireless transmission medium. Unlike traditional solutions, which usually
handle security at the application layer, the primary concern of this thesis is to analyze and
develop solutions based on coding techniques at the physical layer.
First, an information-theoretically secure communication protocol for quasi-static fading
channels was developed and its performance with respect to theoretical limits was analyzed.
A key element of the protocol is a reconciliation scheme for secret-key agreement based
on low-density parity-check codes, which is specifically designed to operate on non-binary
random variables and offers high reconciliation efficiency.
Second, the fundamental trade-offs between cooperation and security were analyzed
by investigating the transmission of confidential messages to cooperative relays. This
information-theoretic study highlighted the importance of jamming as a means to increase
secrecy and confirmed the importance of carefully chosen relaying strategies.
Third, other applications of physical-layer security were investigated. Specifically, the
use of secret-key agreement techniques for alternative cryptographic purposes was analyzed,
and a framework for the design of practical information-theoretic commitment protocols over
noisy channels was proposed.
Finally, the benefit of using physical-layer coding techniques beyond the physical layer
was illustrated by studying security issues in client-server networks. A coding scheme
exploiting packet losses at the network layer was proposed to ensure reliable communication




The advent and success of the Internet, together with the large-scale deployment of wireless
networks, now allows ubiquitous access to communication networks; however, the pervasive
access to online services often comes at the expense of security. For instance, the broad-
cast nature of wireless communications makes them particularly sensitive to eavesdropping.
Given our increased dependency on network services, the interception and malicious use of
data could have a tremendous societal cost, and consequently, there is an increasing need
for secure communication solutions. Unlike traditional approaches, which handle security
at the application layer, physical-layer security aims at developing effective secure com-
munication schemes exploiting the properties of the physical layer. As we discuss in this
dissertation, this new paradigm has the potential of strengthening the security of existing
systems by introducing a level of information-theoretic security, now widely accepted as a
stronger notion than computational security.
1.1 Motivating example: security issues in wireless communications
In addition to standard security issues, wireless systems face very specific security vulner-
abilities caused by the inherent openness of wireless media. First, wireless channels are
susceptible to channel jamming. An attacker can easily jam physical communication chan-
nels and prevent legitimate users from accessing a network. This threat is all the more
difficult to counter as it aims at disrupting traffic and not intercepting information. Sec-
ond, without proper authentication mechanisms, an attacker can gain unauthorized access
to network resources and bypass security infrastructures such as firewalls. Finally, because
of the open nature of wireless media, eavesdropping can be performed without resorting to
advanced technological devices. In principle, even legitimate users in a network could be
regarded as potential eavesdroppers.
Solutions for the aforementioned security issues have been engineered using a layered
approach. Historically, this approach has been used to simplify the design of communication
1
protocols – with little consideration for security. Figure 1 illustrates the various layers con-
sidered in a typical wireless communication protocol, and indicates their specific purposes.
For instance, channel coding is implemented at the Physical (PHY) layer, which ensures
that all above layers operate essentially on error-free information, and admission control
is handled at the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer. Although the design of modern
communication protocols does not follow a strict layered approach and considers cross-layer






















Figure 1. Layered protocol architecture.
As examples of layer-specific security solutions, spread-spectrum modulation techniques
are used at the PHY layer to mitigate channel jamming, authentication mechanisms are
implemented at the Link layer to prevent unauthorized access, and message encryption is
performed at the Application layer to render eavesdropping useless. One can notice that
channel jamming and unauthorized access, which are vulnerabilities at the PHY layer and
Link layer, respectively, are handled by security solutions at their respective layers; however,
eavesdropping, which is also a PHY layer vulnerability, is currently handled by a solution
2
at the application layer. One can naturally ask whether ignoring the physical phenomena
occurring at the PHY layer is appropriate, and whether there exist security solutions against
eavesdropping at the PHY layer.
1.2 Physical-layer security
To illustrate the general concept of physical layer security, consider the example of a three-
node wireless network in Figure 2 where the communication between terminals T1 and T2 is
being eavesdropped by an unauthorized terminal T3. The communication channel between
the legitimate users is called the main channel, whereas the communication channel between






Figure 2. Illustration of eavesdropping scenario in wireless network.
When terminals T2 and T3 are not collocated, radiofrequency signals observed at the
outputs of the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel are usually different. Natural dis-
crepancies are caused by physical phenomena, and for wireless communications, the most
notable effects are fading and path-loss. Fading is a self-interference phenomenon that re-
sults from the multi-path propagation of radiofrequency waves while path-loss is simply
the attenuation of wave amplitude with distance. As a consequence of these effects, if the
transmission distance over the main channel is much smaller than the transmission distance
over the eavesdropper’s channel, one can expect the detection of signals at terminal T3 to be
much harder than at terminal T2. For instance, if T1 broadcasts a video stream, the signal
obtained by T3 is significantly degraded compared to the one received by T2; this degrada-
tion can even prevent T3 from understanding the content of the video stream. Presently,
security solutions against eavesdropping totally disregard these effects and operate as if the
3
eavesdropper detected the same signal as the legitimate receiver. In contrast, the key idea
of physical-layer security is to explicitly take into account differences at the PHY layer to
better protect the messages exchanged over the main channel.
As we detail in Chapter 2, the three-node communication problem in Figure 1 can be
studied from an information-theoretic perspective, and in this case, the security obtained
by exploiting the PHY layer can be precisely quantified. This innate connection between
physical-layer security and information-theoretic security provides the main motivation for
this dissertation. Our study of physical-layer security is exclusively carried out from an
information-theoretic and coding perspective but we acknowledge that the scope of physical-
layer security goes well beyond these considerations. In particular, we do not consider a large
class of techniques that aim to modify the PHY layer to impair potential eavesdroppers.
Examples of such techniques are coded-division multiple-access signaling, which gives signals
a noise-like appearance, and beamforming with smart antennas, which essentially prevents
an eavesdropper located away from the legitimate receiver to detect signals.
1.3 Outline of the dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces fundamental concepts of
information-theoretic security, summarizes the state of the art, and sets the notation used
in subsequent chapters. Our main discussion and results on physical-layer security for wire-
less channels are contained in Chapters 3-5. Specifically, Chapter 3 introduces an efficient
Slepian-Wolf compression algorithm for continuous random variables, which is a key element
in the design of secure communication schemes for wireless channels. Chapter 4 presents
a practical key agreement protocol for quasi-static fading wireless channels and analyzes
its performance. Chapter 5 treats the more theoretical problem of trade-offs between co-
operation and security in wireless environments. Chapter 6 and 7 discuss applications of
physical-layer security beyond wireless communications. Chapter 6 treats the problem of
information-theoretic commitment over noisy channels, and Chapter 7 discusses the design
of network architectures exploiting ideas borrowed from physical-layer security. Finally,
Chapter 8 summarizes our conclusions and points to areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
FUNDAMENTALS OF INFORMATION-THEORETIC SECURITY
This chapter summarizes fundamental information-theoretic security results, which are key
tools used for studying physical-layer security in this dissertation. To date, these results have
been confined within the information theory community, arguably because the assumptions
required are often judged impractical from a cryptographic perspective. We believe that
information-theoretic security has the potential to significantly strengthen the security level
of current systems, but we acknowledge that some claims found in the literature regarding
the pertinence of information-theoretic results can be misleading. We attempt to avoid that
pitfall and provide a fair comparison of computational security and information-theoretic
security by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. In particular, we
clearly state the assumptions used in information-theoretic models.
2.1 Notation and basic definitions
In the rest of this dissertation, scalars are denoted by normal letters (x), vectors of length
n are denoted by boldface letters (xn = (x1, . . . , xn)), and random variables are denoted by
capital letters (X). The entropy of discrete random variables and the differential entropy
of continuous random variables are denoted by H(·) and h(·), respectively, and the mutual
information between two random variables, as defined in [1], is denoted by I(·; ·). The
probability distribution of a random variable X taking values in a set X is denoted by pX (x),
and the conditional distribution of X ∈ X given Y ∈ Y is denoted by pX|Y (x|y). Subscripts
may be omitted to simplify notation, in which case the random variable considered should
be inferred from the context.
The main focus of the present work is a three-party cryptographic scenario similar
to the one illustrated in Figure 2, where a transceiver attempts to communicate with a
legitimate receiver while being spied on by an eavesdropper. Following the tradition, the
transceiver, receiver, and eavesdropper are named Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The
information sent by Alice consists of a set of messages, which are encoded into codewords to
ensure reliable or secure transmissions. In cryptography, messages and codewords are often
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referred to as plaintexts and cyphertexts, respectively. A code is the set of mechanisms by
which messages are encoded into and retrieved from codewords. In all scenarios considered
thereafter, it is assumed that the algorithms used to code messages and decode codewords
are publicly known.
2.2 Principles and fundamental limits of modern cryptography
Modern cryptography is not limited to the analysis and design of encryption schemes, but
also tackles issues such as data signature, message authentication, data integrity, etc. A
detailed presentation of all these aspects goes well beyond the scope of this dissertation,
and we restrict ourselves to a succinct description of secret key and public key encryp-
tion schemes. The objective of this section is merely to highlight the salient features of
these systems and to provide a reasonable basis for comparison with information-theoretic
schemes.
To guarantee the confidentiality of messages transmitted by Alice, codes are based on
keys, which are secret sequences of bits only known to Alice or Bob. The goal of Eve is to
break the codes used by Alice and Bob, that is, to retrieve messages from codewords without
having knowledge of the keys. The security of encryption schemes is traditionally assessed in
terms of computational security1 and relies on assumptions limiting the computing resources
of eavesdroppers. Essentially, computational security ensures that the amount of computing
time or memory required to break a code is “unreasonable” with today’s technology. Usually,
a code is regarded as secure if the computational complexity of an eavesdropper’s decoding
algorithm is equivalent to that required for solving “hard” mathematical problems (NP-
hard problems for example). This notion of security is widely used in current cryptographic
protocols, but despite being satisfactory in many situations, this notion fails to guarantee
security in the long term. For instance, many codes that were regarded as secure twenty
years ago are now easily breakable with off-the-shelf computers. Consequently, encoding
algorithms have to be regularly updated to face the increasing power of computers.
Figure 3 illustrates the principle of secret key encryption schemes (also called symmetric
schemes). Alice and Bob are assumed to share a secret key k that is used to encode
1This type of security is called provable security in [2]
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messages m or decode codewords c. The eavesdropper Eve has knowledge of the encoding








Figure 3. Principle of symmetric encryption.
Secret-key schemes offer the advantage of encrypting messages with relatively short keys
and of operating at high rates. For instance, hardware implementations of the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) can yield encryption rates on the order of gigabytes per sec-
ond [3]; however, security relies not only on the existence of hardly breakable algorithms,
but also on the ability of distributing secure keys efficiently between Alice and Bob.
Public-key encryption schemes (also called asymmetric schemes) were first proposed in
the late 1970s as a solution to the key distribution problem. As shown in Figure 4, their
principle is fundamentally different from that of symmetric schemes since Alice and Bob
own distinct keys. The public key kpub is publicly available and used by Alice for message
encryption. The private key kpriv is kept secret and is only used for message decryption. In
other words, the public key plays the role of an open vault that anyone can close but that










Figure 4. Principle of asymmetric encryption.
Evidently, this scheme is useful, provided that the knowledge of kpub does not allow
one to recover the key kpriv. The keys are not independent in practice, but are usually
constructed based on mathematical conjectures suggesting that recovering kpriv from kpub
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cannot be done in a reasonable time. For instance, the security of the infamous RSA protocol
is linked to the intractability of the decomposition of large integers into prime factors.
Unfortunately, popular public-key schemes suffer from low encryption rates, typically several
orders of magnitude slower than those of symmetric schemes.
To avoid the limitations associated with a computational measure of secrecy, one can
consider a more stringent criterion based on an information-theoretic measure. Specifically,
one can treat messages and codewords as random variables denoted by M and C, respec-
tively, and decide that a codeword is secure if the Shannon uncertainty of the message
after observing the codeword H(M |C) is equal to the a priori uncertainty of the message
H(M). This definition of security is referred to as unconditional security and is now widely
accepted as the strictest notion of security. This definition does not place any restriction
on the resources of the eavesdropper, but there exist few practical methods satisfying the
above criterion.
Before discussing unconditional security any further, it is worth clarifying the practi-
cal meaning of this notion. First of all, one should notice that there exist no unbreakable
encryption schemes. In fact, if a message contains k bits of information, trying to guess
every bit at random is a poor but valid eavesdropping strategy, whose probability of suc-
cess is 2−k. This result does not imply that securing data is impossible, but only points
out that assessing the security of a system should ultimately be done with a probabilistic
measure. The unconditional security criterion, which ensures that messages and codewords
are statistically independent, essentially means that the aforementioned guessing strategy is
the best strategy that an eavesdropper can implement to retrieve messages. In particular,
there are no correlations between messages and codewords that could be exploited, and
unconditionally secure schemes are immune to cryptanalysis techniques.
Analyzing modern cryptography schemes from the perspective of unconditional security
yields a rather surprising and disappointing answer. In fact, Shannon proved that the only
encryption scheme satisfying the unconditional security criterion is the so-called one-time
pad [4] illustrated in Figure 5. Alice and Bob are assumed to share perfectly random
secret keys whose size is at least as long as the messages that they wish to exchange,
and they encrypt or decrypt messages by summing key bits and message bits modulo two.
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Since each key bit can be used only once, Shannon’s result states that it is impossible to
ensure unconditional security with modern cryptographic techniques based on the repeated
use of small secret keys. Actually, the result is even more disappointing since a one-time
pad encryption is impractical unless there exist efficient means of distributing secret keys
between Alice and Bob.
key generator
Eve
M M̂. . . 1101 . . .
C
. . . 1011 . . . . . . 1011 . . .
KK
Alice Bob
. . . 0110 . . . . . . 0110 . . .XOR XOR
Figure 5. One-time pad encryption scheme.
2.3 The wiretap channel
Based on Shannon’s result, one may believe that unconditional security is not achievable
with practical systems; however, as we already pointed out in Chapter 1, the secure com-
munication framework investigated in Figures 3-5 is overly pessimistic since it does not
account for the physical reality of communication channels. Especially, it does not consider
the degradation of signals because of noise. This observation naturally leads to the intro-
duction of a more realistic communication model, now known as the wiretap channel, where
noise in the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel is explicitly introduced.
2.3.1 Wiretap channel model
The wiretap channel model was initially introduced by Wyner [5] and later refined by Csiszár
and Körner [6]. Figure 6 illustrates the latter model, which is also called a broadcast channel
with confidential messages.
Alice and Bob communicate over a discrete broadcast channel characterized by a discrete
input alphabet X , two discrete output alphabets Y and Z, and a probability transition

















Figure 6. Broadcast channel with confidential messages (wiretap channel).
probability of a sequence of n symbols is given by
p (yn, zn|xn) =
n∏
i=1
pY Z|X (yi, zi|xi) .
It is also assumed that Alice wishes to send a common message M0 to both Bob and Eve
and a private message M1 to Bob only.
Definition 2.1. A
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
code for the broadcast channel with confidential messages
consists of the following.
• Two message sets M0 =
{




1, 2, . . . , 2nR1
}
.
• An encoding function (possibly stochastic) fn : M0 × M1 → X n, which maps each
message pair (m0,m1) ∈ M0 ×M1 to a codeword xn ∈ X n.
• Two decoding functions gn : Yn → M0 × M1 and hn : Zn → M0, which map an
observation yn to a message pair (m̂0, m̂1) and an observation z
n to a message ˆ̂m0.





and a rate tuple (R0, R1, Re) is achievable for a broadcast channel with confidential messages
if and only if, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a
(




n) 6= (M0,M1) or hn(Zn) 6= M0] < ǫ (reliability condition),
1
n
H(M1|Zn) ≥ Re − ǫ (secrecy condition).
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It is not a priori obvious whether the conditions defined above can be satisfied simulta-
neously. In fact, the reliability condition calls for an increased redundancy in the coding
scheme, while the secrecy condition tends to limit this redundancy. Surprisingly, the trade-
off between reliability and secrecy can be characterized exactly, as shown by the following
theorem.







0 ≤ Re ≤ R1
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U ) − I(V ;Z|U)
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V ;Y |U ) + min (I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z))




It is also convenient to define a scalar metric characterizing the inherent security that a
channel can provide. The secrecy capacity of a broadcast channel with confidential messages
is defined as the supremum of all rates R1 such that the tuple (0, R1, R1) is achievable. This
metric provides a counterpart to the usual channel capacity, which considers only reliable
communications without secrecy constraints. Based on Theorem 2.1, the following result
can be proven.
Corollary 2.1 ([6], Corollary 2). The secrecy capacity of a broadcast channel with confi-
dential messages is given by
Cs = max
V →X→Y Z
[I(V ;Y ) − I(V ;Z)] . (2.1)
Corollary 2.1 provides a formula that allows, in principle, to compute the secrecy ca-
pacity of any discrete memoryless channel, and it can also be shown that the result holds
for continuous memoryless channels; however, Equation (2.1) involves a maximization over
random variables satisfying a Markov chain condition, which provides little insight in prac-
tical situations. Nevertheless, Equation (2.1) shows that the secrecy capacity depends on
the channel transition probability only through the marginal probabilities pY |X (y|x) and
pZ|X (z|x).
It is instructive to consider the case where the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel
are noiseless. Clearly, the secrecy capacity of a noiseless broadcast channel is zero, which
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confirms that information-theoretic security cannot be obtained within the framework of
traditional cryptography.
For certain channels, a closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity can be obtained.
The most useful model for practical purposes is probably the Gaussian wiretap channel


















Figure 7. Gaussian wiretap channel.
The main channel and eavesdropper’s channel are additive white Gaussian noise channels
with channel gains hm and hw, respectively; the Gaussian noises Nm and Nw corrupting the
transmission have variance σ2m and σ
2
w, respectively. It is also assumed that the codewords










Under these assumptions, we have the following result.































Equation (2.2) confirms the intuition that we developed in Chapter 1. When the le-
gitimate receiver has a better signal-to-noise ratio than the eavesdropper, there exists a
coding scheme ensuring information-theoretic security, and the maximum secure communi-
cation rate is the difference between the main channel capacity and eavesdropper’s channel
capacity.
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2.3.2 Random codes achieving secrecy capacity
Theorem 2.1 was derived in [6] using a maximal code construction argument [9]. We provide
the details of another proof based on typical set decoding in Appendix A. This alternative
proof follows essentially the same lines as the original proof, but the use of typical set
decoding makes the combination of this random coding argument with other techniques
easier. In particular, we combine wiretap coding and relay coding in Chapter 5.
To provide the reader with an intuitive understanding of the proof, we now discuss
the random code construction of wiretap codes in the special case of Theorem 2.1, where
R0 = 0, Re = R1, U = ∅, and V = X. First of all, the converse part of Theorem 2.1 enforces
1
n
H(M |Zn) ≤ I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) + δ, (2.3)
where δ → 0 as n → ∞. By using basic properties of entropy, one can now bound the
eavesdropper’s equivocation as follows.
H(M |Zn) ≥ H(Xn) − I(Xn;Zn) − H(Xn|M,Zn) . (2.4)
Since the Asymptotic Equipartition Principle [1] (AEP) guarantees that, for n large enough,
I(Xn;Zn) ≤ nI(X;Z) + nπ with π → 0 as n → ∞,
the lower bound in Equation (2.4) can match the upper bound in Equation (2.3), provided
that two conditions are met.
1. The capacity of the main channel is exhausted, that is, the codebook uses
the maximum number of codewords that can be transmitted reliably over the main
channel. Since there are roughly 2nI(X;Y ) such codewords, H(Xn) ≈ nI(X;Y ), which
is the first term in Equation (2.3).
2. The eavesdropper is allowed to identify the transmitted codeword reliably,
given the knowledge of the message, which ensures that the term H(Xn|M,Zn)
vanishes as n → ∞.
It is particularly striking that security in terms of equivocation can be enforced by imposing
a structure on the wiretap code, such that the eavesdropper can decode under certain
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conditions2.
A simple way to construct a random code satisfying the previous two conditions is to use
a binning structure, as illustrated in Figure 8. Starting from a randomly generated code-
book for the main channel, which contains on the order of 2nI(X;Y ) codewords, codewords
are grouped at random in 2n(I(X;Y )−I(X;Z)) bins of equal size. Because each bin contains
approximately 2nI(X;Z) codewords, the eavesdropper can identify a codeword sent over the
channel provided that she knows the bin to which the codeword belongs. Consequently, the
index of each bin can be used as the message transmitted by Alice, and upon selection of a




2nI(X;Z) codewords per bin
Figure 8. Binning scheme used to design wiretap codes.
2.3.3 Pertinence of wiretap channel model
In this section, we highlight the implicit assumptions inherent in the wiretap channel model.
1. Knowledge of channel state information. The equivocation of the eavesdropper
is ensured provided that the wiretap code used for transmission is correctly tailored to
the channel. In particular, this requires the Channel State Informations (CSI) about
the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel to be known at the emitter. While
assuming that the main channel CSI is perfectly known is reasonable since Alice and
Bob can always cooperate to characterize their channel, requiring knowledge of the
eavesdropper’s channel CSI is more questionable; however, in situations where Alice
is a wireless base station and the eavesdropper is a user in the network, the CSI is in
2Note, however, that allowing the eavesdropper to decode in certain situations does not mean that we
impose a decoding strategy.
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fact known at the emitter. Moreover, one can replace the exact knowledge of the CSI
by a conservative estimation based on geographical information. As an example, one
can certainly upper bound the signal-to noise ratio at a receiver if it is known to be
located outside a given perimeter.
2. Authentication. The wiretap channel mode implicitly assumes that the main chan-
nel is authenticated. In principle, this assumption is not restrictive since authentica-
tion mechanisms can be implemented in the upper layers of the protocol stack. Note
that it is possible to ensure unconditionally secure authentication [10] if a short secret
key is available. Typically, the key size required for authentication scales as the log-
arithm of the message size; therefore, only a small fraction of secrecy capacity needs
to be sacrificed to exchange secret keys.
3. Passive eavesdropping. The scope of the wiretap channel is restricted to passive
eavesdropping strategies where the adversary does not tamper with the main chan-
nel or the eavesdropper’s channel. Additional techniques are required to cope with
jamming.
4. Availability of random generator. Unlike traditional encoders, which are deter-
ministic functions, wiretap encoders are stochastic encoders and rely on the availability
of perfect random generators. In practice, strong pseudo-random generators could be
used, but their initialization mechanism should be carefully considered.
5. Weak secrecy. Security is defined in terms of the equivocation rate 1nH(M1|Zn),
and a more satisfying criterion would be to use the absolute equivocation H(M1|Zn).
The former notion of information-theoretic security is called weak secrecy, while the
latter is referred to as strong secrecy. It is shown in [11] that strong and weak secrecy
capacity are equal.
2.3.4 Extensions of the wiretap channel model
There has recently been a renewed interest for the study of wiretap channel models. In this
section, we point out several research problems related to the wiretap channel that have
been investigated.
15
• Secrecy capacity of wireless channels. Wireless communications are arguably
the main application of physical-layer security, and characterizing their fundamental
secrecy limits is an important area of research. Barros and Rodrigues [12] provided
a detailed characterization of the outage secrecy capacity of slow fading channels and
showed that fading alone guarantees that information-theoretic security is achiev-
able, even when the eavesdropper has a better average signal-to-noise ratio than the
legitimate receiver. The secrecy capacity of ergodic fading channels was derived inde-
pendently by Liang et al. [13], Li et al. [14], and Gopala et al. [15], and power and rate
allocation schemes for secret communication over fading channels were presented.
• Multiple-input multiple output wiretap channels. A natural extension of The-
orem 2.2 is the situation where Alice, Bob, and Eve have multiple antennas. A closed-
form expression for the secrecy capacity of multiple-input multiple-output Gaussian
wiretap channels was derived independently in [16] and [17]. Although the derivation
is quite involved, the final result is a convenient and simple generalization of Eq. (2.2).
• Multi-user wiretap channels. Numerous multi-user information theory problems
have been reconsidered by adding secrecy constraints. Most notably, [18, 19] inves-
tigate multiple-access channels with confidential messages, [20, 21] consider secure
relaying scenarios, and [22] studies interference channels with confidential messages.
In general, it is not possible to obtain a single-letter characterization of the secrecy
capacity, and most of the aforementioned works only provide bounds. The problem
studied in Chapter 5 of this dissertation falls into the category of multi-user wiretap
problems.
• Wiretap channels with distortion measure. Rather than enforcing a minimum
equivocation rate on the eavesdropper, one could enforce a minimum distortion [23].
This alternative criterion could be useful for securing multimedia content such as video
or voice.
16
2.4 Secret key agreement from common randomness
Contrary to the wiretap channel problem, which considers the communication of secure
messages over noisy channels, the focus of secret-key agreement is the distillation of secrecy
from common randomness [24, 25, 26]. Specifically, the objective of secret-key agreement
is to generate secret keys from common randomness by public discussion over noiseless
channels of unlimited capacity, without worrying about the cost of communication.
Two types of models are usually considered for secret-key agreement. The source-type
model corresponds to a situation where terminals observe the correlated outputs of a source
of randomness without having any control on the source. The channel-type model considers
a scenario where one terminal transmits random symbols to the other terminals over a
broadcast channel. The latter situation is similar to the wiretap channel model presented
in the previous section, with the notable difference that the memoryless broadcast channel
is used only for randomness sharing and that all other communications are performed over
a noiseless side channel of unlimited capacity.
2.4.1 Three-terminal secret key agreement
For brevity, we only discuss the source-type model with three terminals, and unless otherwise
specified, all results assume a discrete memoryless source. Alice, Bob, and Eve have access
to n realizations Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn), Y
n = (Y1, . . . , Yn), and Z
n = (Z1, . . . , Zn), of random
variables X, Y , and Z, respectively. The correlations between the random variables are
governed by the known joint distribution pXY Z (x, y, z).
Definition 2.2. A permissible secret sharing strategy for the source-type model is an in-
teractive protocol consisting of t rounds, such that at each round k Alice sends a message
Φk(X
n,Ψk−1) to Bob depending on Xn and all the messages Ψk−1 = (Ψ1, . . . ,Ψk−1) pre-
viously sent by Bob, and Bob sends a message Ψk(Y
n,Φk−1) to Alice depending on Yn
and all the messages Φk−1 = (Φ1, . . . ,Φk−1) previously sent by Alice. After t rounds, Alice








using publicly known functions f and g..
A rate Rk is an achievable secret-key rate of a source-type model if and only if, for any
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ǫ > 0, there exists a permissible secret sharing strategy such that
1
nH(KA) > Rk − ǫ











n log2 |KA| − ǫ (uniformity condition)
As a counterpart to the secrecy capacity of a wiretap channel, the secret-key capacity
of X and Y with respect to Z, denoted by S(X;Y ‖Z), is defined as the supremum of all
achievable secret key rates. In general, one cannot obtain a closed-form expression of the
secret key capacity, but the following result can be proven.
Theorem 2.3 ([24], Theorem 2 and 3). The secret key capacity of a discrete memoryless
source-type model with distribution pXY Z (x, y, z) is bounded as follows.
max [I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) , I(Y ;X) − I(Y ;Z)] ≤ S (X;Y ‖Z) ≤ min [I(X;Y ) , I(X;Y |Z)] .
If Eve’s observation is a degraded version (i.e., pY Z|X (y, z|x) = pZ|Y (z|y) pY |X (y|x))
or a stochastically degraded version (i.e., pY Z|X (y, z|x) = pZ|X (zxy) pY |X (y|x)) of Bob’s
observation the two bounds are equal.
Interestingly, an exact characterization can be obtained for a subclass of protocols in
which only a single message from Alice to Bob is allowed. In this case, the supremum of
achievable secret key rates is called the forward secret key capacity.
Theorem 2.4 ( [25], Theorem 2). The forward secret key capacity of a discrete memoryless
source-type model with distribution pXY Z (x, y, z) is given by
max
U→T→X→Y Z
[I(T ;Y |U) − I(T ;Z|U)]
When the eavesdropper does not have access to side information (Z = ∅) and only
observes the public discussion, the secret-key capacity is equal to the forward secret-key
capacity and is simply the mutual information I(X;Y ) [25, Proposition 1].
Among the many salient properties of secret-key agreement highlighted in [25, 24, 26],
the most interesting facts are the following.
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1. Secret key agreement is tightly related to Slepian-Wolf compression. As we describe in
Section 2.5, this innate connection is especially useful for designing practical secret-key
agreement schemes.
2. Feedback increases achievable secret-key rates. In particular, certain channels have a
zero secrecy capacity without feedback, but secure communications at strictly positive
rates are possible with feedback.
3. Interaction is more powerful than one-way communication. In [11], Maurer provides
an example where the achievable secret-key rates are strictly larger with interactive
protocols than one-way communications; however, it is still not known whether this
statement is true in general.
2.4.2 Extensions of secret key agreement results
Several extensions of the aforementioned results have been investigated.
• Strong secrecy capacity. As shown in [11, 26], all the above results can be strength-






< ǫ (strong secrecy condition),
H(KA) > log2 |KA| − ǫ (strong uniformity condition).
• Characterization of secret key capacity. Obtaining a general closed-form expres-
sion of the secret-key capacity is still an open problem; however, Maurer showed that
an information-theoretic quantity called the intrinsic conditional information [27] is
useful in many situations for characterizing under what conditions secret key agree-
ment is possible.
• Multiterminal secret key generation. Csiszár and Narayan have investigated the
problem of key generation among multiple terminals in [26]. In the situation where
an eavesdropper only observes the public communication and does not have access to
side information, the secret-key capacity has a pleasing and intuitive expression. It is
simply the total entropy of the source of common randomness minus the amount of
information that must be shared for each terminal to gain complete knowledge of the
source.
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2.4.3 Beyond classical secret key agreement: quantum cryptography
The main drawbacks of secret-key agreement and wiretap channel models are the implicit
assumptions that the probability distribution of the source (or the transition probability of
the broadcast channel) is available and that the eavesdropper is purely passive. Interestingly,
these issues can be circumvented when the transmission power is so low that quantum effects
have to be taken into account. In fact, the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics limit
the amount of information simultaneously accessible to Bob and Eve. Examples of such
limitations are the no-cloning theorem [28], which forbids the exact duplication of a single
quantum, or the Heisenberg uncertainty principle [29], which limits the accuracy of certain
joint measurements. Quantum key distribution (also called quantum cryptography) exploits
these properties to distribute unconditionally secure keys, even in the presence of an all-
powerful eavesdropper only limited by the laws of quantum mechanics [30].
The general principle of a quantum key distribution scheme is the following. Alice and
Bob communicate over two distinct channels, a quantum channel, which may be under Eve’s
control, and a classical channel, which is assumed to be public, noiseless, and authenticated.
Quantum key distribution protocols usually proceed in two steps. First, Alice transmits a
sequence of well-chosen random quantum states over the insecure quantum channel. The
laws of quantum mechanics guarantee that Eve’s operations systematically induce a statis-
tical disturbance in Bob’s measurements. Second, Alice and Bob exchange information over
the public channel to detect statistical disturbances, indirectly infer the amount of infor-
mation accessible to Eve, and distill a secret key. The tools used for secret key distillation
are not specific to quantum key distribution and are presented in Section 2.5.
Let us re-emphasize that the unconditional authentication and integrity of messages
sent over the public channel can be ensured by protocols requiring a short secret key, which
implies that Alice and Bob should initially share such a key and should sacrifice a fraction
of the subsequently generated keys to authenticate future messages. Hence, quantum key
distribution systems are also called quantum key growing systems.
Despite being long regarded as an amusement for researchers, quantum cryptography
has now been accepted as a viable solution for unconditionally secure communications and
can be viewed as the ultimate application of physical-layer security. A few commercial
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systems are already available, but their deployment on a large scale is hindered by their
cost, the low key generation rates, and the requirement of a dedicated quantum channel.
2.5 Practical information-theoretic tools
As is often the case in information theory, the characterization of secrecy capacity and
secret key capacity relies on random coding arguments that are convenient for analysis but
fail to translate directly into practical coding schemes. Despite the numerous theoretical
contributions, the general problem of wiretap coding has not received much attention. There
is still no larger framework to draw on, even with the sustained advances in the area of error
control coding.
2.5.1 Codes for the wiretap channel
Even though the random code construction presented in Section 2.3.2 does not provide any
practical method for constructing a real code, it is quite natural to attempt to reproduce
the binning structure illustrated in Figure 8. In [31], Wei shows how to encode secret
information using cosets of certain linear block codes. More recently, this idea has been
extended by Thangaraj et al. in [32] and Liu et al. in [33], where it has been shown
how low-density parity-check codes can asymptotically achieve the secrecy capacity of the
erasure wiretap channel, and how they can be used to provide secure communications at
rates below the secrecy capacity for other channels.
Figure 9 illustrates the coding method of [32] in the case of a wiretap channel with a
noiseless main channel and an erasure eavesdropper’s channel. In the figure, M is a k-bit
random variable denoting the message to be transmitted. Based on a (n, n − k) code C
with parity-check matrix H and generator matrix G, Alice transmits a codeword X chosen
uniformly at random in the coset of C with syndrome M. Bob retrieves the message by
calculating HXT .
It is assumed that the eavesdropper observes the codewords through a binary erasure
channel with erasure probability 1 − ǫ. Intuitively, no information is leaked, provided the
bits in unerased positions received by the eavesdropper identify codewords in all of the 2k














Figure 9. Coding method for erasure wiretap channel.
eavesdropper’s equivocation is k bits if any submatrix of the generator matrix G containing
ǫn columns has full rank. It turns out that parity-check matrices of LDPC codes chosen
at random from a code ensemble with threshold α∗ > ǫ satisfy this criterion with high
probability. Therefore, the dual of such an LDPC code can be used as the code C to secure
communications.
2.5.2 Reconciliation and privacy amplification
Although there exist few practical coding schemes for the wiretap channel, there exist prac-
tical key distillation methods. Most of these techniques have been proposed in the context
on quantum cryptography [35, 36] and are well understood when the source of common
randomness is binary. In the rest of this section, it is assumed that all random variables
are discrete. The extension of the results to continuous random variables is discussed in
Chapter 3.
Following the source-type model for secret-key agreement described earlier, we assume
that Alice, Bob, and Eve have access to n i.i.d. realizations of discrete random variables
X, Y, and Z, respectively, distributed according to a known distribution pXY Z . Alice,
Bob and Eve’s sequences are denoted by Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn), Y
n = (Y1, . . . , Yn), and
Zn = (Z1, . . . , Zn), respectively. A typical secret-key agreement consists of the two following
steps.
Information reconciliation [37] Since Alice and Bob’s sequences may not be per-
fectly correlated, there are discrepancies between Bob’s received symbols Yn and Alice’s
symbols Xn; therefore, the first step is for Alice and Bob to correct errors before any further
22
processing. In the context of secret-key agreement, this operation is called reconciliation,
and it requires an additional exchange of information between Alice and Bob over the pub-
lic channel. Note that reconciliation is actually a special case of source coding with side
information3, where Alice compresses her source Xn and Bob decodes it with the help of
correlated side information Yn. The Slepian-Wolf theorem [38] yields a lower bound on the
total number of bits Mrec that have to be exchanged:
Mrec ≥ H(Xn|Yn) = nH(X|Y ) . (2.5)
Practical reconciliation algorithms introduce an overhead ǫrec > 0 and require the trans-
mission of Mrec = nH(X|Y )(1 + ǫrec) additional bits. Alternatively, it is also convenient to
characterize the reconciliation by its efficiency β, which is defined as




At the end of the reconciliation step, Alice an Bob share with high probability the common
sequence Xn whose entropy is nrec = nH(X). We assume that X
n is then compressed into
an nrec-bits binary sequence S.
Privacy amplification [39] This second operation allows Alice and Bob to extract
a secret key from the binary sequence S. The principle of privacy amplification is to apply
a well-chosen compression function g : {0, 1}nrec → {0, 1}k (k < nrec) to the reconciled bit
sequence, such that the eavesdropper obtains negligible information about the final k-bit
sequence g(S). In practice, this can be achieved by choosing g at random within family of
universal hash functions [40, 10], as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.5. [39, Corollary 4] Let S ∈ {0, 1}nrec be the random variable representing the
bit sequence shared by Alice and Bob, and let E be the random variable representing the
total information available to the eavesdropper. Let e be a particular realization of E. If
the Rényi entropy (of order 2) R(S|E = e) is known to be at least c, and Alice and Bob
choose K = G(S) as their secret key, where G is a hash function chosen at random from a
universal family of hash functions G : {0, 1}nrec → {0, 1}k, then




3The link between reconciliation and coding with side information is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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The total information available to Eve E consists of the sequence Zn received from the
source of common randomness, as well as the additional bits exchanged during reconcilia-
tion, represented by a random variable M . As shown in [41, Theorem 5.2], for any s > 0
we have
R(S|Zn = zn,M = m) ≥ R(S|Zn = zn) − log2 |M | − 2s − 2 with probability 1 − 2−s.
(2.8)
The quantity log2 |M | represents the number of bits intercepted by Eve during the recon-
ciliation, which is at most nH(X|Y )(1 + ǫrec). Evaluating R(S|Zn = zn) is in general still
difficult; however, conditioned on the typicality of the bit sequence, R(S|Zn = zn) and
H(S|Zn = zn) are equal [11]. Hence, if n is large,
nH(X|Z) − nH(X|Y )(1 + ǫrec) − 2s − 2
is a good lower bound of R(S|E = e), and choosing
k = nβI(X;Y ) − nI(X;Z) − 2s − 2 − r0, (2.9)
with r0 > 0 guarantees that Eve’s uncertainty on the key is such that
H(K|E) ≥ k − 2−r0/ ln 2 with probability 1 − 2−s.
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CHAPTER 3
RECONCILIATION OF CONTINUOUS RANDOM VARIABLES
Reconciliation is an essential ingredient of practical secret-key agreement protocols. The
reconciliation of binary random variable has been extensively studied in the context of
quantum key distribution, and several efficient methods have been proposed [37, 35]; how-
ever, little attention has been devoted to the practical reconciliation of non-binary random
variables. In this chapter, we develop an efficient algorithm based on Low-Density Parity-
Check (LDPC) codes for the reconciliation of continuous random variables. Although our
algorithm is generic and could be applied, in principle, to any continuous random variables,
we focus most of our discussion on Gaussian random variables.
The scenario considered throughout this chapter is the following. It is assumed that two
parties, Alice and Bob, have access to the outcomes of n i.i.d. instances of two distinct cor-
related continuous random variables X ∈ R and Y ∈ R, with joint probability distribution
pXY (x, y). The sequences of realizations obtained by Alice and Bob are denoted by
xn = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn and yn = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Rn,
respectively. The objective of reconciliation is for Alice and Bob to agree on a common bit
sequence based on their observations while minimizing the amount of information exchanged
to obtain this sequence.
3.1 Fundamental limit of reconciliation and algorithm design principles
3.1.1 Source coding with side information
Reconciliation can be related to the problem of distributed data compression, which is
illustrated in Figure 10. In this situation, the i.i.d realizations of jointly distributed discrete
random variables X and Y are to be compressed without loss and reconstructed at a receiver;
however, the realizations of the random variable X are available at encoder 1 while the
realizations of the random variable Y are available separately at encoder 2.
If sources are encoded jointly, the data compression theorem [1, Theorem 2.1] ensures
that a total encoding rate R > H(X,Y ) should be sufficient to reconstruct the sources











Figure 10. Slepian-Wolf coding of correlated sources.
separate encoding does not incur any rate penalty. Formally, we have the following results.
Definition 3.1. A
(
2nRX , 2nRY , n
)
source code for the joint source (X,Y ) consists of the
following.
• Two message sets MX =
{




1, 2, . . . , 2nRY
}
.
• Two encoding fucntion fX : X n → MX and fY : Yn → MY .
• A decoding fucntion g : MX ×MY → X n × Yn.
A rate pair (RX , RY ) is achievable for the distributed source if and only if, for any ǫ > 0,
there exists a
(





n)) 6= (Xn,Yn)] < ǫ.
Theorem 3.1 (Slepian-Wolf theorem). The set of achievable compression rates (RX , RY )
for the distributed source coding problem is given by
RX ≥ H(X|Y ) ,
RY ≥ H(Y |X) ,
RX + RY ≥ H(X,Y ) .
The reconciliation of discrete random variables corresponds to the special case where the
source Y is directly available at the receiver; this situations is referred to as source coding
with side information. From Theorem 3.1, it is clear that X can be reconstructed perfectly
at the receiver provided that the compression rate RX is such that
RX ≥ H(X|Y ) .
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The problem of source coding with side-information can easily be generalized to the
situation where X is discrete and Y is continuous. In this case, the metrics H(X|Y ) and






p (x, y) log2 p (y|x) ,
I(X;Y ) = H(X) − H(X|Y ) .
When X is also a continuous random variable, reconstructing it perfectly would require
an infinitely precise quantization; however, the objective of reconciliation is not the lossless
compression of the sequence of observations xn, but the extraction of a common sequence
from xn and yn with little additional communication. For instance, the common sequence
can be obtained by first quantizing X into a discrete random variable X̂ and then com-




. As discussed in Section 2.5, the performance of



















can be made as close to I(X;Y ) as desired by choosing a fine enough





. This task is non-trivial since the characterization of the ultimate
performance of reconciliation algorithms provided by Theorem 3.1 is obtained with non-
constructive arguments and provides little practical insight.
One could argue that reconciliation is also related to rate-distortion theory. In fact, we
can view the procedure of quantization followed by a lossless compression as a lossy com-
pression subject to a symbol-wise distortion constraint of the reconstructed data. However,
the results of rate distortion theory consider mainly average distortion constraints and do
not apply directly to reconciliation.
3.1.2 Reconciliation as coded modulation
In this section, we reformulate the reconciliation problem to provide more insight on the
design of practical reconciliation schemes. Let us start by introducing a general description
of the quantizer. Let (I1, . . . , Ik) be k intervals forming a partition of R. This partition
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defines quantization intervals, and without loss of generality, we define the corresponding
quantized values (s1, . . . , sk) to be the centers of each interval. We denote the indicator
function of each interval Ij by
χj(x) : R −→ {0, 1}
x 7−→ 1 if x ∈ Ij, 0 otherwise,
(3.2)
and we write the quantizer as
Q : R −→ {ŝj}j=1...k
x 7−→∑kj=1 sjχj(x).
(3.3)









Notice that Alice’s observations xn can be viewed as the output of a discrete in-
put/continuous output channel CQ, characterized by the transition probabilities
pQ(x|sj) = p(x)χj(x)/pj , (3.5)
when the quantized symbols x̂n = (Q(x1), . . . ,Q(xn)) are fed at the input. Likewise, since
the joint probability p(x, y) of the continuous random variables X and Y can always be
written as the product p(y|x)p(x), the symbols yn can also be viewed as the output of a
memoryless channel CS characterized by the transition probability pS(y|x) = p(y|x), when
the i.i.d symbols xn are fed at the input.
Combining these two observations, the continuous symbols yn could have been gener-
ated by sending the discrete symbols x̂n through a channel C∗, obtained by concatenating
channels CS and CQ. Since X̂ → X → Y is a Markov chain, the transition probabilities of




Finally, each quantized value sj can be assigned a unique ℓ-bits binary label, with ℓ =
⌈log2 k⌉. The labeling function that maps an element x ∈ R to the mth bit in the label of
its quantized value Q(x) is denoted by
Lm : R → {0, 1} for m ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, (3.7)
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and the binary sequence obtained by quantizing and labeling xn is denoted by






channel CQ channel CS
channel C∗
Figure 11. Reconciliation as coded modulation.
The above reformulation of the problem is totally artificial but, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 11, it makes apparent the connection with coded modulation techniques. In fact, Fig-
ure 11 could represent a coded modulation scheme if the sequence v was a sequence of
codewords obtained before transmission over the channel C∗. Coded modulation techniques
have been extensively studied in the context of communication over Gaussian channel, and
we shall briefly review two powerful techniques called Bit Interleaved Coded Modulation
(BICM) [42, 43] and MultiLevel Coding / MultiStage Decoding (MLC/MSD) [44, 45].
Figure 12 illustrates a MLC/MSD coded modulation scheme. Codewords v are mapped
to a sequence of symbols s before transmission over a channel. The principle of MLC/MSD
stems from a simple observation. Let (V1, . . . , Vℓ) be the random variables representing the
value of each bit in the label of symbol S. The sequence of bits at a given position in the




I(Vi;Y |S1, . . . , Vi−1) , (3.8)
which means that we can treat the initial channel as ℓ (dependent) sub-channels, and
encoding can be performed on a level-by-level basis. Moreover, the above equation shows
that, without loss of optimality, the decoder can decode the ℓ bit levels successively, using
the result of previously decoded levels.
As illustrated in Figure 13, BICM is a more pragmatic coded modulation scheme where
a single code is used. To ensure that the correlations introduced by the mapping and the






v11, . . . , v1n
v21, . . . , v2n
vℓ1, . . . , vℓn
mapper
sn yn
Figure 12. Multilevel coding with multistage decoding.
is a suboptimal scheme, its complexity is lower than MLC/MSD and it achieves relatively





Figure 13. Bit interleaved coded modulation.
Let H be the parity-check matrix representing the parities satisfied by codewords1 in a
standard coded modulation scheme, such that HvT = 0. The only difference between coded
modulation and reconciliation is the fact that the binary sequence v obtained by quantizing
and labeling the continuous symbols xn is not a codeword in general. Nevertheless, following
the idea suggested by Wyner in [46], we can use the syndromes c = HvT 6= 0 as the
additional information sent by Alice to allow Bob to decode. For BICM-like reconciliation,
a single code would be applied to an interleaved version of the whole sequence vn×ℓ, whereas
for MLC/MSD-like reconciliation, ℓ individual codes would be applied successively to the
sequences (vi1, . . . , vin) for i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
3.1.3 Sliced error correction
We point out that the sliced error correction algorithm proposed in [36] is just a special case
of MLC/MSD-like reconciliation, where interactive binary correction protocols optimized for
binary symmetric channels are used as component codes. The algorithm offers a relatively
low complexity, but as we show next, this simplification limits its efficiency. Let (V1, . . . , Vℓ)
be the ℓ random variables corresponding to the ℓ label bits of X̂. Using the chain rule of
1Here, H does not necessarily represent a single code. For instance, for a MLC/MSD scheme, H contains
the parity-check matrices of the codes used at each level.
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mutual information, we have








[H(Vi|Vi−1, . . . , V1) − H(Xi|Y, Vi−1, . . . , V1)]. (3.9)
Sliced error correction assigns label in such a way that H(Vi|Vi−1, . . . , V1) = 1, and Vi is
estimated from (Y, Vi−1, . . . , V1) using the maximum likelihood estimator MLi. By Fano’s
inequality, we have
I(V ;Y ) ≥
ℓ∑
i=1
[1 − h(pi)] , (3.10)
with
pi = P[Vi 6= MLi (Y, Vi−1, . . . , V1)] (3.11)
and h is the binary entropy function. As expected, treating all ℓ levels as binary symmetric
channels underestimates I(X̂ ;Y ), and
∑ℓ
i=1 [1 − h(pi)] only heads toward I(X;Y ) asymp-
totically as ℓ → ∞. For practical values of ℓ (say less than 5) this approximation may not
be tight enough to ensure a good reconciliation efficiency, even with perfect codes achieving
capacity over binary symmetric channels.
3.2 LDPC-based reconciliation of continuous random variables
Achieving high reconciliation efficiency relies on our ability to design codes and decoders
operating at an overall rate close to I(X̂ ;Y ). Turbo codes and LDPC codes are promising
candidates for this purpose since they have already proven their excellent performance for
error correction and side-information coding [47]; however, we limit our investigation to
the study of LDPC codes, although we acknowledge that turbo-codes or any other strong
channel codes would probably yield similar results.
3.2.1 Review of binary LDPC codes
A binary LDPC code is a binary error correcting code characterized by a sparse parity-
check matrix H = [hij ]
j=1..n
i=1..n−k ∈ {0, 1}n−k×n, that is H contains a small number of ones
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compared to the number of zeros. As illustrated in Figure 14, a parity-check matrix can be
represented as a bipartite graph.
H =






1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
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Figure 14. Parity-check matrix and bipartite graph of an LDPC code of blocklength n = 10.
This bipartite graph, also called a Tanner graph, contains two types of nodes: variable
nodes, which are used to represent the codewords bits, and check nodes, which are used to
represent the parity constraints imposed by the parity-check matrix H. A variable node j
is connected to a check node i by an edge if and only hij = 1 in the parity-check matrix.
The degree of a node is simply defined as the number of edges connected to it.
A regular LDPC code is an LDPC code for which all variables nodes have the same
degree dv and all check nodes have the same degree dc. When nodes of the same type have
different degrees, an LDPC code is called irregular. A convenient way of analyzing LDPC
codes is to consider ensembles of LDPC codes rather that individual ones. In particular,











where dmaxv and d
max
c are the maximum degrees of variables nodes and check nodes, respec-
tively, and λi and ρi are the fraction of edges connected to variables nodes of degree i and
check nodes of degree i, respectively. When the block length n is large, all codes within the
ensemble tend to have the same properties.
The good error-correcting performance of LDPC codes is mainly due to the fact that
there exist low-complexity soft decoding algorithms, which exploit the continuous nature of
probability distributions and estimate not only the value of each variable node but also the
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reliability associated to the estimation. For instance, for a binary variable v ∈ {0, 1}, the
reliability is described by the probabilities P[v = 0] and P[v = 1]. Since P[v = 1]+P[v = 0] =





The sign of λv provides the most likely value of the variables, while the magnitude |λ|
provides a measure of reliability. For instance, when λ = 0, both values are equally likely,
and when |λ| = ∞ there is no uncertainty of the value of v. The decoding of LDPC codes
is performed efficiently over the Tanner graph using a message-passing algorithm that we
describe in detail in the next section.
Among the many techniques proposed to analyze and design LDPC codes, the most
successful ones are probably the methods based on density evolution [87] and EXtrinsic
Information Transfer (EXIT) charts [?]. The principle of density evolution is to predict
the error-correcting behavior of LDPC codes by tracking the evolution of the distribution
of messages exchanged between variables nodes and check nodes at each iteration of the
decoding algorithm. EXIT charts have been proposed has a simpler alternative to density
evolution, where a single scalar parameter is tracked instead of the full probability distri-
bution of messages. We refer the reader to references [87, ?] for a detailed presentation of
these techniques.
3.2.2 LDPC-based reconciliation
In this section, we derive an efficient decoding algorithm that applies to both MLC/MSD-
lie reconciliation and BICM-like reconciliation. This algorithm generalizes the standard
decoding algorithm of LDPC codes for Slepian-Wolf compression of non-uniform sources.
We recall that the jth label bit obtained by quantizing symbol xi is vij = Lj (Q(xi)). The
reconciliation algorithm should estimate the values of variable nodes vij given the knowledge
of observations yn and syndromes c. Specifically, we shall compute the a posteriori Log-
Likelihood Ratios (LLRs)
λij = log
P[vij = 0|yn, c]
P[vij = 1|yn, c]
, (3.12)
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for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Notice that the numerator and denominator are
the marginals of the conditional probability of the whole sequence (v11, . . . , vnℓ) given y
n
and c, that is,
P[vij |yn, c] =
∑
vkl 6=vij
P[v11, . . . , vnℓ|yn, c]. (3.13)
We shall see that, under the assumption that the Tanner graph of the LDPC code does
not contain cycles, this marginalization can be computed efficiently. In fact, the above
expression factorizes into a product of simpler marginals and can be computed recursively
through the graph.
Figure 15 illustrates the Tanner graph from the perspective of a variable node vij . Notice
that the graph is not a bipartite graph. In fact, variable nodes (vi1, . . . , viℓ) originating from
the same symbol xi are correlated; therefore, a third type of node, called demapper nodes,
is introduced to account for these correlations.
To analyze the factorization of the marginal probability, we introduce the following
notation.
• the subgraph of nodes connected to demapper node yi through variable node vij is
denoted by Gij ;









• the subgraph of nodes connected to variable node node vij through check node c(u)ij is
denoted by H(u)ij ;










denotes the set of variable node/observation tuples (vt1, . . . , vtℓ, yt) such

































Figure 15. Extended graph of LDPC code from the perspective of variable node vij .
The total conditional probability in Equation (3.13) can be expanded as follows.
P[v11, . . . , vnℓ|yn, c]
(a)∝ p (yn|v11, . . . , vnℓ) P[c|v11, . . . , vnℓ]P[v11, . . . , vnℓ],
= p (yn, v11, . . . , vnℓ) P[c|v11, . . . , vnℓ],
(b)
= p (yi, vi1, . . . , viℓ)
ℓ∏
k=1
p (vy [Gik]) P[c [Gik] |vik,x [Gik]],
(c)
= p (yi, vi1, . . . , viℓ)
ℓ∏
k=1
p (vy [Gik] |vik) P[c [Gik] |vik,vy [Gik]],
=p (yi, vi1, . . . , viℓ)
ℓ∏
k=1
p (c [Gik] ,vy [Gik] |vik) , (3.14)
where (a) follows from Bayes rule and the fact that y is independent of c given (v11, . . . , vnℓ),
and (b − c) follows from the memoryless property of the source and the fact that for all k,
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c [Gik] only depends on v [Gik] given vik.






























The first summation, which does not involve the observation yi corresponding to the bit
vij and only accounts for the correlations specified by the code, is called the extrinsic
information. The second term, which include the contribution of the observation yi, is
called the intrinsic information.




p (c [Gij ] ,vy [Gij] |vij)
(a)


























































































given vij for v 6= u, and (c) follows
























































































where (a) follows from the distributivity of addition and multiplication, (b) follows from the
law of total probability, (c) follows from steps similar to those of Equation (3.16), and (d)
follows by introducing a dummy variable x̂ spanning all the possible quantized values and






























, x̂k = 1
) , (3.18)























































be the variable nodes other than vij involved in the cal-
culation of parity check c
(u)












































































































































































Therefore, the terms λ
(u)
ij can be computed as a function of the a posteriori LLRs of the
variable nodes v
(u)k
ij , with the observations and syndromes in the subgraph H
(u)
ij . The steps
leading to Equations (3.19) and (3.21) can be reapplied to these a posteriori LLRs, which
allows th computation of λij recursively through the graph.
In practice, we are interested in obtaining the LLRs of all variable nodes, and instead of
applying the above recursion for each LLR, it is possible to use a message-passing algorithm
that computes all LLRs simultaneously. This algorithm, called the Sum-Product algorithm,
is an iterative algorithm that consists of a set of local rules specifying the message computed
by each node at each iteration. As illustrated in Figure 16, for each variable node indexed
by ij, there are four types of messages to consider: variable-to-check messages vijk, check-to
variable messages ukij, demapper-to-variable messages oij , and variable-to-demapper mes-
sages eij .
The set of check nodes connected to a given variable node ij is denoted by N (ij), and
the set of variable nodes connected to a given check node k is denoted by M(k). Based




















Figure 16. Messages exchanged between nodes.
 Initialization. Initialize all message to zero.






kij = 0. (3.22)
 Iterations. For 1 ≤ l ≤ lmax




































3. check-to variable-message update
u
(l)





































+1 if x ≥ 0
−1 if x < 0
Note that this algorithm computes the a posteriori LLRs exactly only when the graph
does not contain cycles; however, most “good” finite-length LDPC codes contain cycles,
and the algorithm only provides approximations of the real a posteriori LLRs. The LDPC
codes used with the above message-passing algorithm naturally admits to a density evolution
analysis similar to that of [48], which is sketched in Appendix B.
3.3 Reconciliation of Gaussian random variables
In this section, we investigate the MLC/MSD-like reconciliation and BICM-like reconcilia-
tion of Gaussian random variables
X ∼ N (0,Σ) and Y = X + N, where N ∼ N (0, σ).
We shall see in Chapter 4 that these correlations are useful to distill secret keys over Gaus-
sian channels. In the rest of this section, we adopt the quantization technique proposed in
[36]. The set of real numbers is split into an even number k of intervals {Ij}1..k symmet-
ric around 0 (this ensures the symmetry of the joint distribution between X̂ and Y ), and
interval bounds are optimized using the simplex method in order to maximize I(X̂ ;Y ).
3.3.1 Choice of codes and rates for MLC/MSD-like reconciliation
Before constructing a set of codes for MLC/MSD-like reconciliation, it is first necessary
to identify the rate of each component code. In this section, we compute the optimal
rates that would be required for ideal codes. Although these rates are not achievable with
practical codes, we shall see in the next section that they provide a good starting point for
optimization. To preserve some symmetry in the probability distribution, it is desirable to
consider only labeling strategies satisfying






for b ∈ {0, 1} . In particular, there are two simple labeling strategies fulfilling this require-
ment: natural labeling and anti-natural labeling. Both labeling assign to each interval j
the ℓ-bit binary representation (ℓ = ⌈log2 k⌉) of
j + (2n − k)/2,
but in the natural labeling case the least significant bit level is decoded first while in the
antibinary labeling case the most significant bit level is decoded first.
For a given SNR s, the optimal code rate Riopt required at each level i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} is
related to the mutual information
I(Vi;Y |V1 . . . Vi−1,SNR = s)
by
Riopt = 1 − (I(Vi;Y |V1 . . . Vi−1,SNR = ∞) − I(Vi;Y |V1 . . . Vi−1,SNR = s)) . (3.28)
Figures 17(a) and 17(b) show the mutual information I(Vi;Y |V1 . . . Vi−1,SNR = s) as
a function of the normalized SNR 10 log(Σ2/2σ2), for 16 quantization intervals (ℓ = 4 bit
labeling). The intervals are optimized for each SNR according to the procedure mentioned
earlier.
With natural labeling, the mutual information obtained for the first two level is close
to zero at low SNR, and consequently, according to Equation (3.28), the code rate required
is also extremely small. In this regime, rather than attempting to design efficient low rate
codes, it is easier to use a zero rate code that would simply disclose the bits of the entire
level. This simplification has negligible impact on reconciliation efficiency and reduces the
number of codes to be designed. With anti-natural labeling, all levels contribute significantly
to the total mutual information and no such simplification is possible; therefore, in all
subsequent MLC/MSD simulations, we use natural labeling and carefully choose the number
of quantization intervals to operate in a regime where only two codes are really needed.
For instance, at an SNR Σ2/σ2 = 3, the rates required with 16 quantization intervals
and natural labeling are
R1opt = 0.002, R
2
opt = 0.016, R
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Figure 17. Mutual information by level.
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Note that the effect of quantization is negligible since I(X̂ ;Y ) differs from I(X;Y ) by less
than 0.02 bits.
In order to further simplify the code design, we use irregular LDPC codes optimized
for a binary-input Gaussian channel as component codes. Good degree distributions with
thresholds close to capacity are obtained via density evolution [49]. For our simulations, a
large block length of 200, 000 bits is used, and Tanner graphs are generated randomly while
avoiding loops of length two and four. In spite of the long block length, the performance of
all constructed codes is in general well below that of their capacity achieving counterparts.
Consequently, achieving perfect error correction with high probability is only possible at
the cost of a code rate reduction. Cutting down the rates of each component code would
disclose far too many bits, but, as we discuss in the next section, a careful choice of codes
and iterations between levels make it possible to achieve high reconciliation efficiency.
3.3.2 Practical performance of MLC/MSD-like reconciliation
In this section, we present a pragmatic (and heuristic) code choice strategy based on Ex-
trinsic INformation Transfer (EXIT) charts [50], which are a convenient tool to visualize the
transfer of mutual information between decoders and demappers involved in MLC/MSD.
The behavior of each decoder or demapper is summarized by a curve IE = T (IA), charac-
terizing the amount of extrinsic information IE obtained with a certain a priori information
IA at the input.
The demapper transfer curves IE = Td(IA) cannot be computed in closed form but
can be obtained via Monte-Carlo simulations using Equation (3.23). Likewise, the transfer
curves IE = Tc(IA) of the constructed LDPC codes are obtained by Monte-Carlo simula-
tions, assuming with Gaussian a priori information. Examples of LDPC transfer curves,
obtained after 100 iterations of Sum-Product decoding, are shown in Figure 18. As ex-
pected, these curves show that low rate codes gather extrinsic information at a slower pace
than high rate codes, which suggests that high reconciliation efficiency can be obtained by
compromising only on the rate of high rate codes and by using iterations to compensate for
the poor performance of lower rate ones.
Let us now detail how practical codes rates can be found in the case Σ2/σ2 = 3 with
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16 quantization intervals (4 bits quantization) and a natural labeling. As explained earlier,
the first two levels are entirely disclosed, and, in theory, one would need two ideal codes
with rates 0.26 and 0.92, respectively, to perform MSD. Instead, following the strategy
suggested by the shape of EXIT curves, a rate 0.25 LDPC code is used for the third level,
and we select a high rate code that gathers enough extrinsic information to pursue the
decoding process and corrects all errors when the a priori information is 0.92. The selection
is performed heuristically by drawing EXIT charts and ensuring that iterations allow a
successful decoding. For instance, a rate 0.86 LDPC code 0.86 offers a good compromise.
Figure 18 shows that realistic decoding trajectories are close to the decoding behavior
predicted by EXIT charts The practical code rates selected according to the same procedure
Figure 18. Iterative decoding trajectory when Σ2/σ2 = 3 with 16 quantization intervals and
binary mapping. Decoding trajectory is averaged over 10 blocks.
for different values of SNR are given in Table 1. Note that when rate 1.0 codes were required,
we used algebraic codes with error correcting capability of 1 instead of LDPC codes.
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Table 1. Parameters used for MLC/MSD-like reconciliation.
SNR Intervals I(X̂ ;Y ) H(X̂) Optimum rates Practical rates
1 12 (4 levels) 0.49 3.38 0.001/0.008/0.187/0.915 0/0/0.16/0.86
3 16 (4 levels) 0.98 3.78 0.002/0.016/0.259/0.921 0/0/0.25/0.86
7 22 (5 levels) 1.47 4.23 0.002/0.020/0.295/0.924/1 0/0/0.28/0.86/1
15 32 (5 levels) 1.97 4.68 0.002/0.025/0.332/0.934/1 0/0/0.31/0.86/1
3.3.3 Choice of codes and rates for BICM-like reconciliation
For BICM-like reconciliation, we do not constrain the labeling to satisfy the symmetry
condition given in Equation (3.27). In fact, since a single code is applied to an interleaved
version of the label bits, a code optimized for a symmetric labeling should perform well,
provided the labeling produces a balanced number of zeros and ones. Note that no additional
interleaving is needed here since LDPC codes inherently interleave bit nodes to define parity-
check equations.
The optimal code rate required at a given SNR is




where I(s) is the maximum BICM-capacity at SNR s. I(s) depends on the mapping and
cannot be computed exactly; however, if we let Vm be the binary random variable at level
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For instance with 16 quantization intervals, Σ2/σ2 = 3 and a gray mapping, we obtain
0.26 ≤ Ropt ≤ 0.27.
Consequently, the maximum reconciliation efficiency is less than 88%. When choosing a
code one has to ensure that the rate is also compatible with the mapping used. Figure 19
shows the transfer curves of a rate 0.16 LDPC code optimized for the Gaussian channel as
well as various demapper transfer curves. All transfer curves are obtained via Monte-Carlo
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simulations with Gaussian a priori information. Perfect decoding is possible if the LDPC
code transfer curve remains below the demapper curve. It clearly appears that all mappings
cannot be used and that no mapping can gather high extrinsic information for both low and
high a priori information. Gray mapping gathers the highest extrinsic information without
a priori information but the slope of its transfer curve is the steepest, which means that it
has to be associated with a strong code. The other mappings can be used with weaker but
lower rate codes and are therefore not suitable for efficient reconciliation.
Figure 19. Transfer curves of demapper and code used in BICM-like reconciliation for Σ2/σ2 = 3
and 16 quantization intervals.
Unfortunately even with Gray mapping and a strong code we found that the practical
code rates were far below the optimal ones. As shown in Figure 19 a rate 0.16 LDPC code is
required to ensure full error correction even though the demapper initially feeds the decoder
with 0.24 a priori information bits.
3.3.4 Simulation results
Table 2 shows the reconciliation efficiency obtained with our MLC/MSD-like procedure for
different values of the SNR and compares it with the efficiency of sliced error correction.
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Simulations were performed over 50 blocks of size 200,000, and all errors were corrected.
When rate-1 codes were required, we used a BCH code with block length 4091 and error
correcting capability t = 1. This disclosed slightly less than 0.003 additional bits per symbol
sent. Since high-rate LDPC codes would sometimes fail to correct a couple of erroneous
bits we also applied the same BCH code on top of these LDPC codes.
All sliced error correction results are given for a quantization with 32 intervals. The




SEC refer to the efficiency with ideal binary codes, interactive
error correction and one-way error correction with Turbo-codes, respectively, as reported
in [51]. ηMLC is the efficiency obtained with MLS/MSD-like reconciliation using the code









1 75% 60% <50% 98% 79.4%
3 87% 79% 67% 98% 88.7%
7 90% 84% 76% 98% 90.9%
15 92% 87% 82% 98.5% 92.2%
Table 2. Reconciliation efficiency.
Clearly, the proposed reconciliation procedure achieves close if no better efficiency that
sliced error correction with ideal codes.
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CHAPTER 4
OPPORTUNISTIC KEY AGREEMENT OVER QUASI-STATIC
WIRELESS CHANNELS
This chapter builds upon the results obtained in Chapter 3 and investigates the design
of a practical communication scheme providing information-theoretic security for wireless
channels. We begin by establishing the fundamental security limits of quasi-static fading
channels in terms of average secrecy capacity and probability of outage of secrecy capacity,
and subsequently describe a secure communication protocol that exploits the fluctuations
of fading coefficients to allow the efficient generation of secret keys. The performance of
the protocol is characterized analytically in asymptotic regimes and through Monte-Carlo
simulations. We also consider a more realistic situation where the eavesdropper’s channel
state information is imperfectly known, and we show the effectiveness of the protocol.
4.1 Information-theoretic security over wireless channels
4.1.1 Wireless system setup
Figure 20 illustrates the wireless system setup considered in this chapter. A base station
(Alice) wants to send messages, represented by the random variable M to a user in the
network (Bob). Messages are encoded into codewords Xn for transmission over the channel.
The main channel is a discrete-time Rayleigh fading channel, and Bob’s observations are
given by
Ym(i) = Hm(i)X(i) + Nm(i) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where Hm(i) is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero-mean
and unit-variance representing the main channel fading coefficient and Nm(i) is a zero-mean
circularly symmetric complex Gaussian noise with variance σ2m.
Another user in the network (Eve) is also capable of eavesdropping Alice’s transmissions.
The eavesdropper’s channel is an independent discrete-time Rayleigh fading channel, and
Eve’s obervations are given by
Yw(i) = Hw(i)X(i) + Nw(i) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
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where Hw(i) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero-
mean and unit-variance representing the eavesdropper’s channel fading coefficient and Nw(i)














Figure 20. Wireless wiretap channel setup.
It is assumed that the channel input, the channel fading coefficients, and the channel
noises are all independent. It is also assumed that both the main and the eavesdropper’s
channels are quasi-static fading channels, that is, the fading coefficients, albeit random, are
constant during the transmission of an entire codeword (Hm(i) = Hm,∀i = 1, . . . , n and
Hw(i) = Hw,∀i = 1, . . . , n) and, moreover, independent from codeword to codeword. This
corresponds to a situation where the coherence time of the channel is large.










Consequently, the instantaneous SNR at Bob’s receiver is
Γm(i) = P |Hm(i)|2/σ2m = P |Hm|2/σ2m = Γm










Likewise, the instantaneous SNR at Eve’s receiver is
Γw(i) = P |Hw(i)|2/σ2w = P |Hw|2/σ2w = Γw











Since the channel fading coefficients H are zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables




















, γw > 0. (4.2)





and secrecy with respect to the eavesdropper is measured in terms of the equivocation rate
Re =
H(M |Y nw )
n
.
In the rest of this chapter, we focus our attention on the case of perfectly secure communi-
cation (Re = R) and limit our analysis to the study of the secrecy capacity.
4.1.2 Impact of fading on secure communications
In this section, we study the impact of fading on the secrecy capacity of this wireless system
by considering two metrics: average secrecy capacity and probability of outage of secrecy
capacity. We assume that Alice and Bob have perfect knowledge of the main channel fading
coefficient and that Eve also has perfect knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel fading
coefficient. These assumptions are realistic for the slow fading wireless environment under
consideration: both receivers can always obtain close to perfect channel estimates, and
additionally, the legitimate receiver can also feedback the channel estimates to the legitimate
transmitter. Moreover, we assume that Alice and Bob also have partial knowledge of the
eavesdropper’s channel fading coefficient. Since Eve is assumed to be another active user in
the wireless network (e.g. in a TDMA environment), Alice can estimate the eavesdropper’s
channel during Eve’s transmissions.
Nevertheless, we shall see that the probability of outage of secrecy capacity allows, in
principle, to consider also situations where no Channel State Information (CSI) about the
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eavesdropper’s channel is available to Alice and Bob. This case corresponds to the situation
where Eve is a purely passive and malicious eavesdropper in the wireless network.
We start by deriving the secrecy capacity for one realization of a pair of quasi-static
fading channels with complex noise and complex fading coefficients. Based on the result of
Theorem 2.2, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 ([12]). The secrecy capacity for one realization (γm, γw) of the quasi-static
complex fading wiretap-channel is given by




log (1 + γm) − log (1 + γw) if γm > γw
0 if γm ≤ γw.
(4.3)
Proof. See Section 4.4.1.
 Average secrecy capacity If perfect CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is available
to Alice, the coding scheme achieving the instantaneous secrecy capacity can be adapted
to every realization of the fading coefficients. Therefore, in principle, any average secure






Cs (γm, γw) p(γm)p(γw)dγmdγw
is achievable. Note that the average secrecy capacity is easily computable numerically. It
can be shown (see the proof of Lemma 4.2 in Section 4.4.2) that




















and E1 is the exponential-integral function.
Figure 21 compares the average secrecy capacity of a quasi-static fading channel to the
secrecy capacity of a classic wiretap Gaussian channel. Strikingly, the average secrecy rate
of the fading channel is higher than or close to the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap
channel. Moreover, contraty to the Gaussian wiretap channel, the average secrecy rate of
the fading channel is non-zero even when the average SNR of the main channel is lower than
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the average SNR of the eavesdropper’s channel. These observations underline the potential
of fading channels to secure the transmission of information between two legitimate parties
against a possible eavesdropper.
Figure 21. Normalized average secrecy rate versus γm, for selected values of γw. Thinner lines
correspond to the normalized average secrecy rate in the case of Rayleigh fading channels,
while thicker lines correspond to the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel. Nor-
malization is effected with respect to the capacity of an AWGN channel with SNR equal to
γm.
 Outage probability of secrecy capacity The secrecy capacity of a quasi-static Rayleigh
fading channel can also be characterized characterized in terms of outage probability.
Proposition 4.1.

















= P[Γm > 2











where the last equality exploits the fact that p(γm, γw) = p(γm)p(γw). The expressions
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of p(γm) and p(γw) are given by Equation (4.2), and the result follows after some simple
algebra.
Based on this result, it follows immediately that for average signal-to-noise ratios γm
and γw on the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively, the probability
of strictly positive secrecy capacity is




It is also useful to express this probability in terms of parameters related to user location.
Letting dm be the distance between Alice and Bob, dw be the distance between Alice and
Eve, and α be the pathloss exponent characterizing the strength of signal attenuation with
distance, we have γm ∝ 1/d
α
m and γw ∝ 1/d
α
w [52]; therefore, the probability of strictly
positive secrecy capacity can be written as




When γm ≫ γw (or dm ≪ dw) then P[Cs > 0] ≈ 1 (or P[Cs = 0] ≈ 0). Conversely, when
γw ≫ γm (or dw ≪ dm) then P[Cs > 0] ≈ 0 (or P[Cs = 0] ≈ 1). This confirms the intuition
that greater security is achieved when Eve is further away from Alice than Bob.
We are now ready to characterize the outage probability
Pout(Rs) = P[Cs < Rs],
that is the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity is less than a target secrecy
rate Rs > 0. The operational significance of this definition of outage probability is twofold.
First, it provides the fraction of fading realizations for which the wireless channel can
support a secure rate of Rs bits/channel use. Second, it provides a security metric for the
situation where Alice and Bob have no CSI about the eavesdropper. In fact, in this case,
Alice has no choice but to set her secrecy rate to a constant Rs. By doing so, Alice is
assuming that the capacity of the wiretap channel is given by C ′w = Cm − Rs. As long as
Rs < Cs, Eve’s channel is worse than Alice’s estimate, and consequently, Cw < C
′
w and the
wiretap codes used by Alice ensures perfect secrecy. Otherwise, if Rs > Cs, Cw > C
′
w and
information-theoretic security is compromised.
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Proposition 4.2. The outage probability for a target secrecy rate Rs is given by











It is illustrative to examine the asymptotic behavior of the outage probability for extreme




and when Rs → ∞, we have that Pout → 1, such that it becomes impossible for Alice and
Bob to transmit secret information (at very high rates).
Figure 22. Outage probability versus γm, for selected values of γw and for a normalized target
secrecy rate equal to 0.1. Normalization is effected with respect to the capacity of an AWGN
channel with SNR equal to γm.
Also of interest is the asymptotic behavior of the outage probability for extreme values
of the average SNRs of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel. When γm ≫ γw,
equation Equation (4.8) yields








Figure 23. Outage probability versus dW /dM , for selected values of γm and for a normalized
target secrecy rate equal to 0.1. Normalization is effected with respect to the capacity of an
AWGN channel with SNR equal to γm.
and in a high SNR regime Pout ≈ (2Rs − 1)/γm, i.e. the outage probability decays as 1/γm.
Conversely, when γw ≫ γm,
Pout(Rs) ≈ 1,
and confidential communication becomes impossible.
Figure 22 depicts the outage probability versus γm, for selected values of γw and for
a normalized target secrecy rate equal to 0.1. Observe that the higher γm the lower the
outage probability, and the higher γw the higher the probability of an outage. Moreover,
if γm ≫ γw, the outage probability decays as 1/γm. Conversely, if γw ≫ γm the outage
probability approaches one. The relationship between outage and distance is highlighted in
Figure 23.
The outage probability is also convenient to analyze the situation where Alice might only
have imperfect estimates Ĥm and Ĥw of the gains of the main channel and eavesdropper’s
channels, respectively. We can reasonably assume that Bob cooperates with Alice, which
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allows her to obtain a perfect estimate of the main channel fading coefficient. Hence,
Ĥm = Hm,
where Hm is the true fading coefficient of the main channel. Unfortunately Eve may not be
as helpful and Alice’s knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel fading is more likely to be
noisy. In order to assess the performance of our protocol under more realistic conditions,
we model Alice’s estimate of Eve’s fading coefficient by
Ĥw = Hw + Z
′
w,
where Hw is the true fading coefficient and Z
′
w is a zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with
known variance σ2e per dimension.
In the absence of additional information allowing Alice to refine her estimation, we have
to resort once again to an outage analysis. If Alice communicates by blindly assuming that
her estimation is accurate, an outage occurs whenever Alice underestimates the gain of the
eavesdropper’s channel and attempts to achieve a secure communication rate not supported
by the channel.










Proof. See Section 4.4.3.
This upper bound on the outage probability is a decreasing function of the variance of
the channel estimation error σ2e , so that the higher σ
2
e the lower the outage probability. This
counterintuitive result stems from the fact that, at moderate values of the variance of the
channel estimation error, Alice tends to consistently underestimate the true wiretap fading
coefficient. Consequently, she consistently attempts to communicate at secure rates lower
than what the true instantaneous secrecy capacity of the channel would allow.
4.1.3 Opportunistic secret key agreement
In principle, secure communications over wireless quasi-static fading channels can be achieved
with codes designed for the Gaussian wiretap channel; however, although the secrecy capac-
ity of the Gaussian wiretap channel has been fully characterized, designing practical coding
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schemes is still an open problem. On the other hand, the results on secret key agreement
by public discussion and privacy amplification presented in Chapter 2 support the idea
that the generation of information theoretically secure keys from common randomness is
a somewhat less difficult problem. This naturally suggest a four-step approach to secure
communications: randomness sharing, information reconciliation, privacy amplification and
secure communication.
• Opportunistic randomness sharing. To share randomness, Alice transmits dis-
crete random symbols, represented by the random variable X, over the wireless chan-
nel. Bob and Eve observe correlated symbols, represented by the random variables
Ym and Yw, respectively. In theory, as long as Eve and Bob do not share the same
information, the amount of secrecy that Alice and Bob can distill from their common
randomness is non-zero [24]; however, we are interested in designing a one-way se-
cret key agreement protocol, which requires communications from Alice to Bob only.
Therefore, the common randomness must be such that I(X;Ym) > I(X;Yw). Clearly,
this is the case if randomness is shared when the secrecy capacity of the wireless
channel is strictly positive. Hence, provided perfect CSI of the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel is available, Alice and Bob should opportunistically exploit the fluctuations of the
instantaneous secrecy capacity Cs with time, that is they should attempt to share ran-
domness only when Cs is sufficiently large. Specifically, in the remaining of the paper,
we take the set of fading realization (γm, γw) for which an opportunistic transmission
of randomness is performed to be
D(τ, κ) = {(γm, γm) : Cs ≥ τ, Cm > κ} . (4.10)
The threshold τ ensures that a minimum amount of secrecy can be distilled from
the randomness while the threshold κ ensures that the correlation between Alice and
Bob’s data is high enough. As discussed in Chapter 3, the latter condition is required
for practical algorithms. Finally, let us emphasize that even though we assume perfect
CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel, the behavior of the protocol is governed by the
fading realizations in the set D(τ, κ) and, therefore, by a probability of outage. This
connection will be established explicitly in Section 4.3.
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• Key generation: reconciliation and privacy amplification. When the esti-
mated fading realizations are such that the secrecy capacity or main channel capacity
are too small ((γm, γw) /∈ D(τ, κ)), Alice and Bob communicate to generate a secure
key from the shared randomness previously obtained. As discussed in Chapter 2,
key generation is performed in two steps. First, Alice and Bob “reconcile” their ran-
domness, that is they correct the discrepancies in their randomness by exchanging
additional error-correction information. Second, Alice and Bob distill secret-bits from
their corrected date using privacy amplification.
• Secure communication. Alice and Bob can finally use their secret key to transmit
















(Cs ≥ τ and Cm ≥ κ)





Figure 24. Flowchart of the opportunistic protocol.
The flowchart of the opportunistic protocol is shown in Figure 24. Note that the random-
ness sharing and privacy amplification steps rely on a perfect estimation of the fading coef-
ficients to calculate the instantaneous secrecy capacity and correctly estimate the amount
of secrecy to distill. We shall see in Section 4.3 that this assumption can be somewhat
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alleviated to consider a more realistic situation where only imperfect CSI (or a conservative
estimate) is available for the eavesdropper’s channel.
4.2 Practical algorithms for Secret-key Agreement
In this section, we detail the various steps of the protocol presented in the previous section.
To ease the presentation, we present the protocol for a Gaussian wiretap channel, which
corresponds to a single realization of the fading coefficients (γm, γw) in the wireless setup
of Section 4.1. Its performance in the quasi-static fading case is evaluated in Section 4.3.
The existence of common information between Alice and Bob is the essential ingredient
for secret key agreement. In a wiretap scenario, Alice can generate this shared randomness
by transmitting a sequence Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn) of n i.i.d. realizations of a discrete random
variable X over the main channel, which provides Bob and Eve with sequences of correlated
continuous random variables Y nm = (Ym,1, . . . , Ym,n) and Y
n
w = (Yw,1, . . . , Yw,n), respectively.
As discussed in Chapter 3, for our application to the Gaussian wiretap channel, we
use a MultiLevel Coding (MLC) and MultiStage Decoding (MSD) scheme to reconcile and
correct the differences between X̂ and X. Since the reconciliation algorithm is not optimal,
its efficiency β is stricly less than unity. At the end of the reconciliation step, Alice an Bob
share with high probability the common sequence Xn with entropy nrec = nH(X), which
is then compressed into a binary sequence S of length nrec.
Finally, the privacy amplification method described in Section 2.5 can be used to distill
a secret key of length
k = n(βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw)) − 2s − 2 − r0 (4.11)
with r0 > 0,s > 0. Letting E be the information accessible to the eavesdropper and G be
the random variable denoting a hash function chosen at random from a family of universal
hash functions, Eve’s uncertainty on the key K = G(S) is guaranteed to satisfy
H(K|G,E) ≥ k − 2
−r0
ln 2
with probability 1 − 2−s. (4.12)
For our protocol, we do not develop anything new and use standard families of hash func-
tions [40, 10].
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Finally, the secret key generated K = G(S) can be used to secure Alice’s message,
using either a one-time pad for perfect secrecy or a standard secret key encryption algo-
rithm. Eve’s uncertainty H(K|G,E) about the key is as close to k as we want according to
Equation (4.12).
Since the size of the key generated from common randomness is proportional to
βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw) bits/symbol,
we choose the random variable X such that the mutual information I(X;Ym) is maximized.
Ideally, Alice should choose X achieving the capacity Cm = 0.5 log2(1 + γm) of the main
channel, which is possible only with continuous Gaussian random variables; however the
discrete support X and the probability mass function of X can always be optimized so that
I(X;Ym) approaches the channel capacity Cm with arbitrary precision. For instance, for a
fixed size Nc = |X | of the support, this optimization can be performed with the algorithm
proposed in [53]. Alternatively, a good approximation of the optimum can be obtained
by expanding a uniformly spaced support {xi}i=1...Nc =
{
±1,±3, . . . ,±Nc−12
}
by a factor
α ∈ R+, and using a Maxwell-Boltzmann probability distribution










Note that even though I(X;Ym) is not a convex function of α and λ, non-linear programming
seems to be relatively insensitive to the initialization of the optimization. Also, Nc should
be large enough so that I(X;Ym) approaches Cm within the required precision, which is
discussed in Section 4.3.
Once again, we point out that the above protocol relies on the results of [38, 39, 41] that
were only proven for discrete random variables whereas Ym and Yw are continuous random
variables; however, it should be noted that these continuous random variables only appear
as conditioning random variables in expressions such as H(X|Yw) where X is discrete.
Therefore, the various results are still valid in this case. For instance, Ym can be quantized
into a discrete random variable Y∆ such that H(X|Y∆) approaches H(X|Ym) with arbitrary
precision as ∆ → 0, and the Slepian-Wolf theorem still holds.
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4.3 Performance evaluation
4.3.1 Performance metrics for secure communications
The information-theoretic secure rates of the secret key agreement protocol can be as-
sessed only if the keys are used in conjunction with a one-time pad. However, in princi-
ple, the protocol could also be tailored to standard encryption algorithms. Although no
information-theoretic security can be guaranteed in this latter case, combining a physical-
layer key-generation technique with a symmetric encryption scheme could still be a means
of enhancing security. In fact, key-generation rates could be substantially higher than those
offered by public-key schemes. Moreover, keys generated from the physical layer are inde-
pendent from one another, which ensures that the security of the system is re-initialized
at each round of key-generation. An attacker getting access to one key would be none
the wiser once the key is renewed. Based on these considerations, the performance of the
opportunistic protocol is evaluated with the following metric.
Definition 4.1. The average1 η-secure throughput T s(η) of a secret key agreement protocol
is the average number of cyphertext bits transmitted per channel use, when the cyphertext
is obtained with a symmetric encryption scheme such that the ratio of secret key bits used
per cyphertext bits is η.
In the above definition, generated secret key bits do not contribute to T s(η) since keys
themselves do not convey any information. The case η = 1 corresponds to the situation
where one bit of secret key is used for each bit of cyphertext. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that the encryption scheme is a one-time pad, and therefore, T s(1) measures an
average communication rate with perfect security. When η < 1, T s(η) loses all significance
in terms of information-theoretically secure communication rate; however, if ks is the key
length required by an encryption scheme, the corresponding key renewal rate is ks/η channel
uses.
Unlike wiretap coding, where messages are transmitted securely directly, secret key
agreement requires additional communication to distill a key and send an encrypted mes-
sage. Here, since we do not assume the existence of another public error-free channel, parts
1The average is taken over all channel realizations.
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of the available communication rate has to be sacrificed for that purpose. We formalize this
constraint by introducing the following metric.
Definition 4.2. The average η-communication throughput T c(η) is the average number of
message bits per channel used that can be transmitted in addition to the message required
for reconciliation and privacy amplification and to the messages encrypted with the keys.
Clearly, T s(η) and T c(η) are not independent and, by definition, take only positive
values.
We are now ready to characterize the maximum secure throughput of the protocol.
To simplify equations, we use the following notation. For a given parameter α(γm, γw)
depending on the fading realizations (γm, γw) and a set D of fading realizations, we let 〈α〉D
denote the average of X(γm, γw) over D. We also assume that the coherence time of the
channel is large enough, so that the block length n is large and the parameters s, r0 of
privacy amplification can be neglected, and that Alice and Bob can always communicate
over the main channel at a rate close to capacity.
Proposition 4.4. The maximum secure throughput T s(η) achievable by the opportunistic
secret key agreement protocol is
max
τ≥0.κ≥κmin
η−1〈βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw)〉D(τ,κ) (4.14)
subject to 〈Cm〉Dc(τ,κ) − 〈2H(X) + β(η−1 − 1)I(X;Ym) − η−1I(X;Yw)〉D(τ,κ) ≥ 0,
(4.15)
where Dc(τ, κ) denotes the complement of D(τ, κ) in R2+, and κmin is imposed by the rec-
onciliation algorithm.
Proof. When the fading realizations (γm, γw) ∈ D(τ, κ), an opportunistic transmission is
performed. From Equation (4.11), we know that the average number of key bits extractable
per channel use is
〈βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw)〉D(τ,κ),
and therefore, the average secure throughtput is
T s(η) = η
−1〈βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw)〉D(τ,κ). (4.16)
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From Equation (2.6), we also know that the average number of bits per channel use that
have to be transmitted for reconciliation is
〈H(X) − βI(X;Ym)〉D(τ,κ). (4.17)
The average number of bits per channel use required by privacy amplification depend on
the number of bits required to identify a given universal hash function within its family.
The minimum size of a family of universal hash functions G : {0, 1}nrec → {0, 1}k is known
to be at least 2nrec−k [54], and identifying a given function therefore requires the transmis-
sion of nrec − k bits; however, no hashing scheme is known to achieve this bound for any
nrec, therefore we consider the more realistic situation where the identification requires the
transmission of nrec bits. For instance, this can be achieved with the following family [10].
HGF(2nrec )→{0,1}nkey = {hc : c ∈ GF(2nrec)} , (4.18)
where hc(x) is defined as nkey distinct bits of the product cx in a polynomial representation
of GF(2nrec). Consequently the average number of bits per channel use required by privacy
amplification is
〈H(X)〉D(τ,κ). (4.19)
Based on our assumption that Alice and Bob can always communicate are a rate equal to
the capacity of the main channel, the average number of bits available for communication
in addition to the opportunistic transmissions is
〈Cm〉Dc(τ,κ). (4.20)
Therefore, the communication throughput is obtained by subtracting Equations (4.16-4.19)
from Equation (4.20) and recalling that T c(η) ≥ 0 yields the desired result.
4.3.2 Asymptotic performance analysis
Obtaining analytical expression for the optimal performance of the opportunistic communi-
cation protocol is non-trivial on several accounts. First, the simplification of the expression
in Proposition 4.4 requires the characterization of the trade-off between H(X) and I(X;Ym)
(or I(X;Yw)) for an arbitrary random variable X. For a given I(X;Yw), we have observed
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that the Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution of Equation (4.13) yields a smaller H(X) than
most other distributions, but for every pair of fading realizations (γm, γw) the parameters α
and λ have to be optimized, which makes the analytical characterization intractable. Sec-
ond, the optimal performance depends explicitly on the maximization over the parameters
τ and κ.
Therefore, the following analysis considers a (sub-optimal) protocol where the random
symbols sent over the channel during the opportunistic transmissions are chosen from a
QAM constellation with uniform probability. We also assume that reconciliation is per-
formed with efficiency β = 1 for all SNRs, and κ = 0.
Proposition 4.5 (adapted from [55]). Let C be the capacity of a complex AWGN channel
with input power constraint P , and let N = ⌊2C/2+1⌋2. If the input symbols X are chosen




≤ P , then the
mutual information between the input X and the output Y bounded as
C ≥ I(X;Y ) ≥ C − ξ with ξ > 0 independent of C,
and the entropy of X is bounded as
C + 2 ≥ H(X) ≥ C.






〈Cm〉D(τ) + η−1〈Cw〉D(τ) − ξ(η−1 − 1)P0(τ) ≥ (4.21)
〈Cm〉Dc(τ) − 〈2H(X) + β(η−1 − 1)I(X;Ym) − η−1I(X;Yw)〉D(τ) (4.22)




〈Cm〉D(τ) + η−1〈Cw〉D(τ) − (4 + ξη−1)P0(τ) (4.23)
and
η−1〈Cm〉D(τ) − η−1〈Cw〉D(τ) + ξP0(τ) ≥ (4.24)
η−1〈βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw)〉D(τ) (4.25)
≥ η−1〈Cm〉D(τ) − η−1〈Cw〉D(τ) − ξP0(τ) (4.26)
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The above bounds allows us to characterize the rates achievable by the protocol in asymp-
totic regimes.
 Secrecy-limited regime. This regime corresponds to the situation where γm → 0, and
therefore, the secrecy capacity over the wireless channel is mainly limited by the capacity
of the eavesdropper’s channel.
Theorem 4.1. In the secrecy-limited regime, the secure throughput is bounded from below
as
T s(η) ≥ η−1〈Cm − Cw〉D(0) − ξP0(0). (4.27)
Proof. By definition of 〈Cm〉D(τ) and P0(τ) we have
∀τ ≥ 0 lim 〈Cm〉D(τ) = 0 and limP0(τ) = 0 when γm → 0. (4.28)
Hence, we can take τ = 0 in Equation (4.23), and Equation (4.23) is positive for γm small
enough.
This result is somewhat disappointing since the lower bound can be negative; however,
in practice, by using a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribution for the random symbols instead of a
uniform distribution, we can expect ξ to be small. Hence, the secure throughput achievable
by the protocol in the secrecy limited regime should be close to the average secrecy capacity
of the channel.
 Communication-limited regime. By opposition to the secrecy-limited regime, this
regime corresponds to the case where γm → ∞, and therefore the secrecy capacity is mainly
limited by the capacity of the main channel.
Theorem 4.2. In the communication limited regimes, the secure throughput achievable by
the opportunistic secret key agreement protocol is such that





Moreover, these throughputs are achievable by choosing τ such that 2τ = O (γm) and in this
case,
T s(η) ≈ η−1τP0(τ) when γm → ∞. (4.30)
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Before proving the result, we introduce a proposition that provides bounds for 〈Cm〉D(τ)
and 〈Cw〉D(τ) depending on P0(τ). The proof is provided in Section 4.4.2.
Proposition 4.6. The average value of the main channel capacity over the set D(τ) can










≤ 〈Cm〉D(τ) ≤ P0(τ)
(




Likewise, the average value of the wiretap channel capacity over the D(τ) can be bounded
as follows.





Proof of Theorem 4.2. By using the inequalities of Proposition 4.6 in Equation (4.23), we













)P0 (τ) − (4 + ξη−1)P0(τ).
(4.33)
For any γm, to satisfy the constraint in the maximization of Proposition 4.4, it suffices to
take τ such that
F (γm)
(2 + η−1) (τ + γw + γm2
−τ (log 2)−1) − η−1F ( γwγmγm+γw ) + (4 + ξη
−1)
≥ P0(τ). (4.34)
For any c0 > 0, we can choose τ such that γm2
−τ = c0, and τ = log2 γm − log2 c0 > 0 for




= 1 when γm → ∞, (4.35)
the left-hand side of Equation (4.34) converges to
log 2
2 + η−1
when γm → ∞, (4.36)










therefore, we can always choose c0 (independent of η) such that Equation (4.34) is satisfied
when γm → ∞. Substituting such a τ in Equation (4.24) and (4.26), we have.
〈Cm〉D(τ) = O(τP0(τ)) and 〈Cm〉D(τ) = O(P0(τ)), (4.38)
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when γm → ∞. Using these scaling laws in Equations (2.3) and (4.26), we obtain the second
part of the theorem,
η−1〈I(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw)〉D(τ) ≈ η−1τP0(τ) when γm → ∞. (4.39)
The first part of the theorem follows by recalling that P0(τ) = O(1) and τ = O(log γm)
when γm → ∞.
For η = 1, the result of Theorem 4.2 states that, in the communication-limited regime,





. Hence, even if secret key agreement incurs a rate penalty compared to
the direct use of wiretap codes, this penalty is a constant fraction of the the average secrecy
capacity.
4.3.3 Simulation results
In this section, we characterize the secure throughput achievable by the protocol through
Monte-Carlo simulations. Simulations are performed using a Maxwell-Boltzmann distribu-
tion of the random symbols, for which
I(X;Ym) ≈ Cm, I(X;Yw) ≈ Cw, and H(X) ≤ Cm + 2. (4.40)
The maximum average secure throughput for η = 1 achievable by the opportunistic
protocol is shown Figure 25.
As expected the protocol is in general sub-optimal since most of the main channel capac-
ity has to be sacrificed for key agreement. Interestingly when the wiretap channel average
SNR γw is well above the main channel average SNR γm, all the additional communication
required for reconciliation and privacy amplification as well as the communication secured
by a one-time pad, can be performed when the secrecy capacity is zero. In this case, the
protocol incurs little loss of secure communication rate.
Figure 26 shows the secure throughputs obtained for different values of η. Strictly
speaking, the protocol does not provide any information theoretic security in this regime,
since the keys generated are used to encode several bits; nevertheless, this result shows
that the protocol provides an efficient and potentially fast way of exchanging information-
theoretically secure keys. In this mode of operation, it could be tailored with standard
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Figure 25. Average secure throughput (thin lines) and average secrecy capacity (thick lines).
All throughputs are normalized to the channel capacity of a Gaussian channel with same
average SNR γm.
secure encryption algorithms (such as AES with 192 bits) to strengthen the current level of
security of wireless communications.
4.3.4 Mitigating the effects of imperfect CSI
In this last section, we consider the situation discussed in Section 4.1, where Alice has
perfect CSI about the main channel fading coefficient, but only partial CSI about the
eavesdropper’s channel fading coefficient. As mentioned in Section before, Alice has little
choice but to apply the opportunistic protocol blindly, and the keys generated have length
k̂ = n
(
βI(X;Ym) − Î (X;Yw)
)
− 2s − 2 − r0. (4.41)
Unfortunately, the lower bound on Eve’s Ŕ’enyi entropy is in reality
n (βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw)) − 2s − 2. (4.42)
Therefore, from Theorem 2.5, Eve’s uncertainty on the final key is





Figure 26. Secure throughput for various values of η.
Clearly, when I(X;Yw) < Î (X;Yw), Alice unnecessarily reduces her secure throughput, but
this does not compromise the secrecy of the key; however, when Î (X;Yw) > I(X;Yw), Alice
understimates the information leaked to the eavesdropper and subsequently generate keys
whose entropy is not maximum.
Until now, we have assumed that the parameter r0 was chosen such that r0 ≪ n. To





From Equation (4.43), we see that as long as Î (X;Yw)− I(X;Yw) < α, the lower bound on
H(K̂|G,E = e) approaches k̂ exponentially as n → ∞.
The introduction of imperfect CSI and the use of the parameter α slightly modify the
expression of communication throughput given in Proposition 4.4. T s(η) is now given by
max
τ
η−1〈βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw) − α〉D(τ,κ) (4.44)
subject to 〈Cm〉Dc(τ,κ) − 〈2H(X) + β(η−1 − 1)I(X;Ym) − η−1I(X;Yw) − η−1α〉D(τ,κ) ≥ 0,(4.45)
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Contrary to the situation where perfect CSI is available, the average secure throughput
defined above is not sufficient to characterize the security of the system. In fact it only
represents Alice’s targeted secure communication rate, which might be different from the
true secure communication rate. Hence, we need to introduce the true average secure
throughput Rs and the average leaked throughput Rl defined as:
Rs = η−1〈βI(X;Ym) − I(X;Yw) − α〉Ds , (4.46)









(γ̂m, γw) : Ĉs ≥ τ, Cm ≥ κ, I(X;Yw) − Î (X;Yw) ≥ α
}
(4.49)
These expressions cannot be computed in close form but can be obtained with Monte-Carlo
simulations. Figure 27 shows the results obtained for an estimation noise variance of σ2 = 10
and σ2 = 0.0001 when η = 1 and α = 0 (i.e. the safety parameter r0 ≪ n).
Interestingly, as already pointed out in Section 4.1.2, when Alice has a bad estimation of
the eavesdropper’s channel fading coefficient, and if the main channel SNR is large, most of
the keys generated are still secure. This unexpected behavior is created by the asymmetry
of the distribution p(γ̂w|γw), which forces Alice to underestimate the eavesdropper fading
coefficient most of the time. On the other hand, when the estimation of the wiretap CSI
improves, the impact of imperfect CSI is somewhat mitigated by increasing the parameter
α, which simply plays the role of a safety margin and reduces the length of the generated
keys. By increasing α, the average leaked throughput can be made arbitrarily small, at the
cost of a decreased secure throughput. Figure 28 shows the results obtained for α = 0.1.
When σ2 = 0.0001, the secure throughput loss is negligible, however this slight increase
in α suffices to ensure the secrecy of the keys generated. The mitigation is less effective when
σ2 = 10, and a further increase of α would be necessary to reduce the leaked throughput.
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Figure 27. Impact of imperfect CSI. Thicker lines represent the estimated average secrecy
capacity. The diamond lines (⋄) represent Alice’s targeted average secure throughput with
her imperfect CSI, the square lines (⊡) and circle lines (◦) respectively represent the true
average secure throughput and average leaked throughput. All throughputs are normalized
to the channel capacity of a Gaussian channel with same average SNR γm.
4.4 Proofs for Chapter 4
4.4.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Suppose that both the main and the wiretap channel are complex AWGN channels, i.e. trans-
mit and receive symbols are complex and both additive noise processes are zero mean cir-







≤ P . Since each use of the complex AWGN channel can be
viewed as two uses of a real-valued AWGN channel [56, Appendix B], the secrecy capacity















To complete the proof, we introduce complex fading coefficients for both the main
2Alternatively, this result can be proven by repeating step by step the proofs of [7] using complex-valued
random variables instead of real-valued ones.
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Figure 28. Mitigation of imperfect CSI. Thicker lines represent the estimated average secrecy
capacity. The diamond lines (⋄) represent Alice’s targeted average secure throughput with
her imperfect CSI, the square lines (⊡) and circle lines (◦) respectively represent the true
average secure throughput and average leaked throughput. All throughputs are normalized
to the channel capacity of a Gaussian channel with same average SNR γm.
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, as detailed in Section 4.1.1. Since in the quasi-
static case Hm and Hw are random but remain constant for all time, it is perfectly reasonable
to view the main channel (with fading) as a complex AWGN channel [56, Chapter 5] with
















with SNR γw = P |hw|2/Nw. Thus, once again based on Theorem 2.2 and the nonnegativity
of channel capacity, we may write the secrecy capacity for one realization of the quasi-static
fading scenario as Equation (4.3).
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4.4.2 Proof of Proposition 4.6





















































To obtain simple bounds of this expression, we introduce a simple lemma.
Lemma 4.2.
e−λx log (1 + x) ≤
∫ ∞
x




Proof. The upper bound in the lemma follows by integrating the left-hand side by parts as
∫ ∞
x
log (1 + z) λe−λzdz = e−λx log (1 + x) + eλE1 ((x + 1)λ) , (4.52)
where E1(x) is the exponential-integral function. The result follows by bounding the
exponential-integral function as E1(x) ≤ e−x/x. The lower bound follows by noting that
log(1 + z) ≥ log(1 + x) for z ≥ x, therefore
∫ ∞
x
log (1 + z) λe−λzdz ≥ log (1 + x)
∫ ∞
x
λe−λzdz = e−λx log (1 + x) (4.53)











































































































































































4.4.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3
An outage event occurs whenever Alice overestimates the amount of secrecy she can distill
from an opportunistic transmission. Therefore,
Pout = P
[



































where p(γw) is the probability density function of Γw (see Equation 4.2) and p(γ̂w|γw) is
the probability density function of Γ̂w conditioned on Γw. This probability density function
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, γ̂w > 0
where I0(·) is the zeroth-order modified Bessel function of the first kind [57]. Thus, the











where Q1(·, ·) is the generalized Marcum Q function [57]. Using standard results for integrals













COOPERATION VS. SECRECY TRADE-OFFS
In Chapters 3 and 4, we studied the design of practical schemes providing some level of
information-theoretic security. In this chapter, we tackle a more theoretical problem and
attempt to grasp the fundamental trade-offs between cooperation and information-theoretic
security in multi-user scenarios. This investigation is motivated by the fact that the pos-
itive impact of cooperation among multiple users on transmission reliability is now well
understood [59, 60], but it is not clear whether cooperation is still beneficial when secrecy
constraints are added to the problems. While the fundamental secure communication rates
over wireless channels have been specifically investigated in [12, 8, 15] for three-terminal
networks, little attention has been devoted to the study of multi-terminal situations where
several players with different (and possibly conflicting) security requirements interact at the
same time.
We shed light on this fundamental problem by considering a three-terminal communi-
cation scenario, where the intended receiver of a private message also acts as a relay for
another node. We acknowledge that similar situations have already been investigated. For
instance, the situation where a relay helps a destination node while being kept ignorant of
some private message is studied in [21], a four-player scenario where a trusted relay helps
a transmitter and a legitimate receiver to conceal messages from an eavesdropper is con-
sidered in [20], and finally, coordination among users is shown to be helpful for increasing
secrecy rates in [19, 22]. However, unlike all aforementioned contributions, our approach
attempts to analyze the fundamental security compromise that a user must accept if he
is willing to cooperate with other nodes. For discrete memoryless channels, we provide a
single-letter characterization of the exact region of achievable rates, which generalizes the
results of Csiszár and Körner on the broadcast channel with confidential messages [6]. For
the Gaussian channel, we analyze the performance of several strategies and obtain simply
computable bounds on the secrecy capacity region. Our results are still mainly of theo-
retical interest, as the design of practical codes seems to be beyond the reach of today’s
capabilities; nevertheless, the relaying strategies that we analyze provide some insight on
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how to design secure relaying schemes.
5.1 Channel model
Definition 5.1 ([60]). A partially cooperative relay discrete broadcast channel is a channel
with a discrete source input alphabet X , a discrete relay input alphabet X1, two discrete
channel output alphabets Y and Z, and a transition probability function p(y, z|x, x1). Such
a channel is denoted by the set (X ,X1, p(y, z|x, x1),Y,Z).
We shall restrict our attention to memoryless channels, for which the transition proba-
bility of a sequence of n symbols is given by




Definition 5.2. A Gaussian memoryless partially cooperative relay broadcast channel is a
partially cooperative relay broadcast channel such that
Y = X + Z1,
Z = X + X1 + Z2,
where Z1 and Z2 and independent zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances N1


















Notice that our definition of a Gaussian partially cooperative relay broadcast channel
assumes that the receiver observing output Y is able to cancel X1 completely. In practice,
there might still be a residual contribution of X1 to Y , and a more accurate model would
be
Y = X + ηX1 + Z1,
where η < 1 models the efficiency of the cancellation; however, for simplicity, we do not
consider this situation here.
Definition 5.3. A
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
code for the partially cooperative relay broadcast channel
consists of the following.
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• Two message sets W0 =
{




1, 2, . . . , 2nR1
}
;
• An encoding function (possibly stochastic) fn : W0 × W1 → X n, which maps each
message pair (w0, w1) ∈ W0 ×W1 to a codeword xn ∈ X n;
• A set of relay functions {gi}ni=1 such that
x1,i = gi (y1, . . . , yi−1) , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
• Two decoding functions hy : Yn → W0 × W1 and hz : Zn → W0 mapping the ob-
servation yn to the message pair (ŵ0, ŵ1) and the observation z
n to the message ˆ̂w0,
respectively.
Definition 5.4. The average probability of error P
(n)
e is defined as the probability that the
decoded messages at the intended receivers are different for the transmitted ones, that is
P (n)e = P[hy(Y
n) 6= (W0,W1) or hz(Zn) 6= W0].
Definition 5.5. A rate tuple (R0, R1, Re) is said to be achievable for a partially cooperative
relay broadcast channel if ∀ǫ0 > 0, there exists a
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
code such that
P (n)e ≤ ǫ0,
1
n
H(W1|Zn) ≥ Re − ǫ0.
Figure 29 illustrates a partially cooperative broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages. We emphasize that the secrecy level of message W1 is measured in terms of the
equivocation rate 1nH(W1|Zn), which corresponds to the notion of weak secrecy. A stronger
measure (and better suited for cryptographic purposes) would be the absolute equivocation
H(W1Z
n) [11]; however, we do not consider it here.
Let us also point out that the model shown in Figure 29 differs from the one studied
in [21] in that the secrecy constraint is placed on the relay node and not on the destina-
tion node. Although this might appear to be a minor modification, the problem becomes
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significantly different on several accounts. First, the results of [21] are only valid provided
the adversary relay follows a fixed protocol. This requirement is somewhat relaxed in our
setting since the relay is the receiver of the secret messages. Second, the results presented
in Section 5.2 do not follow directly from those of [21], and we shall see that the efficient
















p (y, z|x, x1)
Figure 29. Channel model 1: partially cooperative relay broadcast channel with confidential
messages.
Definition 5.6. The secrecy capacity region is defined as the set of rates (R0, R1) such that
the message W1 can be communicated secretly, i.e.
Cs = {(R0, R1) : (R0, R1, R1) is achievable} .
5.2 Equivocation-rate region of discrete memoryless channels
Theorem 5.1. The region of achievable rates (R0, R1, Re) for the partially cooperative







0 ≤ Re ≤ R1
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1) − I(V ;Z|U,X1)
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V ;Y |U ) + min (I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z))




Proof. See Section 5.4.
By setting X1 = ∅ in the above, we obtain the region of achievable rates for the broad-
cast channel with confidential messages. It is actually not surprising that the result of [6]
generalizes to account for partial cooperation of the receiver with a private message. In fact,
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by assuming that the relay decodes the common message, we ensure that there is no loss of
optimality by considering a relaying relaying scheme where the relay decodes his message
before forwading information.
Corollary 5.1. The secrecy capacity region of the partially cooperative broadcast channel







R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1) − I(V ;Z|U,X1)




As is often the case in information-theory, the single-letter characterizations of the
equivocation-rate regions C0 and Cs obtained above are considered an acceptable solution
to the problem since they are computable with numerical algorithms. Clearly, it would be
preferable to obtain a general closed-form expression of the regions, but such a characteri-
zation is not possible in general. Therefore, in the next section, we specialize these results
to the case of Gaussian channels, for which simpler expressions can be obtained.
5.3 Achievable Equivocation-rate region for Gaussian channels
The derivation of achievable rates in Theorem 5.1 relies on the notion of typical set decod-
ing, which can be readily extended to continuous random variables. In particular, we can
obtain achievable equivocation-rate regions for the Gaussian partially cooperative broadcast
channel by substituting well-chosen random variables in Theorem 5.1. Although this does
not characterize, the exact equivocation-rate region, the bounds that we obtain offer some
interesting insight on the design of practical relaying schemes.
In the following, we simplify notation by introducing the function C(x) = 12 log2(1 + x),
where C(SNR) represents the capacity of a point-to-point Gaussian channel with signal-to-
noise ratio SNR. For any constant c such that 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, we also define c̄ = 1 − c.
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Proposition 5.1 (Decode-and-Forward). A region of achievable rates with a “Decode-and-











































Proof. The region is obtained by computing the bound of Theorem 5.1 with the following
random variables.






′ X = U + X ′ V = U
Figure 30 illustrates the rates achievable using the Decode-and-Forward strategy for
parameters P = 1, P1 = 1, N1 = 0.01 and N2 = 0.05. As expected, since the relay messages
are based on the (correctly) decoded common message, no additional information is leaked
to the eavesdropper.
Instead of cooperating with the destination node, the relay might decide to confuse the
destination node by jamming the channel with white Gaussian noise. It is arguable whether
this can be considered as a meaningful relaying strategy, but it is definitely allowed in our
channel model. We note that this idea has already appeared in the literature as “cooperative
jamming” [19], “noise forwarding” [20], or “artificial noise” [22].
Proposition 5.2 (Jamming). A region of achievable rates obtained with a “Jamming”






































Figure 30. Achievable rate regions with a Decode-and-Forward relaying strategy. The private
message rate R1 is represented by thick lines while the equivocation rate Re is represented by
thin lines.
Proof. If the relay emits white Gaussian noise with power P1, the resulting channel is
equivalent to a Gaussian broadcast channel (without relaying) characterized by
Y = X + Z1,
Z = X + Z ′2 with Z
′
2 ∼ N (0, N2 + P1).
The results follows directly from [6, Theorem 1] by using the following random variables.
U ∼ N (0, ᾱP ) X ′ ∼ N (0, αP ) X = U + X ′.
The boundaries of the region achieved with the Jamming relaying strategy are shown
in Figure 31 for parameters P = 1, P1 = 1, N1 = 0.01 and N2 = 0.05. Jamming obviously
increases the equivocation of the private message but the cost of a tremendous reduction of
common rate.
In principle, time-sharing between the two strategies allows to achieve all the equivoca-
tion rates in the convex hull of CDF ∪ CJ ; however, this is not acceptable from a security
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Figure 31. Achievable rate regions with a Jamming relaying strategy. The private message
rate R1 is represented by thick lines, while the equivocation rate Re is represented by thin
lines.
perspective since the same level of security should be ensured for all transmitted messages.
Intermediate points can still be achieved by a mixed strategy, as shown by the following
proposition.
Proposition 5.3 (Opportunistic Jamming). A region of achievable rates with an “Oppor-









































Proof. If the relay uses a fraction γ̄ of its total power P1 to confuse the eavesdropper and
the remaining fraction γ to perform Decode-and-Forward, then the equivalent channel is
given by
Y = X + Z1,




2 ∼ N (0, N2 + γ̄P1),
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and X ′1 subject to the average power constraint E{X1} ≤ γP1. The result follows by
computing the bounds in Theorem 5.1 using the following random variables.






′, X = U + X ′ V = U
In certain regimes where the common rate is mostly limited by the relay node alone, the
Opportunistic Jamming strategy can significantly improve the equivocation rates without
reducing the message rates achievable with Decode-and-Forward. More precisely, we have
the following lemma.























and the relay node can jam without reducing the common message rate as long as the fraction
of power γ satisfies
γ ≥ γ∗ = ᾱP P1 + N2 − N1
P1P + N1P1
.








) ⇐⇒ α ≥ α∗,








) ⇐⇒ γ ≥ γ∗.
The boundary of the maximum equivocation-rate region achievable by Opportunistic
Jamming without sacrificing cooperation is shown in Figure 32 for P = 1, P1 = 1, N1 = 0.01
and N2 = 0.05.
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Figure 32. Achievable rate regions with Opportunistic Jamming. The private message rate R1
is represented by thick lines while the equivocation rate Re is represented by thin lines. The
dashed vertical line corresponds to the common rate when α = α∗.
The opportunistic jamming strategy is interesting, since one would intuitively expect
relaying to be harmful for secrecy and beneficial for reliability; however, our analysis shows
that carefully designing relaying strategies can lead to better performance than no relaying
at all, both in term of secrecy and achievable rates.
5.4 Proof Theorem 5.1
5.4.1 Achievability part
The direct part of the proof follows from a random coding argument combining Csiszár
and Körner’s wiretap coding [6] with Willem’s backward decoding strategy for the relay
channel [61]. Since the wiretap coding scheme is slightly involved, we refer the reader
unfamiliar with wiretap code construction to Appendix A, where a detailed proof of [6] is
provided. An outline of the proof is as follows.
• Step 1. We first show the existence of an inner code with a specific structure allowing







over the partially cooperative broadcast channel;
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• Step 2. We construct a simple outer code that exploits the aforementioned inner
code to guarantee the reliable transmission of a common message W0 and of a private
message W1, with certain rates R0 and R1, respectively;
• Step 3. We compute the equivocation rate Re guaranteed by the coding scheme;
• Step 4. We derive a convex region of achievable rates (R0, R1, Re).










5 log2 |X |
]
. (5.1)
Let U , X1, X, Y , and Z be random variable with joint probability distribution
p (u, x1, x, y, z) = p (y, z|x, x1) p (x|x1, u) p (u|x1) p (x1) ,
and such that I(X;Y |U,X1) ≥ I(X;Z|U,X1).
Step 1: Inner code construction.




R′0 = min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)] − ǫ
R′1 = I(X;Y |U,X1) − I(X;Z|U,X1) − ǫ2
R′2 = I(X;Z|U,X1) − ǫ2 .
 Random code generation.
1. Generate 2nR
′
0 independent sequences of length n at random in X n1 according to
the distribution p (xn1 ) =
∏n
i=1 pX1 (x1,i). Label
1 the sequences Xn1 (i) with i ∈
{





2. For each i ∈
{






0 independent sequences of length n at
random in Un according to the distribution p (un|xn1 ) =
∏n
i=1 pU |X1 (ui|x1,i). Label
the sequence Un(j|i) with j ∈
{











1We assume that all rate R are such that 2nR is an integer. This approximation greatly improves the
clarity of the proof, and we refer the reader to Appendix A for an example of a more careful derivation.
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3. For each (j, i) ∈
{















dent sequences of length n at random according to the distribution p (xn|un,xn1 ) =
∏n
i=1 pX|U,X1 (xi|ui, x1,i) Label the sequences Xn(k, l|i, j) with k ∈
{










 Alice’s encoding procedure. Encoding is performed using a block-Markov scheme over B
consecutive blocks of length n. The same codebooks are used in each of the B blocks. In
block b ∈ {1, . . . , B}, to transmit messages V b0 , V b1 , and V b2 , the encoder simply sends the
codeword Xn(V b1 , V
b
2 |V b0 , V b−10 ) over the channel, with the convention that V 00 = V B0 = 1.
 Bob’s encoding procedure. Let V̂ b−10 be Bob’s estimates of V
b−1
0 . Then in block b ∈
{1, . . . , B}, Bob transmits Xn1 (V̂ b−10 ), with the convention that V̂ 00 = 1.
 Bob’s decoding procedure. Assuming that Bob has estimated V̂ b−10 , he determines the





n(V̂ b0 |V̂ b−10 ),Yn(b)
)
∈ A(n)δ . (5.2)
Bob then determines the unique message pair
(






Xn(V̂ b1 , V̂
b
2 |V̂ b0 , V̂ b−10 ),Xn1 (V̂ b−10 ),Un(V̂ b0 |V̂ b−10 ),Yn(b)
)
∈ A(n)δ . (5.3)
 Eve’s decoding procedure. Eve’s decoding starts once she has received all channel obser-
vations Yn(b) with b ∈ {1, . . . , B}. She then proceeds to decode codewords V b0 in backward
order as follows.
1. Eve knows that in the Bth block, the message V B0 = 1 was sent; therefore, she
determines the unique
ˆ̂





n(1| ˆ̂V B−10 ),Zn(B)
)
∈ A(n)δ .













∈ A(n)δ . (5.4)
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 Charlie’s decoding procedure. To impose a structure on the code, we introduce a virtual
decoder, Charlie, who is assumed to have access to V b0 and V
b
1 for b ∈ {1, . . . , B} and to
decode message V b2 ; therefore, in each block b, Charlie determines the unique
ˆ̂




V b2 |V b0 , V b−10 ),Xn1 (V b−10 ),Un(V b0 |V b−10 ),Zn(b)
)
∈ A(n)δ . (5.5)
 Analysis of probability of error. Let V0 =
(




denote the sequence of messages




V2. We shall start
by simplifying the calculation of the average probability of error of the sequence of B blocks




























The total probability of error can be written as
P
(n)
err = P[EB ∪ EE ∪ EC ]
(a)
≤ P[EB] + P[EE] + P[EC ]
(b)


























where (a) follows from the union bound, (b) follows from the law of total probability, and
(c) follows from the fact that probabilities are upper bounded by 1. Equation (5.6) greatly
simplifies the calculations since it implies that we can bound the average probability of error
at Eve and Charlie’s side by assuming that Bob’s relaying signal is correct.
Now, define the following block-error events
EbB,0 =
{

























By applying the union bound and the law of total probability, we obtain














































































































































































































We shall now proceed to bound the individual probabilities of block error events obtained
in Equation (5.8-5.11). Because of the symmetry of the random coding argument, we can





























































p (yn|xn1 ) p (un|xn1 ) p (xn1 ) , (5.12)
where (a) follows from the definition of decoding in Equation (5.2), (b) follows from the union
bound, and (c) follows the code construction that ensures that Un(i|1) is independent of
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Yn given Xn(1). Now, the AEP ensure that there ∃n0 ∈ N, such that ∀n ≥ n0




p (xn1 ) ≤ 2−n(H(X1)−δ),
p (un|xn1 ) ≤ 2−n(H(U |X1)−2δ),
p (yn|xn1 ) ≤ 2−n(H(Y |X1)−2δ),
and |A(n)δ (U,X1, Y )| ≤ 2n(H(U,X1,Y )+δ).











≤ 2n(R′0−I(U ;Y |X)+6δ) = 2n(6δ−ǫ). (5.13)
Since 6δ < ǫ, ∃n1 ≥ n0 such that























































































2n(H(X,X1,U,Y )+δ)2−n(H(Y |U,X1)−2δ)2−n(H(X|U,X1)−2δ)2−n(H(U |X1)−2δ)2−n(H(X1)−δ)
≤ 2n(R′1+R′2−I(X;Y |U,X1)+8δ) = 2n(8δ−ǫ), (5.15)
where (a) follows from the definition of decoding in Equation (5.3), (b) follows from the union
bound, (c) follows from the code construction that ensures that Xn(j, k|1, 1) is independent
of Yn given Xn(1) and Un(1|1), and (d) follows from the AEP. Since 8δ < ǫ, ∃n2 ≥ n1 such
that































≤ 2n(R′2−I(X;Z|U,X1)+8δ) = 2n(8δ− ǫ2 ). (5.18)








































err ≤ ǫ. ≤ ǫ0 (5.20)
Therefore, ∀n ≥ n3, one can argue that there exists a specific code C∗inner with average
probability of error less than ǫ0.
Step 2: Outer code construction



















0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)] − ǫ





0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)] − ǫ
0 ≤ R1 + R0 ≤ I(X;Y |U,X1) + min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)] − ǫ
I(X;Y |U,X1) ≤ R1
Step 3: Equivocation calculation




. To simplify notation, we
shall write Xn, Xn1 , U
n, and Zn instead of Xn(V b1 , V
b





















































































≥ I(X;Y |U,X1) − ǫ. (5.22)
Now, the two outer codes described in Step 2 have been constructed such that W b1 uniquely





























V b2 6= g(V b0 , V b−10 , V b1 ,Zn)
])
, (5.25)




1 , and Z
n. In
particular, g could be the decoding function used by Charlie. Since Charlie’s probability of










Recall that by construction of the inner code,
(




uniquely determines Un and vice-
versa; therefore, I
(
Xn;Zn|V b0 , V b−10 ,Xn1
)






1 if (un,xn,xn1 , z




By the AEP, ∃n4 ≥ n3 such that ∀n ≥ n4




p (x, zn|un,xn1 ) ≤ 2−n(H(X,Z|U,X1)−2δ),
p (xn|un,xn1 ) ≥ 2−n(H(X|U,X1)+2δ),
p (zn|un,xn1 ) ≥ 2−n(H(Z|U,X1)+2δ),




















I(Xn;J |Un,Xn1 ) +
1
n
I(Xn;Zn|Un,Xn1 , J) , (5.30)
≤ 1
n
I(Xn;J |Un,Xn1 ) +
1
n








+ I(X;Z|U,X1) + 6δ + δ log2 |X |, (5.32)
where (a) follows from the fact that
I(Xn;J |Un,Xn1 ) ≤ H(J) ≤ 1,
I(Xn;Zn|Un,Xn1 , J = 0) ≤ H(Xn) ≤ n log2 |X |,
P[J = 0] ≤ δ and P[J = 1] ≤ 1.
Substituting the bounds obtained in Equations (5.22), (5.26), and (5.32) in Equation (5.21),
we obtain that ∀n ≥ n4
1
n
H(W1|Zn) ≥ I(X;Y |U.X1) − I(X;Z|U,X1) − ǫ −
2
n
− h(ǫ) − 6δ − δ log2 |X |. (5.33)







≥ I(X;Y |U,X1) − I(X;Z|U,X1) − ǫ0, (5.34)
and the equivocation rate Re ≥ I(X;Y |U,X1)−I(X;Z|U,X1) is achievable. We summarize
the results obtained thus far with the following lemma.
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Lemma 5.2. If X, U , X1, Y , and Z are random variables governed by a joint probability
distribution
p (u, x1, x, y, z) = p (y, z|x, x1) p (x|x1, u) p (u|x1) p (x1) ,
and such that I(X;Y |U,X1) ≥ I(X;Z|U,X1), then the rates (R0, R1, Re) satisfying the




0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)]
0 ≤ R1 + R0 ≤ I(X;Y |U,X1) + min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)]
Re = I(X;Y |U,X1) − I(X;Z|U,X1) ≤ R1
Step 4: Achievability of full region
In this last step, we characterize a larger convex region of achievable rates.
Lemma 5.3. If X, U , V , X1, Y , and Z are random variables governed by a joint probability
distribution
p (u, x1, x, y, z) = p (y, z|x, x1) p (v|x1, u) p (x|v) p (u|x1) p (x1) ,
and such that I(V ;Y |U,X1) ≥ I(V ;Z|U,X1), then the rates (R0, R1, Re) satisfying the




0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)]
0 ≤ R1 + R0 ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1) + min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)]
0 ≤ Re = I(V ;Y |U,X1) − I(V ;Z|U,X1) ≤ R1
Proof. The result follows by prefixing the partially cooperative broadcast channel with a
discrete memoryless channel with transition probability p(x|v).







0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)]
0 ≤ R1 + R0 ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1) + min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)]





Proof. The result can be proved by showing that the rates achieved with time-shared ran-
dom variables are also in R. See the proof of Lemma A.3 in Appendix A for details.
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0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
0 ≤ Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1) − I(V ;Z|U,X1)
0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)]





Proof. This lemma is consequence of the convexity of R. See the proof of of Lemma A.4 in
Appendix A for details.
5.4.2 Converse part
The converse part of the proof combines the techniques used in [59] to prove the upper
bound on the capacity region of the relay channel, and in [6] to prove the upper bound
on the achievable region of the broadcast channel with confidential messages. We also
make extensive use of the fact that the relay signal X1,i is a deterministic function of the
observations Yi−1 = (Y1, . . . , Yi−1) only.
We consider a sequence of
(
2nR0 , 2nR1 , n
)
codes for the partially cooperative broadcast
channel with P
(n)
e → 0. From Fano’s inequality [1] we obtain
H(W1,W0|Yn) ≤ 1 + n (R0 + R1)P (n)e
∆
= nǫ1, (5.37)
H(W0|Zn) ≤ 1 + nR0P (n)e
∆
= nǫ2, (5.38)
where ǫ1, ǫ2 → 0 as n → ∞. By the chain rule of entropy, Equation (5.37) also implies that
H(W1|W0,Yn) ≤ nǫ1 and H(W0|Yn) ≤ nǫ1. (5.39)
Let us introduce the shorthand notation Z̃i+1 = (Zi+1, . . . , Zn). Now, consider the
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common message rate nR0.
nR0 = H(W0) = I(W0;Y
n) + H(W0|Yn)




















































































Now, let us consider H(W1|W0).
H(W1|W0) = I(W1;Yn|W0) + H(W1|W0,Yn)














































Combining Equation (5.40) and Equation (5.44) we obtain















We shall now introduce the following lemma.
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Utilizing Lemma 5.6 in Equation (5.44) and combining the result with Equation (5.41)
we obtain














+ n (ǫ1 + ǫ2)(5.48
Finally, by using a method similar to those in [6] and Lemma 5.6, we can bound the
equivocation rate as
nRe ≤ H(W1|Zn) = H(W1|W0,Zn) + I(W1;W0|Zn)
= I(W1;Y
n|W0) − I(W1;Zn|W0) + H(W1|W0,Yn) + I(W1;W0|Zn)
≤ I(W1;Yn|W0) − I(W1;Zn|W0) + H(W1|W0,Yn) + H(W0|Zn)


































































































+ n (ǫ1 + ǫ2) .





and Vi = (W1, Ui). One
can check that random variables Ui, Vi, Xi, X1,i, Yi, and Zi are such that UiX1,i → Vi →
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n (R0 + R1) ≤
n∑
i=1
{I(Ui;Yi|X1, i) + I(Vi;Yi|Ui)} + 2nǫ1,
n (R0 + R1) ≤
n∑
i=1




{I(Vi;Yi|Ui,X1,i) − I(Vi;Zi|Ui,X1,i)} + n (ǫ1 + ǫ2) .
We now introduce a random Q independent of (W0,W1,X
n,Yn,Zn,Xn1 ) and uniformly
distributed over the set {1, . . . , n}, and define V = VQ, Y = YQ, Z = ZQ and X1 = X1Q .
Therefore, letting
ǫ3 = max [2ǫ1, ǫ1 + ǫ2]
we obtain the desired result
R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)] + ǫ3,
(R0 + R1) ≤ min [I(U ;Y |X1) , I(U,X1;Z)] + I(V ;Y |U ) + ǫ3,
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U,X1) − I(V ;Z|U,X1) + ǫ3,




In Chapters 3-5, we discussed the beneficial role of noisy channels for secure communica-
tion; however, the usefulness of noisy channels, and more generally of sources of correlated
randomness, for cryptographic purposes goes well beyond the scope of secure transmissions.
For instance, it is known that information theoretically secure cryptographic primitives such
as bit commitment, oblivious transfer, and coin tossing can be built upon non-trivial noisy
correlations.
The aforementioned cryptographic primitives have been extensively studied in the cryp-
tography community from a computational security perspective. Following the work of
Crépeau [62], the information theory has gained interest for these problems by reconsidering
security from an information-theoretic perspective. Recently, information-theoretically se-
cure protocols for oblivious transfer and bit commitment have been obtained for non-trivial
discrete channels, and the highest rate at which a channel can be used for bit commitment
have been characterized in [63, 64]. Although there have been a few contributions deal-
ing with the construction of practical bit commitment schemes [62, 65], the design of such
schemes in a more general setting, and especially for the Gaussian channel, remains an open
problem.
In this chapter, we provide a partial solution to this problem by presenting a new
achievability proof of bit commitment rates over discrete memoryless and Gaussian channels,
which highlights the innate connection with secret-key agreement. In the case of discrete
memoryless channels, where contrary to the Gaussian case [64] the commitment capacity is
not infinite, our proof also shows the achievability of the bit commitment capacity. Although
non-constructive, our proof yields useful insight on how to design practical bit commitment
schemes over general noisy channels.
6.1 Principle of bit commitment
In this section, we briefly review the bit commitment models proposed in [63, 12]. As shown
in Figure 33, we assume that there exists a unidirectional memoryless channel (X , p(z|x),Z)
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connecting the players Alice and Bob. This channel can be either discrete of Gaussian with







Figure 33. Bit commitment setup.
A commitment scheme consists of two phases, a commit phase and a reveal phase.
During the commit phase, Alice commits to a message a belonging to a set A and sends
Bob an evidence of her commitment. The set of messages received by Bob and his private
randomness are denoted by the random variable Vb. During the reveal phase, Alice discloses
a and any other private randomness R she may have used in the commit phase. Bob then
checks if Alice’s data is consistent with the evidence received during the commit phase. He
finally accepts a if it is consistent, and rejects it otherwise. Bob’s test is denoted by the
function β(Vb, a,R) ∈ {ACC,REJ}.
A bit commitment protocols should satisfy the following properties:
• Concealing. A bit commitment protocol is ǫ-concealing if after receiving Alice’s
commitment Vb, Bob is unable to learn more than ǫ bits of information on A:
I(A;Vb) ≤ ǫ. (6.1)
• Binding. A protocol is δ-binding if Alice cannot cheat once she has committed to a
value:
∀a, a′ 6= a ∈ A P
[
β(Vb, a,R) = ACC, β(Vb, a
′, R) = ACC
]
≤ δ. (6.2)
• Correct. A protocol is η-correct if, when Alice and Bob behave according to the
protocol, the probability of Bob accepting Alice’s commitment is higher than 1 − η:
∀a ∈ A P[β(Vb, a,R) = ACC] ≥ 1 − η. (6.3)
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Definition 6.1. A bit commitment protocol is secure if for any ǫ > 0, δ > 0, and η > 0
there exists a commitment that is ǫ-concealing, δ-binding, and η-correct. The commitment





and the commitment capacity is the maximum rate achievable by a secure protocol.
In the following, we implicitly assume that the discrete memoryless channels considered
a non-redundant, meaning that none of their output distributions is a convex combination
of their other output distributions:




As discussed in [63], this assumption does not limit the scope of the results, and one can
note that most channels of interest (binary symmetric, Gaussian, etc.) satisfy this property.
Also, we point out that we do not allow Alice or Bob to modify the channel.
6.2 Bit commitment from secret key agreement
The earlier achievability proofs of bit commitment rates over discrete memoryless and Gaus-
sian channels [63, 64] exploit the connections with the achievability proofs of secrecy capacity
over the wiretap channel [5, 7]. In fact in both cases, the proofs rely on the existence of
“wiretap codes” capable of ensuring simultaneously reliability and security. Unfortunately
these proofs provide little insight on how to design bit commitment protocols, since the de-
sign of practical wiretap codes is still a challenging problem [32]. However, the link between
bit commitment and wiretap codes turns out to be a mathematical convenience rather than
a fundamental connection. More specifically, as we will see shortly, the concealing and bind-
ing properties of a bit commitment scheme need not be enforced by a single code, revealing
the innate connection with secret key agreement and Slepian-Wolf coding [38] for which
practical constructions exist.
We now introduce a simple bit commitment protocol over discrete memoryless channels.
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Protocol 1 (discrete memoryless channels)
Commit phase
1. Alice generates a vector of n i.i.d symbols xn ∈ X n according to a uniform probability
distribution and sends it through the noisy channel; Bob receives a correlated vector
zn;
2. Alice sends a vector s = s(xn) of αn + log2 n + ξ bits to Bob, calculated according to
a predefined Slepian-Wolf compression code (the exact choice of s, α > 0 and ξ > 0
will be discussed later);
3. Alice chooses a function g uniformly at random among a universal2 family of hash
functions G : X n → {0, 1}k, where k = nH(X|Z) − αn − log2 n − ξ − 2r0 − 2 − r1
(r0, r1 > 0), and reveals g to Bob;
4. Alice distills a key k = g(xn) and computes c = k⊕ π(a), where a is the message she
wants to commit to and π : A → {0, 1}k is a one to one mapping;
5. Alice reveals c to Bob;
Reveal phase
1. Alice reveals xn and m to Bob;
2. Bob accepts m if and only if
(a) zn ∈ A∗(n)ǫ (Z|xn), where A∗(n)ǫ (Z|xn) is the set of sequences zn strongly condi-
tionally typical with xn,
(b) s(xn) = s,
(c) g(xn) ⊕ c = m.
Lemma 6.1. Protocol 1 is ǫ-concealing.
Proof. The concealing property depends only on the secrecy of the key k distilled by Alice,












Figure 34. Bit commitment setup with third party.
More specifically, as shown in Figure 34, let us introduce a third party (Charlie) ob-
serving the vector xn through a virtual discrete memoryless channel (X , p(y|x),Y) such
that nH(X|Y ) = αn + log2 n + ξ. After the first step of the protocol, Alice, Charlie and
Bob have access respectively to the n i.i.d. realizations of the correlated random variable
X, Y and Z, distributed according to p(x, y, z) = p(z|x)p(y|x)p(x). Let G be the random
variable denoting the random choice of the hash function. From [41, Theorem 5.2] and [39,
Corollary 4], we know that Alice and Charlie can distill a secret key K of length
k = nH(X|Z) − αn − log2 n − ξ − 2r0 − 2 − r1,
such that
H(K|zn, s, G) ≥ k − 2−r1/ln 2 (6.6)
with probability 1 − 2−r0 . It is important to note that this result does not depend on the
actual function s, but only on the number of bits disclosed.
We now introduce a simple lemma that we shall use to study the binding property of the
protocol.
Lemma 6.2. The number of sequences of length n ≥ 1 in Hσ(x) is upper bounded by
κ
√
n2(h(σ)+σ log2 |X |)n for some κ > 0.

























For n ≥ 1 exp(1/12n) ≤
√
2π, hence setting κ =
√
σ/(1 − σ) we get the desired result.
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Lemma 6.3. There exists a Slepian-Wolf compression scheme such that Protocol 1 is δ-
binding.
Proof. Let δ > 0 and α > 0. Let σ > 0 be such that
h(σ) + σ log2 |X | < α. (6.9)
We denote the Hamming distance between between two discrete vectors xn and xn0 by
dH(x
n,xn0 ). Now, for any x
n ∈ X n define
Hσ(x
n) = {xn0 ∈ X n : dH(xn0 ,xn) < σn} (6.10)
and H∗σ(x
n) = Hσ(x
n) r {xn}. (6.11)
For any xn,xn0 ∈ X n, if xn0 /∈ Hσ(xn) we know from [63, Lemma 14] that ∃n1 ∈ N such that
∀n ≥ n1 P
[
Zn ∈ A(n)ǫ (Z|xn0 )
]
< δ (6.12)
Hence, Alice cannot pass Bob’s first test but with arbitrarily low probability. We shall now
show that there exists a function s such that if xn0 ∈ H∗σ(xn), then Alice cannot pass Bob’s
second test but with arbitrarily low probability. To do so, we first use a random binning
argument to show that for n large enough,
P
[





where S is a random variable representing a Slepian-Wolf compression code s chosen uni-
formly at random among all codes disclosing αn bits. In fact,
P
[
∃xn0 ∈ H∗σ(Xn) : Zn ∈ A
(n)



















n2(h(σ)+σ log2 |X |)n2−αn,
≤κ√n2(h(σ)+σ log2 |X |−α)n,
(6.13)
where (a) follows from the union bound and
P
[
Zn ∈ A(n)ǫ (Z|Xn), S(xn0 ) = S(xn)
]
≤ P[S(xn0 ) = S(xn)], (6.14)
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Since h(σ) + σ log2 |X | < α, ∃n2 ≥ n1 such that
∀n ≥ n2 κ
√
n2(h(σ)+σ log2 |X |−α)n ≤ δ
2
. (6.16)
It is now standard procedure [1] to argue that there exists at least one function s1 such that
∀n ≥ n2 P
[





Since the random variable Xn is uniformly distributed on X n, notice that Equation (6.17)
only implies that
∀n ≥ n2 P
[
∃xn0 ∈ H∗σ(xn) : Zn ∈ A(n)ǫ (Z|xn), s1(xn0 ) = s1(xn)
]
≤ δ (6.18)
for half of the sequence xn ∈ X n. Let X1 be the set containing such sequences, and note that
|X1| = ⌈|X n|/2⌉. By applying the previous random coding argument to the set X nrX1, one
can show the existence of a function s2 and a set X2 ⊂ X n r X1 such that |X2| = ⌈|X n|/4⌉
and the sequences x ∈ X2 satisfy Equation (6.18) with s2. By induction, one can then
construct a sequences of disjoint sets Xi of decreasing size and a sequence of functions si
such that all the sequences x ∈ Xi satisfy Equation (6.18) with si. It is easy to check that
n log2 |X | sets are sufficient to ensure that any
∀xn ∈ X n ∃i ∈ {1, . . . , n log2 |X |} such that xn ∈ Xi.
Let s be a Slepian-Wolf compression code defined as follows:
∀xn ∈ X n s(xn) = (i, si(xn)) if xn ∈ Xi. (6.19)
By construction (i, si(x
n)) can be described with only αn+log2 n+log2 log2 |X | bits. Hence,
we have shown the existence of a Slepian-Wolf code s such that
∀xn ∈ X n, P
[
∃xn0 ∈ H∗σ(xn) : Zn ∈ A(n)ǫ (Z|xn), s(xn0 ) = s(xn)
]
≤ δ. (6.20)
Setting ξ = log2 log2 |X | concludes the proof.
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Lemma 6.4. Protocol 1 is η-correct.
Proof. Let η > 0. If Alice and Bob behave according to the protocol, clearly the only
test which might fail is Bob’s first typicality test. However the Asymptotic Equipartition
Principle guarantees that the probability of the set of non jointly-typical sequences gets
negligible as n → ∞ [1].
Based on the previous lemmas, we can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1. Protocol 1 achieves the commitment capacity of a discrete memoryless chan-
nel.
Proof. Since the parameters ξ, r0 and r1 are independent of n, Alice can commit to messages
at a rate k/n ≈ H(X|Z) − α in the limit of large n . Furthermore, α can be chosen as
small as desired, hence protocol 1 achieves the bit commitment rate H(X|Z) as n → ∞.
As it is, our protocol does not achieve the bit commitment capacity since we have assumed
that the sequences xn were chosen uniformly at random; however, this assumption can be
removed since it is not required in the derivation of Lemmas 6.1 and 6.4, and the proof of
Lemma 6.3 can be modified to operate on the set of typical sequences xn sequences rather
than on the whole set X n.
We note that Imai et al have proposed a similar scheme in [65], however their protocol
differs from Protocol 1 in that the additional bits computed in step 2 are chosen randomly by
Bob for each committed message. Their protocol has the advantage of being constructive,
however its extension to the Gaussian case is not straightforward because of the required
interactivity. On the other hand, Protocol 1 can be easily modified to operate over the
Gaussian channel as described below.
Protocol 2 (Gaussian channel)
Commit phase
1. Alice generates a vector of n i.i.d continuous symbols xn = {xi}i=1..n, where the xi are






≤ P ; Alice then sends xn through the Gaussian channel; Bob receives a
correlated vector of symbols zn;
2. Alice chooses a function g uniformly at random among a universal2 family of hash
functions G : X n → {0, 1}k, where k = nH(X|Z)− 2r0 − 2− r1 (s, r > 0), and reveals
g to Bob;
3. Alice distills a key k = g(x) and computes c = k ⊕ π(a), where a is the message she
wants to commit to and π : A → {0, 1}k is a one to one mapping;
4. Alice reveals c to Bob;
Reveal phase
1. Alice reveals x and m to Bob;
2. Bob accepts m if
(a) z ∈ A(n)ǫ (Z|x), where A(n)ǫ (Z|xn) is the set of sequences zn weakly conditionally
typical with xn,
(b) g(x) ⊕ c = m.
Lemma 6.5. Protocol 2 is ǫ-concealing.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.1 by introducing a noiseless channel
between Alice and Charlie, and will be omitted.
Lemma 6.6. Protocol 2 is δ-binding.
Proof. The proof is simpler than the proof of Lemma 6.3, since the Hamming distance
is replaced by the Euclidean distance and since no binning procedure is required. In the
following, we denote the Euclidean distance between two continuous vectors xn and xn0 by
‖xn − xn0‖. Let δ > 0 and let σQ be the minimum Euclidean distance between two scalar
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n) r {xn}. (6.22)
For any xn,xn0 ∈ Rn, if xn0 /∈ Eµ(xn), we know from [64, Proposition 3] that ∃n1 ∈ N such
that
∀n ≥ n1 P
[
Zn ∈ A(n)ǫ (Z|xn0 )
]
< δ. (6.23)
By choosing µ < σQ, is it clear that Alice cannot choose a sequence x
n
0 ∈ E∗µ(xn), which
concludes the proof.
It is interesting to highlight that the binding property is solely enforced by the use of
a finite set of symbols X ⊂ R, and one can legitimately wonder if Protocol 1 could not
be simplified to avoid the requirement of a binning scheme. In fact, instead of sending
n i.i.d realization of the same random variable through the discrete memoryless channel,
Alice could send a sequence xn chosen at random among a set of sequences with known
minimum distance; however, achieving the bit commitment capacity would require imposing
a structure on the set of sequences, which is likely to be as difficult in practice as the
construction of wiretap codes.
Lemma 6.7. Protocol 2 is η-correct.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 6.4 and will be omitted.
For a fixed choice of X and p(x), the commitment rate achievable with Protocol 2 is
k/n ≈ H(X|Z) in the limit of large n. This rate can be made as large as desired by
increasing the size of the set X , which is in accordance with the fact that the commitment
capacity of a Gaussian channel is infinite, as shown in [64].
From a practical perspective, it is convenient that bit commitment does not require the
use of codes ensuring simultaneously the concealing and binding properties. By highlighting
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the connection between bit commitment and secret key agreement, we have provided non-
constructive protocols for both non-redundant discrete memoryless channels and Gaussian
channels based on privacy amplification and Slepian-Wolf coding. Although these protocols
are in essence non-constructive, they provide useful guidelines for developing practical bit
commitment schemes, as we discuss in the next section.
6.3 Practical commitment schemes
6.3.1 Bit commitment over binary memoryless channels
As it is often the case in information theory, the random binning argument used in the
previous section is convenient for analysis purposes but it fails to translate directly into
practical coding schemes. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the only non-constructive
part in our protocols concerns the existence of “good” binning codes, since the existence
of universal2 families of hash functions for privacy amplification is a widely accepted cryp-
tographic premise [10]. Furthermore, the construction of binning codes is arguably better
understood than the construction of wiretap codes required by the previous works [63, 64],
and it is known that there exists “good” structured algebraic binning schemes.
The desired property of structured binning schemes is illustrated in Figure 35, where
the smaller balls represent sequences x and the different colors represent different bins. The
bins should be assigned in such a way that no two identical bins can be found in a Hamming




Figure 35. Binning through coset codes.
As shown in the following example, this property can be obtained by binning according
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to the cosets of some parity-check codes. This procedure was first suggested by Wyner
in [46]. Given a parity-check code with (n− k)× n parity check matrix H, a coset code Cs
is defined as
{
x : xHT = s
}
. There are 2n−k cosets and each of these is a shifted version
of the original code, hence conserving his distance properties. One should notice that the
coset coding scheme imposes a tradeoff between the practical value n and the achievable
commitment rate. In fact, achieving a high commitment rate requires the use of a high rate
code, while operating with a reasonable value of n requires a code with a linearly growing
minimum distance δn with δ close to 1.
Example 6.1 (Binary symmetric channel.). Let us consider a binary symmetric channel
with cross-over probability p = 0.4, whose bit commitment capacity is h(p) ≈ 0.97. Gallager
showed in [66] that for large k and large n the ensemble of (n, j, k) regular Low-Density
Parity-Check (LDPC) codes has a typical minimum distance ratio of δjk such that 1−R ≈
h(δjk), and that most codes in the ensemble have a minimum distance close to or greater than
δjkn. For instance, any (n, 5, 6) LDPC code is likely to have a minimum distance greater
that 0.25n and has a rate R ≈ 0.2. One can therefore hope to achieve a bit commitment
rate of h(0.4) − 0.8 ≈ 0.17.
6.3.2 Bit commitment over Gaussian channels
It is clear from the properties of Protocol 2 that designing a high rate practical scheme only
relies on the construction of a good quantizer. Yet, even a particularly simple quantization
allows to achieve reasonable rates.
Example 6.2 (Gaussian channel.). Let us consider a Gaussian channel with noise variance
1 and power constraint P = 1, and a 8-PAM constellation of uniformly spaced symbols
X = {−7d,−5d,−3d,−d, d, 3d, 5d, 7d} ,
where the inter-symbol distance 2d is optimized to satisfy the power constraint P . If Alice
transmits n symbols chosen uniformly at random in X during the commit phase of Protocol
2, one can easily check that I(X;Z) ≈ 0.5 bits, and therefore we can hope to achieve a
commitment rate of approximately 2.5 bits.
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CHAPTER 7
SERVER-CLIENT ARCHITECTURES BASED ON WIRETAP CODES
Based on the previous chapters, it may appear that physical-layer security is indeed a speci-
ficity of the physical layer; however, as we illustrate in this final chapter, some of the tools
developed for the physical layer can find applications in upper layers of a communication
protocol stacks. In particular, we show that the wiretap channel model naturally appears
in certain client-server network communications subject to active attacks. In this context,
the secrecy capacity admits to a different meaning, as it can be used as an optimization
metric rather than simply identify maximum secure communication rates.
7.1 Client-server networks under attack
Among the many attacks which infect the Internet and aim at disrupting packet traffic,
the most disruptive ones are host compromise and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In a
host compromise scenario the attacker exploits weaknesses of a node to gain control of the
host. Once the host is compromised attacks are launched on the neighboring nodes. On
the other hand, in a DoS attack an attacker tries to direct a large amount of bogus traffic
to a susceptible node, with the intention of consuming a large amount of bandwidth and
rendering the node unable to service legitimate traffic. In a more harmful manner, host
compromise and DoS attacks can be combined to cause a Distributed DoS attack (DDoS).
The frequency and magnitude of DoS attacks have been steadily increasing for the last
couple of years [67]. For instance, there has been a significant number of DoS attacks
on popular e-commerce websites and governmental websites in 2000 and 2001, and more
recently these attacks have targeted the root Domain Name Servers (DNSs) and the DNS
backbone network. DoS attacks can target either Transmission Control Protocol/Internet
Protocol (TCP/IP) [68], overlay network [69] or application layers [70].
Both host compromise and DoS attacks are often caused by worms, which are self-
replicating computer programs specifically designed to damage the network. Worms may
have various types of spreading behavior over the network that are intended to compromise
a host. Random scanning simply selects a victim node at random. In contrast, topological
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scanning [71] uses address information contained in the victims for propagation. With the
advent of IPv6 whose address space is much larger than that of IPv4, topological scanning
or other more sophisticated types of scanning methods may supersede random scanning
as a method of infection. Specifically, topological worms exploit “susceptible neighboring”
nodes, and then infect those neighbors. Vital information such as routing tables, email
addresses, a list of peers, and Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) about other hosts, can
be exploited to identify new potential victims.
Most of the previous research in countering DoS attacks requires significant changes
to the existing network infrastructure (see [72, 73] and references therein) or collaboration
across ISPs [74], and hence may be farfetched or impractical. Several DoS attacks detection
schemes and mitigating mechanisms have been proposed, using filtering [75], Honeypots [76],
or specialized overlay nodes that have capabilities to resist and survive attacks [70, 77, 78].
Among the recent works based on overlay network for protection against DoS attacks are a
survivable DoS-resistant overlay network called “rewire” [78] and a generic DDoS protection
service called “OverDoSe” [79].
Despite all these protective measures, the Internet is intrinsically an open network and
will never be completely protected from these attacks. Therefore designing network archi-
tectures capable of mitigating the impact of these unavoidable attacks has become a crucial
issue. Here, we specifically consider the effect of these attacks upon the design of resilient
and secure client-server architectures. The typical client-server architecture of interest is
shown in Figure 36. In order to communicate with a distant server, a client sends packets
to access points, which then route these packets through an interconnection network and to
a set of targets directly connected to the server.
The clients have a secure protocol to access the content or service from the servers,
and they have knowledge of the location of several access points. Therefore, only legitimate
clients can talk to the access points. Each access point knows the path to certain targets and
forwards the traffic from clients to servers and vice-versa once the authentication protocol
is established. Access points forward traffic to multiple targets to forward the traffic, and
targets can serve multiple access points for service responses. Typically, the ratio of access
points per target is roughly about 10 and access points may choose to forward traffic only to
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Figure 36. Client-server architecture
a subset of targets. The interconnection network is assumed to employ the Internet Protocol
(IP) network. Routers in the IP network forward the packets and do not distinguish between
normal and secure traffic from the access points. The server is usually a single node (e.g.
a cluster of several computers) and the service offered cannot be replicated for security
purpose (dynamically changing content). In some cases, servers with the same content may
also be distributed geographically to prevent service denials in the case of failure/attack of
one of them. Servers use packet filters to ensure that only traffic from the clients is received.
In [80], Bu et al. proposed to design attack-resistant client-server architectures that are
both resilient, i.e. able to provide an alternative communication path should one of them
be disrupted, and secure, i.e. able to reduce or prevent the number of compromised nodes.
Clearly, these two requirements are contradictory since resiliency calls for an increased
connectivity between targets and access point, while security calls for a limited connectivity.
In order to measure quantitatively the resistance of a given assignment of access points to
targets, Bu et al. introduced a metric called the blocking probability which is defined as the
percentage of client requests that cannot be relayed to the servers in case of attacks.
In this chapter, we consider a similar approach but we include an additional secrecy
constraint. Specifically, we want to ensure that a malicious attacker hacking the packet
information at compromised nodes is unable to retrieve information about the content
being exchanged between client and server. Rather than using traditional cryptographic
tools to encrypt information contained in the packet, we also want to exploit the fact that
the attacker only gets parts of the packets sent by the client.
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7.2 Notation and attacker model
In the following, we use notations similar to those of [80]. The set of access points and
the set of targets are denoted by A and T , respectively. Furthermore, we let na = |A| and
nt = |T |. The assignment relationship between the access points and the targets is specified
by an na × nt matrix M = {mij} called the assignment matrix, such that mij = 1 if and
only if the access point i is connected to the target j. The set of access points connected
to a target j is denoted by A(j) and the set of targets connected to an access point i is
denoted by T (i). The assignment matrix can be conveniently represented as a bipartite
graph where each node is either an access-point or a target, as shown in Figure 37. In




Figure 37. Bipartite graph representation of an assignment matrix.
We assume that attacking the interconnection network would not be fruitful from the
attacker point of view. Namely, if an attacker compromises a random host or launches
a DoS attack against a random node in a sufficiently large interconnection network, the
probability that this attack actually disrupts the traffic between access points and targets
is very low. We note that if an overlay network is used for client-server services [69, 79, 78]
this probability might not be negligible anymore. We do not consider this scenario here,
and leave its analysis for future work. We focus only on DoS and host compromise attacks
on the access points and targets. For k ∈ {A,T }, we denote the event of a node being
compromised by Ck, and by Dk if it is subject to a DoS attack.
We also make the following additional assumptions:
• The tools used to launch a compromise attack or a DoS attack on an access point are
usually different, hence the corresponding events are assumed to be independent:
∀ i ∈ A P[Ci,Di] = P[Ci]P[Di].
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• To improve the resiliency and to reduce the probability of correlated failures, access
points are often placed in different domains. In general, the access points do not have
information about each other and as a result we assume that the probabilities that
access points are compromised or under DoS attack are independent:




P[Ci, Cj ] = P[Ci]P[Cj],
P[Ci,Dj ] = P[Ci]P[Dj ],
P[Di,Dj ] = P[Di]P[Dj].
• We assume that the traffic from access points to targets is secure, but the publicly
known assignment is a vulnerability that can be exploited for topological scanning.
Since the location of access points is publicly known, the probability of launching
an attack directly on a target is substantially smaller than the probability of first
compromising an access point. Therefore, we make the simplifying assumption that
targets are never directly attacked:
∀ j ∈ T P
[




Dj |∀ i ∈ A(j) C̄i
]
= 0.
Moreover, we assume that an attack on a target depends only on the attacks on its
connected access points:




P[Ci, Cj ] = P[Ci]P[Cj],
P[Ci,Dj ] = P[Ci]P[Dj ],
P[Di, Cj ] = P[Di]P[Cj ],
P[Di,Dj ] = P[Di]P[Dj],
• Finally, we simplify the problem by adopting an Internet Service Provider (ISP) centric
approach, where all the nodes are assumed to have the same probability of attack.
∀ (i, j) ∈ A× T s.t.mij = 1 P[Cj |Ci] ∆= ηc,
∀ (i, j) ∈ A× T s.t. mij = 1 P[Dj |Ci] ∆= ηd,
∀ i ∈ A P[Ci] ∆= ρc,
∀ i ∈ A P[Di] ∆= ρd.
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Another approach would be to consider nodes in very different domains and potentially
with different levels of protection. This latter situation is more difficult to investigate
analytically, and is only addressed in Section 7.5.2.
The consequences of the attacks are twofold. First, a packet is blocked whenever it reaches
a node that is compromised or under DoS. Second, a packet is read whenever it is routed
through a compromised node. We assume that attackers can launch distributed attacks on
a large number of nodes and that they have the ability to collude, i.e. they can coordinate
their attacks and share their information about the packets intercepted. For instance, if a
packet reaches a compromised node that is also under DoS, then the packet is still read and
all read packets can be sent to a centralized attacker.
Given an assignment matrix M, let pb(M) and pr(M) denote the probability of a packet
being blocked and read, respectively, and let us assume that each packet is sent uniformly
at random to one of the access points. A packet is blocked either if the access point is under
attack or if all neighboring targets are attacked from other access points. Likewise, a packet
is read if the access point is compromised or if one of the connected targets is compromised






[P[Ci] + P[Di] − P[Ci]P[Di]

















∃k ∈ A(i) s.t. Dk|C̄iD̄i
])]
.
In general, it is not possible to derive closed-form expressions of pr(M) and pb(M) without
further assumptions on the structure of the assignment. Moreover, computing the exact
values numerically is computationally intensive. In practice, one has to resort to approx-
imation algorithms similar to those of [80] to obtain an estimation of these parameters.
In this chapter, numerical values of pr(M) and pb(M) are obtained through Monte Carlo
simulations.
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7.3 Client-server communication over a wiretap channel
7.3.1 Packet coding with scrambled codewords
The notions of blocking probability and reading probably given in the previous sections are
naturally defined packet-wise. However, to achieve the promise of physical-layer security,
and eventually exploit wiretap codes, we need a packet coding scheme such that these























Figure 38. Packet encoding scheme with scrambled codewords.
Let us assume that each packet carries N message bits, and let L ≤ N be an integer that
divides N . To generate packet bits, the client first generates N/L independent messages of
length k bits, vi = (vi1, . . . , vik) for i ∈ {0, . . . , N/L − 1}. He then encodes each of them
into a codeword of length n bits, ci = (ci1, . . . , cin) for i ∈ {0, . . . , N/L − 1}, with an error
correcting code to be specified later. The coded bits of each codeword ci are finally grouped
into subblocks bik = {cij, j ∈ {kL, . . . , (k + 1)(L − 1)}} of length L, and each subblock is
assigned to a different packet. Hence, the jth packet (j ∈ {0, . . . , ⌈n/L − 1⌉}) contains the
subblocks pj = {bij : i ∈ {0, . . . , N/L − 1}}. Each packet j is finally routed uniformly at
random to an access point.
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The overall effect of this encoding is simply to scramble the bits within the same code-
word among different packets. Therefore, from the perspective of a codeword ci, the prob-
ability of each codeword subblock bij being blocked or read is
P[bij blocked] = P[pj blocked] = pb,
P[bij read] = P[pj read] = pr.
The delay introduced by this coding scheme is in the order of n/L packets since the server
needs to buffer n/L packets before being able to decode N/L messages. Consequently, this
approach may not perform well in its current form for delay-sensitive services, however the
coding scheme can be applied to situations where high-throughput dedicated links are avail-
able between access points and targets. Coding the messages across packets also introduces
some overhead, which might decrease the communication throughput. The characterization
of overhead is further discussed in Section 7.4. In the remaining of this chapter, we assume
that L = 1 unless otherwise specified.
7.3.2 Equivalent wiretap channel model
As we describe next, the coding scheme of Section 7.3.1 allows us to model the communi-
cations between the client and the server as a particular instance of communications over
a wiretap channel. In fact, the bits of each codeword, from the server perspective, are
obtained as if they were transmitted through a binary erasure channel with erasure prob-
ability ǫ1 = pb(M). Likewise, from the attacker perspective, the bits are read as if they
were transmitted through a binary erasure channel with probability ǫ2 = 1 − pr(M). This
holds even though our model assumes the presence of an active attacker launching various
attacks on the access points and targets. An equivalent formulation of the problem is shown
in Figure 39.
It should be noted that the assumptions of Section 7.2 do not guarantee that these
two erasure channels are independent in general. Therefore, computing the exact secrecy
capacity of this general broadcast channel is a non-trivial problem. Nevertheless, we still
have the following proposition:











Figure 39. Equivalent wiretap channel model.
pr(M) + pb(M) ≤ 1, then the secrecy capacity of the client-server architecture is given
by
Cs(M) = ǫ2 − ǫ1 = 1 − pr(M) − pb(M). (7.1)
Proof. The main channel BEC(ǫ1) between the client and the server, and the wiretap chan-
nel BEC(ǫ2) between the client and the attacker are binary erasure channels; therefore, for
any input probability distribution (P[X = 0] = p,P[X = 1] = 1 − p) of the binary variable
X, we have [1]
I(X;Y ) − I(X;Z) = (1 − ǫ1)h(p) − (1 − ǫ2)h(p),
= (ǫ2 − ǫ1)h(p).
Since h(p) is a convex-∩ function of p, I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) is also a convex-∩ function of p if
and only if ǫ2 ≥ ǫ1. If this is the case, then by [81, Theorem 2] the main channel BEC(ǫ1)
is less noisy than the wiretap channel BEC(ǫ2). The result finally follows by [81, Theorem
3].
This proposition provides only a partial characterization of the secrecy capacity, since
we do not know the value of the secrecy capacity when ǫ2 < ǫ1. However, as we illustrate
numerically in Section 5.2, this characterization is sufficient to analyze most situations of
interest.
Note that these results can be generalized to the case where codewords are scrambled
in blocks of length L > 1. The equivalent wiretap channel is then a 2L-ary erasure wiretap
channel, and if ǫ2 ≥ ǫ1 the secrecy capacity is given by
Cs(M) = (ǫ2 − ǫ1) L = (1 − pr(M) − pb(M)) L. (7.2)
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7.4 Assignment optimization based on secrecy capacity
Unlike a traditional wiretap model, where the secrecy capacity depends on the fixed a
priori properties of the underlying channel, the secrecy capacity of the equivalent wiretap
channel Cs(M) depends on the chosen assignment matrix M through the probabilities
pr(M) and pb(M). Therefore, rather than being viewed only as the fundamental limit
on secure communication rates, the secrecy capacity should also be understood as a metric
quantifying the quality of a specific assignment matrix. Hence, the design of the assignment
matrix M can be optimized with the secrecy capacity as the objective function. From an
operational perspective, maximizing the secrecy capacity of an assignment is equivalent to
minimizing the rate penalty inflicted by the packet coding strategy.
As we pointed out earlier, there exists no closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity
Cs(M) in general. Consequently, it is difficult to characterize the optimal assignment with
respect to the secrecy capacity without resorting to numerical approximations of Cs(M) and
specific optimization algorithms. Nevertheless, in the remainder of this section, we derive
upper and lower bounds of the secrecy capacity. The derivations of these limits provide
useful insight on the practical construction of assignment matrices.
7.4.1 Bounds on secrecy capacity
Let us introduce the probability of an access point being under attack ρa = ρc+ρd−ρcρd and
the probability of a target being successfully attacked from an access point ηa = ηc+ηd−ηcηd.
An upper bound of the secrecy capacity C
(u)
s is given by the following proposition.




Cs(M) ≤ C(u)s = 1 − ρa − ρc. (7.3)
Proof. Clearly, ignoring the effect of the attacks on the targets upon pb(M) and pr(M)
provides valid lower bounds of these probabilities. By definition,
∀M pb(M) ≥ ρa and pr(M) ≥ ρc,
and the results follows directly from the expression for the secrecy capacity.
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Notice that our upper bound is currently independent of any specific assignment and
therefore, it might not be tight. In future work, we will address this issue and develop an
upper bound taking into account network parameters.
To obtain a lower bound C
(l)
s of the secrecy capacity, we can compute the secrecy capacity
of any specific assignment matrix M. By construction, this secrecy capacity is achievable
and therefore, it provides a valid lower bound. We introduce the following definitions to
make the characterization of the lower bound tractable analytically.
Definition 7.1. A cluster is a set of access points connected to a single target, see Figure 40.
A cluster containing exactly k access points is called a k-cluster. A clustered assignment is
an assignment containing only clusters.
Definition 7.2. An assignment is balanced if the number of access points connected to any
two different targets differs at most by 1. Formally,
∀ i, j ∈ T ||A(i)| − |A(j)|| ≤ 1.
k access points
1 target
Figure 40. A k-cluster.
The exact blocking and reading probabilities of a k-cluster are then an immediate con-
sequence of the previous definition.
Proposition 7.3. For a k-cluster, the blocking probability p
(k)
b and the reading probability
p
(k)
r are given by
p
(k)
b = ρa + (1 − ρa)
[
1 − (1 − ρcηa)k−1
]
, (7.4)
p(k)r = ρc + (1 − ρa)
[







r are increasing function of k and limk→∞ p
(k)
b = limk→∞ p
(k)
r = 1.
The secrecy capacity of a balanced clustered assignment follows readily and provides
the desired lower bound.
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1 − p(k+1)b − p(k+1)r
)
(7.6)
When all clusters are of equal size (i.e. nt/na is an integer), then this expression
simplifies to
C(l)s = 1 − ρa − (1 − ρa)
[
1 − (1 − ρcηa)k−1
]
− ρc − (1 − ρa)
[
1 − (1 − ρcηc)k−1
]
,
= C(u)s − (1 − ρa)
[
2 − (1 − ρcηa)k−1 − (1 − ρcηc)k−1
]
.
The latter equation clearly shows the secrecy rate penalty inflicted by the attacks on targets.
Figure 41 shows these two bounds for several sets of parameters (ρc, ρd, ηc, ηd) as a
function of the ratio nt/na. As the values of (ρc, ρd, ηc, ηd) increase, assignments become
more vulnerable and therefore, their secrecy capacity decreases. Also, as expected, as the
ratio nt/na decreases, the size of the clusters in a balanced clustered assignment increases
and therefore, a target is more likely to be blocked.
Figure 41. Lower and upper bounds of secrecy capacity. The thick lines correspond to lower
bounds, while the thin ones correspond to upper bounds.
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Notice that the gap between the upper and lower bounds becomes more significant as
the ratio nt/na decreases; however, in practice, it might be difficult to find an assignment
whose secrecy capacity is significantly greater than our lower bound. In fact, although a
balanced clustered assignment is one of the simplest assignment that one can implement,
the following theorem shows that it is “nearly optimal” in some situations.
Theorem 7.1. If the size k of the clusters in a balanced clustered assignment satisfies the
following (sufficient) conditions
1 ≤ (1 − ρcηa)k−1(1 − (k + 1)ρcηa) + (1 − ρcηc)k−1(1 − (k + 1)ρcηc), (7.7)









then the assignment is “nearly optimal”, in the sense that no greedy algorithm operating
edge-by-edge can improve its secrecy capacity.
Proof. (sketch) A greedy algorithm operating edge-by-edge attempts to improve the secrecy
capacity of an assignment by modifying one edge at a time. Therefore, we need only to
consider three operations on edges: removing an edge, adding and edge and rewiring an
edge. The theorem is then a consequence of the following propositions, whose proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 7.5. If condition (7.7) is fulfilled, then removing an edge cannot improve the
secrecy capacity of a balanced clustered assignment.
Proposition 7.6. If condition (7.8) holds, then rewiring a link cannot improve the secrecy
capacity of a balanced clustered assignment.
Proposition 7.7. Adding an extra link cannot improve the secrecy capacity of a balanced
clustered assignment.
To model practical situations, we can assume that ρc ≪ 1 and ρd ≪ 1, and condi-
tions (7.7-7.8) reduce to an upper bound of the size of the clusters k.
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In [80], the metric used for assignment optimization is the blocking probability alone.













A “near optimality” result, similar to that of Theorem 7.1, also holds.
Theorem 7.2. If the size k of the clusters in a balanced clustered assignment satisfies the
following conditions




then the assignment is “nearly optimal”, in the sense that no greedy algorithm operating
edge-by-edge can decrease its blocking probability.
Proof. See appendix.
7.4.2 Overhead of packet coding scheme
The communication scheme described in Section 7.3.1 requires the introduction of cod-
ing across packets and the overhead introduced by the codes reduces the communication
throughput between access points and targets. Yet, a fair estimation of this overhead should
be made with respect to the capacity of the equivalent main erasure channel BEC(ǫ1). In
fact, during the communication some information redundancy is required to compensate for
the lost packets, regardless of the error-control system employed (coding, re-transmit, etc.).
The capacity of a BEC(ǫ1) is C1 = 1− pb(M), therefore the overhead is at least ∆min =
pb(M) bits per packet bit. The proposed coding scheme is based on codes with rates
arbitrarily close to the secrecy capacity Cs = 1 − pb(M) − pr(M), hence the overhead is at
least
∆ = pb(M) + pr(M) bits per packet bits.
Figure 42 shows the increase in overhead (pr(M)/pb(M) in percent) inflicted by the use of
wiretap codes when using a balanced clustered assignment in different scenarios.
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Figure 42. Increase in overhead inflicted by wiretap codes.
Table 3. Set of parameters used in simulations.





Conditions (7.7-7.8) k ≤ 21 k ≤ 169
As expected, more vulnerable architectures require more overhead since their secrecy
capacity is lower. The overhead tends to decrease with the ratio nt/na as the blocking
probability increases at a faster pace than the reading probability. It is also interesting to
notice that all curves exhibit a minimum, in the low nt/na regime. In all cases, Figure 42
clearly shows that information-theoretic secrecy has a significant cost in terms of overhead.
7.5 Simulation results
7.5.1 Near-optimality of balanced clustered assignments
We start this section by numerically analyzing the lower and upper bounds derived in
the previous section. In our simulations, we consider two situations whose parameters are
described in Table 3.
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Figure 43. Secrecy capacities of several assignments for a robust client-server architecture.
The first set of parameters represents a vulnerable architecture where access points are
quite likely to be attacked and where a compromised access point is used to launch a DoS
attack with probability 1 on the connected targets. On the other hand, the second set of
parameters describes a more robust system, where a compromised access point does not
have as much impact on the neighboring targets. The secrecy capacities of several network
assignments in these two scenarios are shown in Figures 43 and 44 as a function of the ratio
nt/na. All results are obtained assuming nt = 10.
In addition to the bounds derived in Section 7.4, we also plot the secrecy capacity of
a random assignment, where each edge between an access point and a target is created
according to a Bernoulli 1/2 probability distribution1, and the secrecy capacity of an opti-
mized assignment, where the positions of the edges are the result of a greedy optimization
(see [80] for details).
For a robust client-server architecture, the choice of assignment has little effect and
a random assignment performs almost as well as an optimized one. On the other hand,
1We also ensure that each access point is connected to at least one target.
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Figure 44. Secrecy capacities of several assignments for a vulnerable client-server architecture.
as the architecture becomes more vulnerable, the gap between the secrecy capacity of a
random assignment and of optimized one becomes more significant. Notice that none of
our optimizations yielded an assignment with a higher secrecy capacity than a balanced
clustered assignment. This supports the argument that our lower bound might be tight.
7.5.2 Non-ISP centric situations
The ISP centric approach investigated thus far, where all access points or targets are equally
likely to be attacked, may not always be valid in practice. In fact, in a non-ISP centric
approach, access points are in different domains and therefore, their robustness to an attack
is likely to differ. This scenario is harder to analyze, nevertheless a balanced clustered
assignment still provides a valid sub-optimal assignment that can be used as the starting
point for optimization algorithms.
In the following simulation we choose the DoS attack probability ρd and the compromise
probability ρc of each access point according to a uniform distribution on [0, 0.08]. We also
set the probability of each target being under DoS attack from an access point to ηd = 1.0,
and a choose the compromise probability ηd according to a uniform distribution on [0, 0.08].
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Figure 45. Secrecy capacities of several assignments for an architecture with different vulner-
abilities.
Even though we do not have results characterizing the goodness of our lower bound
of the secrecy capacity in this case, notice that none of the assignments obtained after
optimization exhibit a secrecy capacity significantly higher than that of a balanced cluster
assignment.
7.6 Proof of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2
7.6.1 Effect of edge removal
Let us consider the effect of removing an edge from a k + 1 cluster. As shown in Figure 46,
this operation leaves an access point unconnected. The new reading probability is therefore
removed link
k-cluster




















After some calculation, one can verify that premb − p
(k+1)
b is positive if and only if k ≤ 1ρcηa ,




r − p(k+1)r is positive as
long as condition (7.7) is satisfied:
1 ≤ (1 − ρcηa)k−1(1 − (k + 1)ρcηa) + (1 − ρcηc)k−1(1 − (k + 1)ρcηc). (7.14)
7.6.2 Effect of edge addition
By adding an edge to a balanced clustered assignment, one necessarily connects two clusters
together. For simplicity we focus on the case with two k-clusters, but the connection of




Figure 47. Addition of a cross-link between clusters.
shown in Figure 47, a packet can be routed in one of three access point sets labeled S0, S1
and S2. A packet routed to an access point in S1 (S2) is blocked either if the node in S0 is
compromised and attacks the targets, or if the sub-cluster made of the access point in S1
(S2) and of the connected target is itself blocked. Therefore,
P[block|packet routed toS1] = ρcηa + (1 − ρcηa)p(k−1)b , (7.15)
P[block|packet routed toS2] = ρcηa + (1 − ρcηa)p(k)b . (7.16)
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Likewise, a packet routed to the node S0 is blocked if the node S0 is under attack or if both
targets are attacked by other nodes. Hence,
P[block|packet routed to S0] = ρa +(1−ρa)
(
1 − (1 − ρcηa)k−1
)(
1 − (1 − ρcηa)k
)
. (7.17)
After some calculations, one can show that the change in blocking probability after adding
the edge is positive if
kρcηa ≥
(
1 − (1 − ρcηa)k−1
)
(1 − ρcηa). (7.18)
Note that ρcηa ≤ 1, therefore (1 − ρcηa)k−1 ≥ 1 − (k − 1)ρcηa and the condition is always
satisfied for k ≥ 1.
A similar analysis shows that adding an edge also increases the reading probability.
7.6.3 Effect of edge rewiring
Finally, consider the effect of rewiring an edge between 2 clusters as illustrated in Figure 48.
We examine the case of rewiring between two k + 1-clusters. The rewiring of two k-clusters
or a k+1-cluster with a k-cluster can be treated in a similar way, but leads to less stringent
conditions. Essentially, the rewiring introduces an unbalance by creating a k+2-cluster and
a k-cluster. The new blocking probability prwb and reading probability p
rw




















After some lengthy but straightforward calculations one can check that prwb − p
(k+1)
b ≥ 0 if
k + 1 ≤ 2−ρcηaρxηa . Likewise, p
rw
r − p(k+1)r ≥ 0 if k + 1 ≤ 2−ρcηcρxηc . The sufficient condition (7.8)
follows directly.
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This final chapter summarizes our contributions and points out several areas for future
research.
8.1 Contributions
The notion of physical-layer security, which is based on the idea that noise and losses are
resources for information-theoretic security, advocates a paradigm shift in cryptography
and calls for a cross-layer design of security schemes. Although physical-layer security
has the potential of significantly strengthening the security level of current systems, by
introducing some level of information-theoretic security instead of computational security,
it is fair to acknowledge that its practicality is sometimes questionable. In this dissertation,
we investigated several aspects of physical-layer security, with an emphasis on the design
of practical schemes exploiting the imperfections of communication channels. In particular,
the core of this dissertation focuses on wireless channels, whose specific nature is ideally
suited for the design of effective physical-layer security schemes.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we developed and analyzed a practical secure communication proto-
col for quasi-static wireless channels, which is based on secret-key agreement from common
randomness and opportunistically exploits the fluctuations of fading to allow the distilla-
tion of information theoretically secure keys. The protocol relies heavily on a specifically
designed message-passing algorithm for the reconciliation of continuous and non-binary ran-
dom variables, which exploits the ingredients of powerful error-control coding techniques,
such as soft and iterative decoding, to achieve performance close to the fundamental limits
imposed by information theory. Our analysis of the protocol showed that, in some instances,
a pragmatic yet practical secret-key agreement approach does not incur any penalty in terms
of secure rate.
Chapter 5 examined the interplay between cooperation requirements and security con-
straints, which is a particularly relevant issue in wireless communications. Cooperation has
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already been proven to be beneficial for reliability, but intuitively, the redundancy intro-
duced by relaying and cooperation schemes is likely to impair secrecy. To shed light on
this problem, we analyzed a tripartite relaying situation with secrecy constraints, and we
characterized the fundamental security compromise that a relay must accept if he desires to
help an adversarial node. Strikingly, our analysis showed that the notion of cooperation and
secrecy are not necessarily antagonistic. In particular, for Gaussian channels, we exhibited
relaying strategies that provide both increased reliability and improved security.
Chapter 6 built upon the insight on secret-key agreement schemes obtained from Chap-
ter 2, 3, and 4, to design an information-theoretically secure commitment primitive. Inter-
estingly, although bit commitment might seem totally unrelated to physical-layer security,
the tools developed for secure communication are equally useful for information-theoretic
commitment. We highlighted the innate connection between secret-key agreement and bit
commitment, which shed light on the design of practical schemes. Most notably, we showed
that pragmatic commitment protocols based on secret-key agreement incur no loss of opti-
mality and achieve the commitment capacity of discrete memoryless channels. Moreover,
such protocols easily generalize to operate over Gaussian channels.
Finally, our investigation of secure client-server-architectures in Chapter 7 led to several
interesting observations regarding the scope of applications of physical-layer security. Most
importantly, we showed that the transmission of packets at the network layer sometimes
admits to a natural erasure wiretap channel representation, which is in sharp contrast with
the analysis of secure communications at the physical layer, where the wiretap channel
model is usually introduced as an a priori model. This equivalent representation advocates
the use of wiretap codes at the upper layers of protocol stacks, to prevent attackers from
retrieving information based on a fraction of intercepted packets. Although the introduction
of coding across different packets requires a redefinition of the role of the network layer,
this idea is not dissimilar to the increasingly popular notion of network coding, which
calls for the replacement of routing mechanisms by coding techniques. Furthermore, we
emphasize that the use of wiretap channel models for packet-based communications seems
less restricting than for physical-layer communications over noisy channels. For instance,
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the attacker model adopted for our analysis of client-server architectures explicitly considers
active attacks on the network. Moreover, the parameters of the wiretap channel model used
to represent the network depend on the network characteristics; therefore, these parameters,
such as the secrecy capacity, can be used as optimization metrics to improve the robustness
and security of the network architecture.
8.2 Future Research
The work presented in this dissertation could be extended in many interesting directions.
• Design of practical wiretap codes. In this dissertation, we often circumvented the
problem of designing wiretap codes by using a pragmatic yet more practical secret-
key agreement approach; however, we point out that this simplification always came
at the cost of increased communication and protocol complexity. Therefore, finding
practical wiretap code constructions is still extremely relevant for practical purposes.
Research on the construction of practical wiretap codes has been mostly driven by
the insights provided by the early work of Wyner and Csiszár and Körner, but few
practical solutions have been proposed so far, and the issue of coding for the wiretap
channel should probably be addressed from a different perspective. For instance,
rather than trying to design codes achieving a certain level of information-theoretic
security, it would be useful to develop tools for analyzing the equivocation of a given
code over a fixed channel. The insights brought by this analysis should shed light on
the construction of finite-length codes with desirable security properties.
• Multi-user information-theoretic security. There are a number of challenging
problems in the area of multi-user information-theoretic security. Most of the current
work on information-theoretically secure communications is related to the wiretap
channel model, and little attention has been devoted to information-theoretic security
for networks. Generalizing the results obtained for secure point-to-point commu-
nications to secure network communications is all the more challenging as there is
currently no framework to draw on. The notions of feedback, cooperation, and trust,
are of paramount importance in multi-user scenarios and are not yet well understood.
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• Cryptographic primitives based on noisy channels. There are many theoretical
and practical issues that can be further explored regarding information-theoretically
secure primitives. First, the identification of the fundamental security limits of noisy
channels is still an largely open problem. Most of the work thus far has focused
on discrete channels and, in general, the methods developed do not extend to con-
tinuous channels. Second, the design of efficient practical schemes has seldom been
addressed, although this is of paramount importance to demonstrate the usefulness
of information-theoretic security. This problem is non-trivial since most theoretical
analysis rely on mathematical arguments that do not translate directly into practical
schemes. As discussed in Chapter 6, secret-key agreement techniques might be useful
for that purpose. Finally, it is essential to find convincing engineering applications for
these schemes. As an example, some of the aforementioned cryptographic primitives
could be tailored to cognitive radio protocols. In fact, in cognitive radio scenarios,
devices compete to use a shared medium and maximize bandwidth usage, and en-
suring that all players behave honestly and observe a fair behavior is a crucial issue.
Bandwidth allocation is often performed with bidding schemes, and bit commitment
protocols would be ideally suited to prevent devices from cheating and monopolizing
bandwidth.
• Cross-layer protocols for physical-layer security. Physical-layer security has
the potential of strengthening the security of communications by relaxing the as-
sumptions on the computational power of the eavesdropper; however, it relies on
other assumptions about the communication channels which may not be extremely
accurate in practice. In light of these considerations, it is likely that the implemen-
tation of physical-layer security in a real system will be part of a layered-approach,
and the design of protocols that combine traditional cryptographic techniques with
physical-layer techniques is an interesting research direction. A key part of this re-
search is the definition of relevant metrics that would make it possible to assess the
performance of these hybrid schemes.
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• Experimental validation. A crucial step towards establishing the validity of physical-
layer security is the demonstration of secure protocols in real-life situations; however,
with the notable exception of [82], experimental information-theoretic security has
been left relatively unexplored. A more exhaustive study of the hardware require-
ments for physical-layer security is required to assess the weaknesses of realistic sys-
tems. As is often the case in cryptography, practical devices inevitably present security




ACHIEVABLE RATE-EQUIVOCATION REGION OF BROADCAST
CHANNEL WITH CONFIDENTIAL MESSAGES
In this appendix, we provide and alternative proof for the result obtained in [6] by Csiszár
and Körner. Our proof is based on the notion of typical set decoding popularized by Cover
and Thomas. This approach has the advantage of being conceptually simpler than the
maximal code construction used by Csiszár and Körner and allows us to combine wiretap
codes with many other coding schemes, such as multiple-access schemes, relaying schemes,
etc.
We first introduce modified definitions of codes and achievable rates for the broadcast
channel with confidential messages, which ensure that message sets always contain an integer
number of messages.
Definition A.1. An (M0,M1, n) code for the broadcast channel with confidential messages
consists of the following.
• Two message sets M0 = {1, 2, . . . ,M0} and M1 = {1, 2, . . . ,M1}.
• An encoding function (possibly stochastic) fn : M0 × M1 → X n, which maps each
message pair (m0,m1) ∈ M0 ×M1 to a codeword xn ∈ X n.
• Two decoding functions gn : Yn → M0 × M1 and hn : Zn → M0, which map an
observation yn to a message pair (m̂0, m̂1) and an observation z
n to a message m̃0.
In the rest of this appendix, we denote the two messages sent by the transmitter by
random variables W0 and W1, the messages estimated by decoder gn by Ŵ0 and Ŵ1, and
the message estimated by decoder hn by W̃0.
Definition A.2. A rate triple (R0.R1, Re) is said to be achievable if, ∀ǫ > 0, there exists
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an (M0,M1, n) code such that
R0 − ǫ ≤
1
n
log2 M0 ≤ R0,
R1 − ǫ ≤
1
n
log2 M1 ≤ R1,
1
n
H(W1|Zn) − ǫ ≤ Re,
P[(W0,W1) 6= gn(Yn) or W0 6= fn(Zn)] ≤ ǫ.
The main technical difficulty in obtaining the region of achievable rates is the proof of
the following lemma.
Lemma A.1 ([6], Lemma 3). Let U , X, Y , and Z be random variables such that U → X →




R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,
R1 + R0 ≤ I(X;Y |U) + min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,
Re = I(X;Y |U) − I(X;Z|U) ≤ R1.
To show the achievability of rates in Lemma A.1, we shall consider the coding scheme





























Figure 49. Coding scheme for wiretap code construction.
The encoder consists of the concatenation of an outer code, which maps the message
pair (W0,W1) ∈ {1, . . . ,M0} × {1, . . . ,M1} to a message triple (V0, V1, V2) ∈ {1, . . . ,K0} ×
{1, . . . ,K1} × {1, . . . ,K2}, and an inner code, which maps the message triple (V0, V1, V2)
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into a codeword Xn for transmission over the broadcast channel. We shall design the inner
code to have the following properties.
1. Bob, observing the output Yn of the broadcast channel, recovers messages V0, V1,
and V2 with arbitrarily small probability of error;
2. Eve, observing the output Zn of the broadcast channel recovers message V0 with
arbitrarily small probability of error;
3. Charlie, a virtual receiver observing Zn and having access to V0 and V1, recovers V2
with arbitrarily small probability of error.
We point out that the third receiver Charlie is simply introduced to set a constraint on the
structure of the inner code. We shall see that this specific structure is essential to compute
the equivocation of Eve.
Fix 12 > ǫ > 0 and fix probability distributions pU (u) and pX|U (x|u). Let κ, δ and ǫ′ be
such that
0 < κ <
ǫ
20
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∃n0 ∈ N such that ∀n ≥ n0, one can find K0,K1,K2 ∈ N satisfying
min (I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)) − 2κ ≤ 1
n
log2 K0 ≤ min (I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)) − κ, (A.2)
I(X;Y |U ) − I(X;Z|U ) − 2κ ≤ 1
n
log2 K1 ≤ I(X;Y |U) − I(X;Z|U ) − κ, (A.3)
I(X;Z|U ) − 2κ ≤ 1
n
log2 K2 ≤ I(X;Z|U ) − κ. (A.4)
The above equations also imply
I(X;Y |U) − 4κ ≤ 1
n
log2 K1K2 ≤ I(X;Y |U ) − 2κ. (A.5)
1. Random inner code construction
Generate K0 sequences of length n independently at random in Un according to the dis-
tribution p (un) =
∏n
i=1 p(ui). Label the sequences U
n(i) with i ∈ {1, . . . ,K0}. For each
sequence Un(i), generate K1K2 sequences of length n independently at random in X n ac-
cording to the distribution p (xn|un) = ∏ni=1 pX|U (xi|ui). Label the sequences Xn(i, j, k)
with i ∈ {1, . . . ,K0}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,K1}, and k ∈ {1, . . . ,K2}.
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 Encoding procedure. It is assumed that messages V0, V1, and V2 are chosen at random
according to a uniform distribution in {1, . . . ,K0}, {1, . . . ,K1}, and {1, . . . ,K2}, respec-
tively. To transmit a message triple (V0, V1, V2), the encoder simply transmits the codeword
Xn(V0, V1, V2).















If there are none such tuple or more than one, an error is declared.






If there is none such codeword or more than one, an error is declared.










If there si none such message or more than one an error is declared.
2. Analysis of probability of error






Ẽ (i, j, k) =
{
(Un(i),Xn(i, j, k),Yn) ∈ A(n)δ
}
(A.7)
F (i, j, k) =
{








By symmetry of the random code construction, the average probability of error1 is inde-
pendent of the codeword send; therefore, we can assume without loss of generality that the
1The probability of error is averaged over all codewords and all codebooks generated according to pU (u)
and pX|U (x|u)
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codeword Xn(1, 1, 1) is sent and write the total probability of error as follows.
P
(n)













F c(1, 1, 1)
⋃
k 6=1





G(i)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent

 (A.10)




e ≤ P[Ec(1)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent] +
∑
i6=1
P[E(i)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent]
+ P
[







Ẽ(1, j, k)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent
]
+ P[F c(1, 1, 1)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent] +
∑
(j,k)6=(1,1)
P[F (1, 1, k)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent]
+ P[Gc(1)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent] +
∑
i6=1
P[G(i)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent]. (A.11)
By the joint AEP, ∃n1 ≥ n0 such that ∀n ≥ n1




















Now, for (i, j, k) 6= (1, 1, 1), the code generation process ensures that Xn(i, j, k) is in-
dependent of Xn(1, 1, 1) and Un(1). Since Yn and Zn are obtained by transmitting
Xn(1, 1, 1) over the broadcast channel, they are also independent of Xn(i, j, k) and Un(i)
for (i, j, k) 6= (1, 1, 1). Consequently,
∀i 6= 1 P[E(i)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent] = P
[








p (un) p (yn) . (A.16)
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Again, by the joint AEP, ∃n2 ≥ n1 such that ∀n ≥ n2
∀(un,yn) ∈ A(n)δ p (un) ≤ 2−n(H(U)−δ), p (yn) ≤ 2−n(H(Y )−δ),
and |A(n)δ (U, Y )| ≤ 2n(H(U,Y )+δ),
Therefore, substituting the above inequalities in Equation (A.16), we obtain
∀i 6= 1 P[E(i)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent] ≤ 2n(H(U,Y )−H(U)−H(Y )+4δ),
= 2−n(I(U ;Y )−3δ). (A.17)
Likewise, ∀(j, k) 6= (1, 1),
P
[












p (un) p (xn|un) p (yn|un) . (A.18)





p (un) ≤ 2−n(H(U)−δ),
p (xn|un) ≤ 2−n(H(X|U)−2δ),
p (yn|un) ≤ 2−n(H(Y |U)−2δ),
and |A(n)δ (U,X, Y )| ≤ 2n(H(U,X,Y )+δ),
Again, substituting these inequalities in Equation (A.18), we obtain
∀(j, k) 6= (1, 1) P
[
Ẽ(1, j, k)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent
]
≤ 2n(H(U,X,Y )−H(U)−H(X|U)−H(Y |U)+6δ)
= 2−n(I(X;Y |U)−6δ). (A.19)
Applying the same technique to the events F (1, 1, k) and G(i), we can show the existence
of n4 ≥ n3 such that ∀n ≥ n4
∀(j, k) 6= (1, 1) P[F (1, 1, k)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent] ≤ 2−n(I(X;Z|U)−6δ), (A.20)
∀i 6= 1 P[G(i)|Xn(1, 1, 1) sent] ≤ 2−n(I(U ;Z)−4δ). (A.21)
Finally, substituting Equations (A.12-A.15), (A.17), (A.19), (A.20) and (A.21) in the right-







−n(I(U ;Y )−4δ) + K1K22





+ 2−n(κ−4δ) + 2−n(2κ−6δ) + 2−n(κ−6δ) + 2−n(κ−4δ), (A.22)
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where the second inequality follows from Equations (A.2-A.4). Since κ > 6δ, ∃n5 ≥ n4 such




, 2−n(κ−6δ) ≤ ǫ
′
8








It is now standard procedure to argue that ∀n ≥ n5 there exists at least one specific code




3. Outer code construction
We are now ready to design the outer code. To ensure that the outer code does not increase
the probability of error, the following properties should be satisfied.
1. The mapping of (W0,W1) to (V0, V1, V2) is an injective function such that V0, V1, and
V2 are uniformly distributed in {1, . . . ,K0}, {1, . . . ,K1}, and {1, . . . ,K2}, respectively.
2. The outer decoders at Bob and Eve’s side are surjective functions.
We shall now consider the construction of the outer code in detail. Recall that the trans-
mission rate of messages W0 and W1 are denoted by R0 and R1, respectively.




0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,
I(X;Y |U ) − I(X;Z|U) ≤ R1 ≤ I(X;Y |U) .
Let 0 ≤ α ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] − 4κ and 0 ≤ β ≤ I(X;Z|U ) − 4κ. ∃n6 ≥ n5 such that
∀n ≥ n6 one can find L′0, L′′0 , L′2, L′′2 ∈ N satisfying
L′0L
′′





0 ≤ α + 2κ,
and L′2L
′′





2 ≤ β + 2κ.
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1) chosen uniformly at random in sets {1, . . . , L′0}
and {1, . . . ,K1} × {1, . . . , L′2}, respectively, Alice computes the indices






1 − 1)L′′2 + r2,
where r0, and r2 are chosen uniformly at random in sets {1, . . . , L′′0} and {1, . . . , L′′2}, re-
spectively. Then, she uses the code C∗inner identified earlier and transmits the codeword
xn(v0, v1, v2).
One can easily check that v0 and v2 are uniformly distributed in {1, . . . ,K0} and {1, . . . ,K2},
respectively, and it is obvious how to define surjective decoding functions. The concatena-
tion of this outer code with C∗inner achieves transmission rates





0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] − α − 2κ,
(A.23)





2 ≤ I(X;Y |U) − β − 2κ. (A.24)




0 ≤ R0 + R1 ≤ I(X;Y |U ) + min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)]
with R1 ≥ I(X;Y |U) .
Let 0 ≤ α ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] − 4κ and 0 ≤ β ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] − α − 6κ.
∃n7 ≥ n6 such that ∀n ≥ n7 one can find L′0, L′′0 , L′′′0 , L′′′′0 ∈ N satisfying
L′0L
′′















0 ≤ β + 2κ.






1 ) chosen uniformly at random in sets












where r0, is chosen uniformly at random in {1, . . . , L′′′′0 }. She then uses the code C∗inner
identified earlier and transmits the codeword
xn(v0, v1, v2),
Once again, one can check that v0 is uniformly distributed in {1, . . . ,K0}, and it is obvious
how to define surjective decoding functions. The concatenation of this outer code with
C∗inner achieves transmission rates





0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] − α − β − 3κ,
(A.25)





0K1K2 ≤ I(X;Y |U) + α − 2κ.
(A.26)
Combining Equations (A.23-A.24) and (A.25-A.26), it is clear that transmission rates




0 ≤ R0 + R1 ≤ I(X;Y |U) + min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,
0 ≤ R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,
R1 ≥ I(X;Y |U) − I(X;Z|U ) .
4. Analysis of equivocation
We shall now bound the equivocation H(W1|Zn) obtained with the concatenated coding
schemes described above. Using basic properties of the entropy, the equivocation can be
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bounded as follows.




n,Xn|V0) − H(Xn|W1, V0,Zn) − H(Zn|V0)
= H(Xn,W1|V0) + H(Zn|V0,W1,Xn) − H(Xn|W1, V0,Zn) − H(Zn|V0)
≥ H(Xn|V0) − H(Xn|W1, V0,Zn) − I(Xn;Zn|V0) , (A.27)
where the last inequality follow from the fact that (V0,W1) → Xn → Zn.









log2 K1K2 ≥ I(X;Y |U) − 4κ. (A.28)
Now, the two outer codes described above have been constructed such that W1 is uniquely














+ h (P[V2 6= g(V0, V1,Zn)]) , (A.31)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality and g is any function of V0, V1, and Z
n. In
particular, g could be the decoding function used by Charlie. Since Charlie’s probability of







Recall that by construction of the inner code, V0 uniquely determines U
n and vice-versa;









By the AEP, ∃n8 ≥ n7 such that ∀n ≥ n8




p (x, zn|un) ≤ 2−n(H(X,Z|U)−2δ),
p (xn|un) ≥ 2−n(H(X|U)+2δ),
p (zn|un) ≥ 2−n(H(Z|U)+2δ),
and P[J = 1] = P
[
(un,xn, zn) ∈ A(n)δ
]














I(Xn;J |Un) + 1
n
I(Xn;Zn|Un, J) , (A.36)
≤ 1
n
I(Xn;J |Un) + 1
n








+ I(X;Z|U ) + 6δ + δ log2 |X |, (A.38)
where (a) follows from the fact that
I(Xn;J |Un) ≤ H(J) ≤ 1,
I(Xn;Zn|Un, J = 0) ≤ H(Xn) ≤ n log2 |X |,
P[J = 0] ≤ δ and P[J = 1] ≤ 1.
Substituting the bounds obtained in Equations (A.28), (A.32), and (A.38) in Equation (A.27),
we obtain that ∀n ≥ n8
1
n
H(W1|Zn) ≥ I(X;Y |U) − I(X;Z|U ) − 4κ −
2
n
− h(ǫ′) − 6δ − δ log2 |X |. (A.39)
Using the bounds in Equation (A.1), it is clear that
1
n
H(W1|Zn) ≥ I(X;Y |U) − I(X;Z|U ) − ǫ. (A.40)
The equivocation rate Re ≥ I(X;Y |U)−I(X;Z|U ) is achievable, which concludes the proof
of Lemma A.1.
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For completeness, we provide the remaining of the proof leading to the characterization
of the full achievable region, but these last steps are identical to those provided in [6].
Lemma A.2 ([6], Lemma 4). If U , V , X, Y , and Z are random variables such that





R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min [I(V ;Y ) , I(V ;Z)] ,
Re = I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) ≤ R1.
Proof. Consider the discrete memoryless channel with transition probability pY Z|V (y, z|v),
obtained by concatenating a channel with transition probability pX|V (x|v) before the orig-
inal broadcast channel with transition probability pY Z|X (y, z|x) . The result follows by
applying Lemma A.1 to the new channel.







R0 ≤ min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,





Proof. First, since I(V ;Y |U)−I(V ;Z|U) is an achievable equivocation rate, the fact that all





















be rate tuples in R, achievable with
random variables U1 → V1 → X1 → Y1Z1 and U2 → V2 → X2 → Y2Z2, respectively. Let
J be a random variable independent of all others taking values 1 and 2 with probability p
and 1 − p, respectively, and define the time-shared random variables
U = UJ , V = VJ , X = XJ , Y = YJ , Z = ZJ . (A.42)
Then, by definition of conditional mutual information, we have
I(V ;Y |U) = pI(V1;Y1|U1) + (1 − p)I(V2;Y2|U2) (A.43)
I(V ;Z|U) = pI(V1;Z1|U1) + (1 − p)I(V2;Z2|U2) (A.44)
I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z|J) = pI(U1;Z1) + (1 − p)I(U2;Z2) , (A.45)
I(U ;Y ) ≥ I(U ;Z|J) = pI(U1;Z1) + (1 − p)I(U2;Z2) . (A.46)
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Therefore, using the definition of the achievable rates in R, we obtain
pR
(1)
0 + (1 − p)R
(2)
0 ≤ pI(U1;Y1) + (1 − p)I(U2;Y2) ≤ I(U ;Y ) , (A.47)
pR
(1)
0 + (1 − p)R
(2)
0 ≤ pI(U1;Z1) + (1 − p)I(U2;Z2) ≤ I(U ;Z) . (A.48)


















1 ) ≤ I(U ;Z) + I(V ;Y |U ) , (A.50)
pR(1)e + (1 − p)R(2)e ≤ I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) (A.51)
Therefore, the time-shared random variables are also in R which concludes the proof.







0 ≤ Re ≤ R1,
Re ≤ I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) ,
R1 + R0 ≤ I(V ;Y |U) + min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] ,





Proof. Clearly, R ⊂ C and the only difference between regions R and C are the rates R1
such that
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U ) .
Now let (R0, R1, Re) ∈ C and define
R∗1 = I(V ;Y |U) + min [I(U ;Y ) , I(U ;Z)] − R0,
R∗e = I(V ;Y |U) − I(V ;Z|U) .
Since R∗1 ≥ R∗e, the rate tuple (R0, R∗1, R∗e) ∈ R. By definition of R, the triples (R0, R∗e , R∗e),
(R0, R
∗
1, 0), and (R0, 0, 0) also belong to R. Recalling that R1 ≤ R∗1 and Re ≤ R∗e , the triple
(R0, R1, Re) is in the convex hull defined by the four triple above. Therefore R ⊂ C and
the proof is complete.
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APPENDIX B
THRESHOLDS OF ITERATIVELY DEMODULATED
CODED-MODULATION SCHEMES
In this appendix, we discuss the density evolution analysis of the algorithm described in
Chapter 3. For simplicity, we consider the application of the algorithm to coded modulation
schemes rater than reconciliation. We restrict our investigation to Bit-Interleaved Coded
Modulation (BICM) [42], which is commonly used to achieve good error-rate performance
and bandwidth efficiency over Gaussian channels. We recall that the good performance
of this techniques relies mainly on the use of powerful error-correcting component codes,
and LDPC codes have been proven to be especially useful for this purpose; however, to
achieve performance close to capacity, the edge degree distributions of the bipartite graphs
associated with the constituent code has to be carefully optimized.
In the particular case where the receiver does not iterate between the demapper and
the error correcting code, which is usually the case for BICM with gray mapping, the
optimization of asymptotically long codes can be performed exactly using density evolu-
tion [83]; however, in other situations, such as BICM with non-Gray mapping, iterations
result in significant improvement. Several optimization techniques based on EXtrinsic In-
formation Transfer (EXIT) charts have been proposed for those iteratively demodulated
schemes [84, 85, 86]. The major advantage of the EXIT chart approach is the reduction of
the initial code design problem to a less complex curve-fitting problem; however, despite
their effectiveness, these methods rely on the assumption that curve-fitting yields capacity-
approaching codes, which has only be proven for the binary erasure channel. Moreover,
EXIT chart analysis approximates the densities of messages propagated during the decod-
ing algorithm by symmetric Gaussian densities.
B.1 Coded Modulation with LDPC Codes
B.1.1 System Model
The density evolution algorithm presented here applies to any concatenation of demapper
and decoders (e.g. iterative MultiStage Decoding); however, for simplicity, we focus our
discussion on BICM schemes, see Figure 50. At the transceiver, k-bit messages m are
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encoded into n-bit codewords c = (c1, . . . , cn) by a single LDPC encoder. The bits of
each codeword are then grouped into sub-blocks of ℓ bits. Each sub-block is mapped to
one of 2ℓ complex-valued symbols x according to a predefined mapping. The set X of 2ℓ
symbols is called a constellation in the context of coded modulation. The symbol sequence
x is corrupted by additive white gaussian noise n with variance σ2 = N0/2 during the
transmission, and the receiver observes the sequence y = x + n. The demapper plays the
role of a metric computer, and outputs the intrinsic Log-Likelihood Ratios (LLRs) of each
bit ci. These LLRs depend not only on the observations y coming from the channel but
also on the extrinsic LLRs that may be available from a previous decoding attempt.
Mapperencoder demapper decoder m̂k
ynxncn
mk channel
Figure 50. Iteratively demodulated BICM scheme.
B.1.2 Message Passing Algorithm
The iterative demodulating and decoding algorithm considered here is a message passing




∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The graph is obtained by adding demapper nodes to the standard bipartite Tanner graph
of an LDPC code, see Figure 51. Contrary to the standard Sum-Product decoding algo-
rithm [87], where the intrinsic information available at each variable node is fixed during
the decoding process, the introduction of demapper nodes allows this information to be
updated at a later stage.
We use the following notations to describe the message passing algorithm.
• N (i) (M(j)) denotes the set of indices of check (variable) nodes connected to a variable
node i (check node j),
• O(i) denotes the set of indices of variable nodes connected to the same demapper
node as the variable node i,



















Figure 51. Example of extended Tanner Graph including demapper nodes.
• if x is a symbol in the constellation X , then xk denotes its kth label bit,
• messages are defined as shown in Figure 51.
The message passing algorithm presented in Chapter 3 can then be rewritten as follows.
 Initialization. Initialize all message to zero.






ji = 0. (B.1)
 Iterations. For 1 ≤ l ≤ lmax




































3. check-to variable-message update
u
(l)





































+1 if x ≥ 0
−1 if x < 0
Notice that the scheduling of the message-passing algorithm assumes that the messages
o
(ℓ)
i are calculated at every iteration. In practice, for large constellations, the computation
of o(ℓ) according to Equation (B.2) quickly becomes prohibitive, and it is computationally
more efficient to perform this update less often.
B.2 Density Evolution and Threshold Computation
The principle of density evolution is to analyze the performance of the message-passing
algorithm by tracking the probability densities of the messages computed at each itera-
tion. When the underlying channel is symmetric, the probability densities of messages are
codeword-independent [48], and it is sufficient to analyze the transmission of the all-zero
codeword. However, as we illustrate in Figure 52, the underlying channel in a BICM scheme
is clearly asymmetric when there are more than two symbols in a constellation, and the den-
sities depend on the codeword sent. Notice that the shape of the curves shown above also
questions the Gaussian assumption used in EXIT chart approaches. To circumvent this
problem, one can either track the messages densities averaged over the LDPC code and
its cosets [88], or averaged over all valid codewords [89]. The former approach is easier to
analyze, but, in practice, we are interested in the behavior of linear codes only and there
is no guarantee that the results averaged over all coset codes are still relevant for linear
codes, in general; therefore, we consider the latter approach and average the densities over
all possible codewords.
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Figure 52. Probability densities of messages at the output of the demapper, for a 4-PAM
constellation with Gray mapping and noise variance σ2 = 0.016.
B.2.1 Density Evolution










where λi and ρi represent the fraction of edges connected to degree-i variable and check
nodes, respectively.
The probability of decoding error during the ℓth iteration is analyzed by considering the
message v(ℓ+1) flowing from a variable node to a check node during the ℓth iteration. The
ensemble of node and edges contributing to v(ℓ+1) forms a message flow neighborhood of
depth ℓ. Figure 53 represents a message flow of depth 1, and a neighborhood of depth ℓ can
be constructed by branching several of these elementary neighborhoods. It should be noted
that a neighborhood of depth ℓ depends on the input sequence, since from Equation (B.2)
the message sent by a demapper node depends on the value of its connected bits. Hence,











Figure 53. Demapping neighborhood of depth 1.
Assuming that the value of the variable node at the root of the message flow neighbor-




O (x), and f
(ℓ)
E (x) be the respective
densities of the messages v(ℓ), u(ℓ), o(ℓ) and e(ℓ), averaged over all valid codewords such that
the value of the variable node at the root of the neighborhood is x, .
Under the assumption that the message flow neighborhood is perfectly projected (see [89]
for a formal definition), it is possible to show that the density f
(ℓ+1)
V (x) is obtained by
evolving f
(ℓ)
V (x) as follows. At the root variable node,
f
(ℓ+1)























where ⊗ denotes the convolution operator on probability density functions. Note that this
operation can be computed efficiently using Fourier transforms. The closed-form expression
of the evolution through a check node requires a change of measure (see [89][Equation 15]),



























This evolution can be calculated with a look-up table, as discussed in Section B.4. The
evolution of the density through the demapper can likewise be written as
f
(ℓ)









In general, there exists no closed-form expression for Ed, and the numerical evaluation must
be done via Monte-Carlo simulations of the demapping function given by Equation (B.2).
More precisely, the ℓ-th density evolution through the demapper is performed as follows.
We first generate nb bits ci uniformly at random, which are then mapped to ns symbols and





E (ci). Using these values, we compute the nb outputs o
(ℓ)
i of the demapper for each bit ci.
The output density f
(ℓ)
O (x) (x ∈ {0, 1}) is finally obtained by reconstructing the histogram
of the values o
(ℓ)
i for which ci = x. The number of bits nb used in the simulation has to be
carefully chosen, since a bad estimation of the density f
(ℓ)
O (x) may lead to an overestimation
of the true threshold. These numerical issues are discussed in Section B.3.1.
Finally f
(ℓ)




















Notice that, in the equation above, the averaging is performed from a node perspective and
not from an edge perspective.
B.2.2 Concentration and Threshold
The key result justifying the validity of the density evolution algorithm is the fact that, if
the message bits m are independent and uniformly distributed, then, for almost all graphs
with given edge degree distributions λ(x) and ρ(x), the decoder behaves close to its expected
behavior. The derivation of this results follows directly from the proof of [89][Section IV],
and will be omitted.
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Table 4. Mappings of 4-PAM constellation
Symbol -1.34 -0.45 0.45 1.34
Natural 0 0 1 1
mapping 0 1 0 1
Gray 0 0 1 1
mapping 0 1 1 0
Antigray 0 1 1 0
mapping 0 1 0 1
It can be shown that the probability of decoding error concentrates around the value
p
(ℓ)
















The threshold σ∗ of the iteratively demodulated coded modulation scheme is defined as
the supremum of all noise standard deviations such that
lim
ℓ→∞
p(ℓ)e = 0. (B.11)
As a consequence of the concentration theorem, if we can find σ∗ then almost all input
sequence will be decoded reliably if the noise is such that σ < σ∗
B.3 Simulation Results
B.3.1 Iterative and Non-Iterative Thresholds
In this section, we apply density evolution to analyze BICM coded modulation with 4-PAM
constellations and rate-0.5 codes. We consider two different LDPC codes; the first code is
a regular LDPC code with degree distributions
λ(x) = x2 and ρ(x) = x5,
whereas the second code is an irregular LDPC codes with degree distributions
λ(x) = 0.251828x + 0.211152x2 + 0.537020x9,
and ρ(x) = x7.
The 4-PAM constellation contains 4 symbols with amplitudes {−1.34,−0.45, 0.45, 1.34},
and the various mappings used in our simulations are shown in Table 4.
All simulations are performed using a 8-bit discretized density evolution, with 28 − 1
quantization bins spanning the range [−25; 25] uniformly. We allow at most 1000 decoding
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Table 5. Thresholds of 4-PAM iterative BICM scheme with regular code.
Mapping Non-Iter. threshold Iter. threshold
Natural 4.78 dB 3.41 dB
Gray 3.41 dB 3.34 dB
Anti-Gray 6.08 dB 4.39 dB
Table 6. Thresholds of 4-PAM iterative BICM scheme with irregular code.
Mapping Non-Iter. threshold Iter. threshold
Natural 4.25 dB 3.69 dB
Gray 2.80 dB 2.77 dB
Anti-Gray 5.62 dB 4.95 dB
iterations, and densities are evolved until the probability of error falls below 10−6 or until
a fixed point is reached. The number nb of realizations used in Monte-Carlo simulation for
the evolution of densities through demappers is ns × 5 106, which turns out to be sufficient
to reconstruct the histograms of f
(ℓ)
O (0) and f
(ℓ)
O (1) accurately. The thresholds obtained
with our algorithm are presented in Table 5 and 6.
As expected, Gray mapping yields the best thresholds and, in this case, negligible gain
is obtained by performing iterations between the demapper and decoder. Notice that the
best threshold of 2.77 dB obtained with the irregular code is less than 0.5 dB away from
the parallel independent decoding capacity (2.27 dB) of the channel, which is the ultimate
performance of the BICM scheme. For all other mappings, iterations lead to more significant
improvements of the thresholds, although better results could be expected by using codes
specifically optimized for each scheme. This will be briefly discussed in section B.3.2.
In order to validate the threshold calculations, we simulated the 4-PAM iterative BICM
scheme for LDPC codes of size 500,000. The codes were randomly generated by avoiding
cycles of length 2 and 4. In order to speed up the decoding, we limited the number of
iterations of the LDPC code to 100, and the number of iterations between the decoder
and the demapper to 10. As shown in Figure 54 and Figure 55, the thresholds previously
obtained accurately predict the performance of a BICM scheme with long LDPC codes.
B.3.2 Optimization Results
As mentioned earlier, given a fixed modulation scheme, one can optimize the degree dis-
tribution of an LDPC code in order to obtain the best possible threshold. However, the
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Figure 54. Simulation of 4-PAM BICM scheme with regular code.
Figure 55. Simulation of 4-PAM BICM scheme with irregular code.
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threshold is not a linear function of the edge degree distributions, which makes it impossible
to apply well-know fast optimization techniques. Following [87], we used the Differential
Evolution (DE) optimization method. DE is a mixture of a genetic algorithm and a hill-
climbing optimization, and has been proven to be quite effective for solving real-valued
non-linear problems.
We applied DE to maximize the threshold of the anti-Gray 4-PAM BICM scheme at
a spectral efficiency of 1 bit/symbol. In order to limit the search space, we limited our
optimization to variable node degree distributions with maximum degree 10, and three non-
zero elements (degrees 2,3 and 10). We also restricted the check node degree distribution
to be concentrated. One good degree distribution found was:
λ(x) = 0.307274x + 0.400869x2 + 0.291857x9
ρ(x) = 0.645361x5 + 0.354639x6.
The thresholds obtained are given in Table 7 and compared against the results of the
irregular code of the previous section.
Table 7. Thresholds of 4-PAM anti-Gray BICM.
Optimized code BPSK-AWGN code
Iterative threshold 4.05 dB 4.95 dB
Non iter. threshold 5.77 dB 5.62 dB
Clearly, the optimized code outperforms the previous code, which confirms the impor-
tance of specific code optimization for iterative receivers.
B.4 Discretized density evolution
In this section, we briefly describe the discretized density evolution algorithm used to com-
pute thresholds. Densities are evolved through variable nodes by using discrete Fourier
transforms [90]. However, the evolution through the check nodes (according to [89][Equation
15]) requires an averaging over all possible values of the bits involved in the parity-check
equation. This can be computed efficiently by performing a change of measure, however,
we use a different technique in our simulations.
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Following [90], we define the operator R as












where Q is the quantizer used for the discretized density evolution. If a and b have densi-
ties pa and pb, respectively, we abuse notations and write R(pa, pb) to denote the density
of R(a, b). Also, the kth fold calculation of R R(pa, . . . ,R(pa,R(pa, pa))) is denoted by
Rk(pa). R is efficiently calculated with a look-up table.
The evolution of the input densities f
(ℓ)
V (0) and f
(ℓ)
V (1) through the check node of degree























































Clearly, this operation becomes fairly complex as the maximum degree of check nodes
increases, but is perfectly tractable for degrees less than 20.
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